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Abstract 
Plato appears to have used the genre of the philosophical dialogue in a unique way. 
It could be interpreted as philosophy with dramatic elements, or drama with 
philosophical arguments, or possibly a mixture of both. This has made it difficult for 
scholars to gain a clear understanding of Plato and his dialogues. 
To date, little attention has been paid by commentators to the dramatic and literary 
aspects of Republic Books II to X. This study has been inspired by the recent 
debates concerning the dramatic and literary aspects of Plato's dialogues and 
especially the debates concerning the connections between the philosophical, 
dramatic and literary aspects of these works. It attempts to add to the scholarship to 
date by carrying out a detailed investigation of the Republic as a whole, rather than 
focusing primarily on Book I. 
This enquiry considers the philosophical and dramatic role of the respondents and 
Socrates in the Republic. Particular attention is paid to the theme of uncertainty and 
problematising which runs through the dialogue in the different methods of enquiry 
adopted by Socrates and the respondents. 
The examples considered of the input from the respondents, especially 
Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, together with Socrates' reaction to these, 
alert the reader to some important connections between the philosophical and 
dramatic aspects of the Republic. These connections would not become evident 
from a study of the work from a purely philosophical or literary perspective. They 
help the reader to gain a broader understanding of the work as a whole and what 
message or messages Plato may have been trying to convey. They also suggest 
the need for caution in selecting a particular interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. 
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Introduction 
Historical context 
- Focus of this study 
Plato appears to have used the genre of the philosophical dialogue in a unique way.l 
It could be interpreted as philosophy with dramatic elements, or drama with 
philosophical arguments, or possibly a mixture of both. This has made it difficult for 
scholars to gain a clear understanding of Plato and his dialogues. Indeed Aristotle, in 
his Poetics (2, 1447b11), notes the difficulty of categorising the style of presentation 
adopted by the writers of Socratic dialogues, including Plato. Plato's style of 
presentation makes it difficult to determine what message he seeks to convey in his 
works, or according to some, whether he intended to put forward a message at all. It 
is interesting to compare Plato's style of presentation with that of Aristotle his pupil. 
The philosophical works of Aristotle are written in thesis style without any dramatic 
elements.2 Although both of these philosophers strongly influenced the western 
philosophers that came after them, it is Aristotle's style of presentation that is most 
frequently adopted by present-day philosophers. 
To date, little attention has been paid by commentators to the dramatic and literary 
aspects of Republic Books II to X.3 This is because they have not considered 
Republic Book II onwards, to be of much significance from a dramatic and literary 
perspective, particularly in relation to the role of the respondents in the dialogue as 
opposed to Book I and earlier works. This study has been inspired by the recent 
debates concerning the dramatic and literary aspects of Plato's dialogues and 
especially the debates concerning the connections between the philosophical, 
dramatic and literary aspects of these works. It has been prompted, in particular, by 
1 There are other examples of philosophical dialogues by Berkeley, Cicero, Hume, Lucian and 
Xenophon. However, these are less dramatic in style than the dialogues of Plato. 
2 Examples of these include Aristotle's Ethics and Poetics. 
3 There are exceptions to this which include Yunis (2007, pp. 1-26) who considerers the protreptic 
role of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic and Kahn (1993, pp. 131-142) who alerts the 
reader to some literary, dramatic and philosophical connections between Books I, II, III and IV and 
later Books of the Republic. Also, Rutherford (1995, pp. 206-240) looks at the Republic overall in 
his chapter on the Republic. Von Reden and Goldhill (1999, pp. 257-289) consider the story of 
Leontius in Republic Book IV, 43ge-440a, together with examples from other works of Plato, in 
relation to the performance of dialogue. Tarrant (1955, pp. 82-89) considers the dramatic elements 
of the Republic as a whole, along with other dialogues of Plato. 
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Beversluis' and Blondell's recent works which focus on Socrates and the respondents 
in the dialogues of Plato.4 It attempts to add to the scholarship to date by carrying out 
a detailed investigation of the Republic as a whole, rather than focusing primarily on 
Book I. 
This enqUiry considers the Republicfrom a philosophical, dramatic and literary 
perspective. It pays particular attention to the connections between these aspects of 
the Republic and what they reveal about Plato's intention in writing this dialogue. This 
study looks at the overall role of the respondents in the Republic, together with the 
role of Socrates. 
Background 
- Pre-Socratlcs, sophists and mime 
It is worth considering whether any previous or contemporary sources reveal any 
possible influences on Plato's style of writing. There were many early Greek 
philosophers, known as pre-Socratics, who came before Socrates and Plato. 
However, only fragments of their works have survived. Notable examples of these 
include Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno.5 Socrates did not produce any written 
works. Plato is the first Greek philosopher whose works have survived in complete 
format. The fragments that have survived from the pre-Socratics are expository rather 
than conversational and they do not appear to have provided a model for the 
dialogue format adopted by Plato in his works. 
The sophists, who were highly influential during Plato's lifetime, feature strongly in a 
number of his dialogues. However, Plato's portrayal of sophists such as Protagoras 
and Gorgias emphasises their uneasiness with the dialectical method and their 
preference to make long speeches. Also, the surviving fragments of their work 
support this picture. 
4 Beversluis 2000 and Blondell 2002. 
5 Barnes (1987) provides a useful study of the early Greek philosophers. 
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- Greek drama 
Plato's dialogues appear to share some common features with Greek drama. The 
Platonic dialogue reads like a performance, similar to that of a play, with characters 
interacting with one another in the dialogue form. Furthermore, in the dialogues, the 
characters of Socrates and the respondents are often brought out strongly and there is 
a display of tension between the different characters, as in Greek comedy and Greek 
tragedy. This is especially the case with some of the early and middle dialogues of 
Plato, for example, Euthydemu5, Laches, Gorgias, Protagoras and Symposium.6 In 
the Platonic dialogues there is often an audience in the background similar to that of 
Greek drama where the audience is referred to from time to time. Also, the theme of 
morality is a major focus of both Greek tragedy and the dialogues of Plato.7 However, 
Socrates is essentially not a tragic figure because whatever happens to him he is 
persistent in regarding himself as morally justified in what he is doing. 
Nevertheless, there are important differences between Plato's dialogues and Greek 
tragedy. In Greek tragedy, there is often a display of moral conflict between the 
characters as they seek to find a solution to the issue which is being acted out. This 
conflict can only be resolved through persuasion. However, during the course of the 
play, it is not always possible to find a resolution. Sometimes it requires drastic 
measures to be taken in order to resolve the problem. In Plato's dialogues, Socrates 
and the respondents are seeking to find an answer to the question under discussion. 
For example, they may seek to establish the nature of courage or justice. Although, 
the aim is not always fulfilled, the reader is left with the impression that there is an 
answer to the question under discussion and with further enquiry Socrates and the 
respondents will eventually find the answer and this is their stated purpose. 
Another difference between Plato's dialogues and Greek drama is the depiction of 
Socrates in these works. In the dialogues of Plato, the character Socrates is generally 
6 Examples of this include Protagoras, 315b, where Socrates describes Protagoras walking in 
procession with his followers and Euthydemus, 276b-c, where Socrates describes the followers of 
Dionysodorus and Euthydemus as acting like a chorus. I use the terms early and middle dialogues 
with caution as the chronological order of Plato's works is a much debated issue among scholars, 
which is beyond the scope of this study. Commentators generally consider the Republic to fall 
within Plato's middle period of writing, with the exception of Book I, which appears to be stylistically 
early in its composition but not historically so. Nevertheless, whatever its origins, Book I does 
appear to be an integral part of the Republic. 
7 An example is The Oresteian Trilogy by Aeschylus. In this trilogy, there is a focus on the question 
of justice with the murder of Agamemnon by his wife and her subsequent punishment. 
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depicted in a good light with some ironic and comic features. By contrast, the character 
Socrates as depicted in The Clouds by Aristophanes is a figure of ridicule. Also, in 
Plato's dialogues the character Socrates tends to dominate the enquiry unlike the 
characters in Greek drama, and he is often the narrator 'presenting' the dialogue. 
Importantly, the reader needs to bear in mind that, like the authors of Greek drama, 
Plato is controlling all the action in the dialogues, rather than the characters that feature in 
these works. It is also notable that Plato puts forward a detailed criticism of poetry and 
drama (Republic Book III, 376c-398b). Here, Socrates argues that poetry and drama 
would have a negative impact on the education of the guardians in the ideal state and 
he proposes that it should be censored. As the Republic makes clear, for Plato, most 
drama appeals to the emotions rather than the intellect and is concerned with the 
projection of images of undesirable feelings and attitudes.s 
Indeed, Plato's criticism of poetry and drama in Republic Books III and X, leaves the 
reader somewhat confused about Plato's view concerning poetry and drama. This is 
because many of Plato's dialogues are highly dramatic and Plato makes numerous 
references to poetry and drama in his works. However, as noted above, there are 
some significant differences between Plato's dialogues and Greek drama. A key 
difference is the use to which Plato puts drama: search for the 'truth' as opposed to 
presentation of what he would consider to be harmful emotions. 
- The Socratic 10go1 
Plato was not the only writer on philosophical themes whose works were influenced 
by and featured the character Socrates.9 In addition to Plato, there were three other 
major writers of Socratic style literature, which is known as Socratic logo;, whose works 
have survived. These include Antisthenes and Aeschines, who were earlier than 
Plato. They also include Xenophon who was a contemporary of Plato. Importantly, 
the writers of Socratic logo; adopted this style of writing in order to defend the 
character of Socrates and also for their own individual purposes. They all reproduced 
what purported to be conversations with the historical Socrates. 
8 In Republic Books 1\ and 1\1 Plato does theoretically allow drama of ethically acceptable content-
presumably his own. However, in Book X, part 1, Plato appears to rule out all drama in the ideal 
state. This is an unresolved controversy. 
9 Clay (1994, pp. 23-47) provides a useful account of the origins of the Socratic dialogue. 
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Interesting comparisons can be drawn between the Socratic logoi of Xenophon and 
Plato. These two writers produced a significant number of Socratic dialogues, some 
of which shared the same title, including Apologyand Symposium.10 In their Socratic 
dialogues, they both give a defence of the character of the historical Socrates. In 
these works, the character Socrates is popular and respected. Socrates is also 
depicted as gifted in conversation and very much in control of the discussion. 
However, there are some notable differences between the Socratic dialogues of 
Plato and Xenophon.11 In the Socratic dialogues of Plato, there is considerable variety 
in the depiction of the character of Socrates. For example, in Plato's Gorgias and 
Protagoras, the character of Socrates appears to be much more confident than the 
Socrates of the Laches. There is much less variety in the depiction of Socrates in the 
Socratic dialogues of Xenophon. In the early Books of Xenophon's Memorabilia, the 
exchanges between Socrates and the other characters are short. In Book IV of the 
Memorabilia, Socrates is more like the Platonic depiction of Socrates, engaged in 
lengthier discussions. However, the discussions in Book IV of the Memorabilia are 
still considerably shorter than the Socratic dialogues of Plato. Other important 
differences include the highly dramatic aspects of the interaction between Socrates 
and the respondents in Plato's Socratic dialogues and his use of stories, images and 
myth in works such as Phaedo, Protagoras, Gorgias and Republic and Plato uses the 
elenchus more consistently. 
There is a useful example in Xenophon's Memorabilia, IV, II, 1-40, which alerts the 
reader to some of the differences between the approaches taken by Xenophon and 
Plato in their Socratic dialogues. In this passage, Socrates and Euthydemus enquire 
into how one gains wisdom. During the course of the discussion it becomes apparent 
that, contrary to his earlier belief, Euthydemus does not possess wisdom. As in the 
Socratic dialogues of Plato, Socrates takes the lead in the enquiry with the respondent 
following his lead. However, unlike the works of Plato, Xenophon does not put any 
significant emphasis on the character of Socrates or the respondent. Also, 
Xenophon's respondent does not display any resistance to Socrates in the enqUiry. 
10 Bartlett (2006) provides a useful translation with interpretative essays on Xenophon's shorter 
Socratic writings. 
11 Rutherford (1995, pp. 46-56) provides a helpful comparison of the Socratic dialogues of Plato 
and Xenophon. 
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Indeed, the reader is left with the impression that a meaningful dialogue has not really 
taken place between Socrates and the respondent. 
At the end of the enquiry into wisdom in Memorabilia, Euthydemus admits to being 
stupid and he departs feeling dejected and disgusted with himself (IV, 11,39). This 
can be compared with Plato's Gorgias where the last respondent, Callicles, ends up 
being defeated but defiant. Another example is at the end of Book I of Plato's 
Republic, where Thrasymachus displays anger at the end of his encounter with 
Socrates and Socrates expresses disappointment at not finding an answer to the 
question under consideration. It is notable that Plato, unlike Xenophon, uses the 
Socratic dialogue to raise problems associated with the Socratic style of enquiry, in 
particular, that it does not provide an answer to the question under discussion. Plato 
also uses the character of the respondent to bring out messages concerning the 
enquiry. An example of this is the suitability or otherwise of the respondent to 
partake in the enquiry. 
In the middle and later works of Plato, the role of the character Socrates changes with 
the introduction of positive philosophical theories. In a number of Plato's dialogues, 
Socrates acts as the narrator, for example in the Republic. This is not a feature of the 
dialogues of Xenophon. Another important difference is that Plato introduced the 
historical setting into his dialogues, a literary device that was new to the Socratic /090i.12 
Significantly, Xenophon's works were not confined to Socratic /ogoi. He also wrote in 
other genres, for example, historical literature. However, Plato adopted the dialogue 
form in all his works except the Apology. 
So, while some possible influences can be traced, the dramatic element in Plato's 
dialogues appears to be uniquely developed with no predecessors or successors. 
12 Clay (1994, pp. 43-46) considers Plato's introduction of the historical setting to the Socratic logoi. 
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Where this study Is situated In the development of scholarship on the 
subject 
Until comparatively recently, the main focus of Platonic scholarship was the 
philosophical content of the dialogues. This remains a major focus of the work of 
recent scholarship. Some notable examples of this emphasis include Irwin, Vlastos 
and Reeve.13 Other commentators include Cross and Woozley, Annas and Mitchell 
and LucaS.14 There are many collections of articles and critical essays on the Republic 
and the works of Plato, which concentrate primarily on philosophical aspects. Some 
recent examples of these have been edited by Fine, Kraut and Santas.15 
Irwin, in Plato's Ethics, gives detailed consideration to the ethical theories advanced in 
a number of the earlier, middle and later dialogues of Plato. In the first half of his book, 
Irwin focuses his attention on some of the earlier dialogues including Charmides, 
Euthydemus, Gorgias, Laches, Mena and Protagaras. In the second half of the book, 
he examines some of the middle and later dialogues. In this section, Irwin devotes 
most of his attention to the Republic. But, he also looks at the Laws, Phaedrus, 
Philebus and Symposium. 
In his book, Irwin provides the reader with a helpful and thorough examination and 
interpretation of the key ethical theories outlined in the dialogues of Plato. The range 
of dialogues that he covers from the earlier, middle and later works of Plato helps the 
reader to appreciate the theories advanced in these works and the different methods 
of enquiry adopted by Socrates and the respondents. 
13 Irwin (1995) which includes a helpful and detailed account of the philosophical theories outlined 
in the ten books of the Republic. Vlastos (1995) gives a useful account of the elenchus method of 
enquiry as adopted by Socrates in the early and middle works of Plato. Reeve (2006) offers a 
detailed study of the arguments in the Republic. All three of these commentators make a clear 
distinction between the philosophy of the historical Socrates and the philosophy of Plato. It is 
worth noting that although these commentators focus primarily on the philosophical arguments in 
the dialogues of Plato, they also have some interest in the literary aspects of these works, 
especially Reeve. 
14 Cross and Woozley (1964) provide a useful philosophical commentary on the Republic. Annas 
(1981) offers a detailed study of the philosophical theories outlined in the Republic. Mitchell and 
Lucas (2003) also provide a useful account of the philosophical theories of the Republic. Sayers 
(2002) and Pappas (1996) provide helpful introductions to the philosophical aspects of the 
Republic. 
15 Fine (1999) provides an interesting selection of articles focusing on ethical, political and religious 
aspects of some of the works of Plato, including the Republic. This is one of a pair of volumes 
edited by Fine. Kraut (1997) offers a set of in-depth critical essays on Plato's Republic covering a 
wide range of philosophical issues. Santas (2006) provides a selection of essays on philosophical 
aspects of the Republic, some of which focus on literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogue. 
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It is notable that, in Plato's Ethics, Irwin focuses his attention on the philosophical 
content of the dialogues without giving consideration to the literary and dramatic 
aspects of these works. This is intentional and it ignores the point that many of the 
dialogues are highly dramatic in style. Also, Irwin appears to work on the assumption 
that the philosophical arguments put forward in the Republic and the other middle and 
later period dialogues are those of Plato, as opposed to the earlier dialogues which 
are thought to be representative of the philosophy of Socrates. This is despite the 
fact that Plato does not feature in any of the dialogues. 
Drawing on scholarship from the second half of the last century and in particular the last 
thirty years, alongside the philosophical approach as discussed above, there has 
been a growing interest in the literary, dramatic and cultural aspects of Plato's 
dialogues. This has covered a wide range of issues including consideration of the 
connections between the philosophical and dramatic aspects of the dialogues. Much 
of this scholarship has focused on some of the more dramatic early and middle works 
of Plato including Laches, Meno, Protagoras, Phaedo, Gorgias and Symposium. It 
has also included examination of the highly dramatic Book 1 of the Republic. 
Examples of recent works published in this area include Beversluis, Blondell, 
Rutherford and Yunis. 16 
There has also been an increase in the number of articles and essays that focus upon 
the literary, dramatic and cultural aspects of the dialogues of Plato.17 A considerable 
amount of this scholarship has focused on specific questions and issues relating to 
Plato and his dialogues. An important example of this is the collection of articles 
edited by Klagge and Smith.18 Other notable examples have been provided by 
Press.19 
Significantly, the increased interest among scholars in the literary and dramatic aspects 
of the dialogues of Plato has resulted in some tension being displayed between the 
16 Beversluis (2000), Blondell (2002), Rutherford (1995) and Yunis (2007). 
17 Examples of these include Emlyn-Jones (1999, pp. 123-138 and 2004, pp. 389-405), Johnson 
(1998, pp. 577-598), and Von Blackenhagen (1992, pp. 51- 68). 
18 Klagge and Smith (1992) provide a useful set of articles which focus on the various methods of 
interpreting Plato and his dialogues. 
19 Press (1993) provides an interesting selection of essays on interpreting Plato's dialogues. Press 
(2000) offers a collection of critical essays on the question of who speaks for Plato. 
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various scholars who take different approaches in interpreting these works, both 
philosophical and literary. 
John Beversluis, in Cross Examining Socrates, gives a thorough investigation into 
nine of Plato's earlier and middle dialogues. He concentrates on the respondents in 
these dialogues of Plato:!) In his book, Beversluis gives detailed consideration to the 
exchanges between Socrates and the respondents in these works, including a study 
of the role of Cephal us, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Republic Book I. Like 
Irwin, Beversluis considers the character Socrates who features in the earlier dialogues 
to be representative of the historical Socrates and the character Socrates in the middle 
and later works to be representative of the views of Plato. Beversluis gives a strong 
defence of the respondents who feature in these works. He accuses the character 
Socrates of manipulating the views of the respondents and being more concerned 
with winning arguments than seeking to improve the respondents. 
I welcome the importance that Beversluis places on the role of the respondents in the 
dialogues of Plato that he investigates. His detailed study of the role of Cephal us, 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Republic Book I is particularly useful for my study. 
Nevertheless, it is disappointing that Beversluis does not consider the role of the 
respondents after Book I of the Republic. In my view, the respondents Glaucon and 
Adeimantus play an important role, philosophically and dramatically, in the course of 
the enquiry in the remaining books of the Republic. This is examined in detail in my 
study. 
Unlike Beversluis, my enquiry examines the role of the respondents in the whole of 
the Republic, together with the role of Socrates. An advantage of this approach is 
that it can include an investigation into whether there are connections between Book I 
and the remaining Books of the Republic. An example of this, is the role of 
Thrasymachus in the dialogue overall. Although Thrasymachus does not play an 
active role from Book II onwards, his input in Book I has a significant influence on the 
remaining enquiry in the dialogue and in particular Book II. Another advantage of 
investigating the role of the respondents in the Republic overall, is that it can help the 
reader to gain a fuller appreciation of what Plato sought to demonstrate in Book I, and 
the rest of the dialogue and why a change of approach is taken from Book II onwards. 
20 Beversluis 2000. 
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In addition to considering the role of Socrates and the respondents in Republic Book I 
and the other dialogues, Beversluis could have considered what Plato was hoping to 
achieve by including these exchanges in these works. Indeed, some commentators 
have criticised Beversluis for focusing too much attention on the interchanges between 
Socrates and the respondents and failing to consider what Plato's intention may have 
been in presenting these exchanges.21 Beversluis seems to be too highly critical of 
Socrates' handling of the respondents in the dialogue. Some commentators have 
criticised Beversluis for this approach and have argued that Beversluis fails in his 
attempt to demonstrate that Socrates mishandles the respondents.22 The above 
criticisms of Beversluis' account suggest that there may be more to learn from the role 
of the respondents and Socrates in the dialogues of Plato, including the Republic 
Books II to x. 
Blondell, in The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, provides a detailed and useful 
study of the literary aspects of a number of the dialogues of Plato with a focus on the 
play of character.2l Her enquiry includes a discussion on the Republic, where she 
pays particular attention to Book I. Blondell considers the character of Socrates and 
the other respondents in the dialogues to be literary devices that should not be taken 
to be representative of the views of Plato. 
This assumption has been challenged by some commentators. In particular, it has 
been asserted by some that although we cannot assume that the character Socrates 
and the respondents are speaking directly on behalf of Plato, we can take the overall 
messages coming out of the dialogues to be representative of the view of Plato. 
Indeed it is argued by some that the dialogues are dramatic treatises in which Plato 
seeks to persuade the reader of his philosophical positions.24 
In response to this, I would suggest that the attempt to interpret what Plato wishes to 
convey in the dialogues may prove to be more complex. I support the view that the 
dialogues are like dramatic treatises. However, even if we take them to be dramatic 
21 Gill (2001, pp. 297-321) and Poster (2001) see this as a major shortcoming of Beversluis' book, 
Cross Examining Socrates. 
22 Brickhouse 2001, pp. 179-182. See also Beversluis' reply to Brickhouse (2002, pp. 493-497). 
23 Blondell 2002. 
24 Kraut 2002, pp. 4-8. 
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treatises, it is not always clear what message Plato seeks to advance in the dialogues. 
The earlier dialogues often end in aporia with no firm conclusion being reached by 
Socrates and the respondents. This makes it difficult for the reader to determine what 
philosophical message Plato is seeking to convey in these dialogues, except the fact 
that they have not found an answer to the question under discussion. There is often a 
dispute over whether one should 'read' the positive message into the dialogues and 
the philosophical commentators tend to assume that one can take this approach. 
There are other examples in Plato's dialogues which suggest that Plato is not 
necessarily expecting the reader to accept the philosophical theories advanced in 
these works. In enquiries such as the Gorgias and the Republic Book I, although 
Socrates appears to have won the argument, the respondents Polus, Callicles and 
Thrasymachus are not convinced of the arguments given by Socrates. The strong 
reaction from these respondents makes it uncertain as to whether Plato expected the 
reader to accept the arguments advanced by Socrates. Indeed, at the end of Book I, 
Socrates admits that he has not been convinced by his own arguments (354a-b). 
Another example is the introduction of concepts such as the Forms and the immortality 
of the soul by Plato in a number of the dialogues, which he claims are beyond our 
grasp intellectually. 
Rutherford, in The Art of Plato, provides a set of essays which look at the literary 
aspects of a number of Plato's dialogues, including a useful chapter on the Republic.25 
It has been argued by some who focus on the philosophical arguments in the 
dialogues that a study of the literary aspects of the dialogues can lead to a false 
understanding of the philosophical arguments being advanced.:!! In this example, 
Irwin accuses Rutherford in his book, The Art of Plato, of supporting the false claim that 
the literary aspects of the Platonic dialogue can cast doubt on the belief that in his 
dialogues Plato is advancing definite philosophical arguments that can be examined 
independently from the context of the dialogue. 
In response to this, I would argue that a purely philosophical study of the dialogues 
might not give the reader a full appreciation of these works and it could potentially lead 
to a false conclusion concerning Plato's message. For example, a purely 
25 Rutherford 1995. 
26 Irwin 1996, p. 346. 
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philosophical study of the Republic could lead the reader to conclude that, in this 
dialogue, Plato is putting forward the theory of justice in the state and soul and the 
theory of knowledge, with confidence. However, a study of the Republicwhich 
includes the philosophical, dramatic and literary aspects, and in particular the input from 
the respondents, can lead to a different conclusion. The interventions from the 
respondents at strategic points in the Republic, together with Plato's use of stories, 
images and myth, alert the reader to some problems associated with the theories 
advanced by Socrates. This puts doubt on the feasibility of these theories and in 
Plato's confidence in advancing them. This is the focus of my study. 
Yunis, in his book chapter The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic, considers the role 
of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic and he asserts that they playa protreptic 
role in this dialogue.27 According to Yunis, Plato's depiction of Glaucon and 
Adeimantus being persuaded by Socrates in the enquiry is intended to move the 
reader towards accepting the theory of justice as outlined in the Republic. I concur with 
the importance that Yunis places on the role of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the 
Republic. However, I interpret the role played by Glaucon and Adeimantus 
differently. In my view, Yunis does not take full account of the negative aspects of the 
speeches and interruptions made by Glaucon and Adeimantus in the dialogue and 
Socrates' reaction to their input. Unlike Yunis, I argue that the speeches and 
interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus raise problems concerning the theories 
being advanced by Socrates in the enquiry in the Republic. This causes the reader to 
have some doubts regarding the feasibility of these theories. 
The different approaches taken by scholars and the tension displayed between them 
in the interpretation of the dialogues of Plato can leave the reader somewhat 
confused. Indeed, these secondary debates can take the reader's attention away 
from the dialogues themselves. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of these 
issues and debates when attempting to interpret the dialogues of Plato as they can 
influence our approach to the study of Plato and his works. The secondary works to 
which this introduction refers together with the issues which it raises are considered in 
more detail in this study. Importantly, these are just some key examples from the 
extensive volume of literature on the dialogues of Plato. In this study, reference is 
made to a wide range of secondary sources including articles, books and electronic 
27 Yunis 2007, pp. 1-26. 
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resources, philosophical, dramatic and literary, in the discussion of specific issues in the 
individual chapters. 
The difficulties associated with the various interpretations of the works of Plato suggest 
that a broad study, which takes account of the philosophical, dramatic and literary 
aspects of the dialogues may present the best way forward in order to gain a greater 
appreciation of what Plato wished to convey. This is the approach taken in my 
enquiry. 
How the respondents operate In other dialogues of Plato 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the respondents and the character 
Socrates and the way they work in the Republic, it helps to consider their role in some 
of the other dialogues and in particular the earlier ones. 
In works such as the Gorgias, Protagoras and Laches, there appears to be a strong 
connection between the individual's character and their ability to conduct philosophical 
enquiry. For example, in the Laches, Nicias is portrayed as reasonably intelligent. 
But, his self-confidence and reliance on the training he has received from his sophist 
friend Damon have a negative effect on his ability to enter into philosophical enquiry 
with Socrates. Laches is portrayed as less intelligent than Nicias and this affects his 
ability to conduct philosophical enquiry. At the end of the dialogue, Laches and Nicias 
are annoyed with the outcome of the enquiry and are abusive to each other. In the 
Gorgias, Callicles is portrayed as strong willed, opinionated and aggressive towards 
Socrates. Nevertheless, at the end of the dialogue, Callicles is defeated by Socrates 
in the exchange. 
There are also some connections between the character and characterisation of the 
respondents in different dialogues. For example, the character Callicles in the Gorgias 
is similar to Thrasymachus, who rudely interrupts the philosophical discussion and puts 
forward a strong defence of injustice in Republic Book I. At the beginning of works 
such as Laches and the Republic, Socrates is portrayed in a good light, as popular 
and intelligent, with the other characters eager for him to stay and enter into 
philosophical enquiry. He is also portrayed as lacking in confidence concerning his 
knowledge of the areas under discussion, for example, courage and justice. 
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Plato's portrayal of sophists including Gorgias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus tends to 
be less positive. Although they are portrayed as popular, Gorgias and Protagoras 
are depicted as proud and overconfident and they are defeated by Socrates in the 
exchanges. This is because the theories advanced by them are argued by Socrates 
to be contradictory. The characterisation of Thrasymachus in the Republic is also 
negative. However, it is also complex and it is considered in more detail in this study. 
It is also interesting that although Socrates defeats the respondents in the exchanges 
in these works, the arguments advanced by him are often somewhat contrived, for 
example, in his exchanges with Callicles and Thrasymachus. In addition, it does not 
result in Socrates finding an answer to the question that they are enquiring into, for 
example, the nature of justice. This can encourage the reader to have some 
sympathy with the characters Callicles and Thrasymachus as portrayed in these works 
and the arguments that they advance. It can also lead the reader to question the 
usefulness of the method of questioning adopted by Socrates. 
It may help to consider a typology of the key respondents in a number of the works 
of Plato and in particular some of the earlier and middle dialogues. Some of the 
respondents fit into more than one category in the typology. 
1 a. 'Warm .. up' characters 
These are characters who feature briefly at the beginning of the discussion in 
some of the dialogues of Plato. It includes Cephalus in the Republic Book I 
and Lysimachus in the Laches. These characters do not playa role in the main 
discussion which follows in the dialogue and the reader is left with the 
impression that it would be beyond their grasp. 
1 b. 'Walkover' respondents 
This is a feature of much of the earlier works of Plato. The respondents in these 
works are portrayed as being not particularly bright and they are inexperienced 
in the question and answer method of enqUiry. Examples of these 
respondents include Ion in the lon, Laches and Nicias in the Laches and 
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Polemarchus in the Republic Book 1.33 Other examples include Euthyphro in 
the Euthyphro, Hippias in Lesser Hippias and Charmides and Critias in the 
Charmides. 
Socrates adopts the elenchus method, a form of question and answer, in his 
exchanges with these respondents. a These exchanges are friendly and co-
operative but they all end inconclusively in aporia, with the respondents 
looking rather foolish. 
At the end of these encounters, Socrates is aware that although he has won the 
argument, the enquiries have failed to provide an answer to the question under 
consideration. Despite this, the character Socrates does not seek to find an 
alternative method of enquiry at this pOint in the dialogues. The respondents 
do not blame Socrates for the inconclusive end to the enquiry. 
2. 'Clever' sophists and rhetoricians 
This group of respondents includes sophists and rhetoricians who are gifted at 
giving long speeches. However, they are inexperienced in the question and 
answer method of enquiry, which Socrates adopts. They include Gorgias and 
Polus in the Gorgias and Protagoras in the Protagoras. Also, Thrasymachus in 
the Republic Book I. Other examples include Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus in the Euthydemus. 
Socrates adopts the elenchus method of enquiry in these exchanges. These 
respondents provide a stronger challenge to Socrates as they are clever and 
confident in their ability to persuade their audience. In these exchanges, 
Socrates displays more confidence in his method of enquiry and is determined 
to defeat his opponent. Nevertheless, the reader is somewhat surprised with 
the ease at which Socrates defeats these clever respondents and this makes 
the exchanges lack credibility. Importantly, like the elenchus exchanges in 
other early dialogues of Plato, these also end in aporia. 
26 Notably, the character Polemarchus is depicted in a different manner at the beginning of Republic 
Book V, 44gb, where he urges Adeimantus to interrupt Socrates and seek further clarification 
concerning the arrangements for women and the family in the guardian and auxiliary classes in the 
ideal state. 
29 The elenchus method of enquiry is considered in detail in chapter 1 of this study. 
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3. Clever hostile respondents 
Examples of these include Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus in the 
Republic Book I. Socrates adopts the elenchus method of enquiry in his 
exchanges with these respondents. The respondents in this group are 
combative and they are rude to Socrates at times in the enquiries. Socrates is 
determined to defeat these respondents and he is confident in his approach. 
At the end of these exchanges, Socrates and the respondents are in 
disagreement and there is a tense atmosphere. Also, these respondents are 
not convinced of the arguments put forward by Socrates. As in the other early 
dialogues, the elenchus enquiry has not provided an answer to the question 
being enquired into. 
There is a difference between Plato's depiction of Callicles and 
Thrasymachus. The character Socrates is convinced that he has defeated 
Callicles. However, in the case of Thrasymachus, although he has been 
nominally defeated by Socrates at the end of Republic Book I, it would 
appear that not even Socrates is fully convinced that Thrasymachus has been 
defeated. 
Importantly, after the exchange with Thrasymachus in Republic Book I, Plato 
introduces two new methods of enquiry. Firstly, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
adopt the display oration method in Book II, part 1, (357a-367e). Secondly, 
Socrates adopts the dialectic method, from 368a, Book II, for the remainder of 
the enquiry in the Republic. 3) 
4. Capable and sympathetic respondents 
These include Meno in the Meno and Cebes and Simmias, Pythagoreans, in 
the Phaedo.31 They also include Glaucon and Adeimantus in some parts of the 
dialectic enquiry from Book II, 368a onwards in the Republic. 
30 The display oration method is considered in chapter 2 and the dialectic method is considered in 
chapter 3 of this study. 
3' The Meno is generally considered to be a transitional work between the early and middle 
dialogues of Plato. The Phaedo is considered to belong to the middle works of Plato. 
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These respondents enter into co-operative exchanges with Socrates. In these 
works, Socrates and the respondents enter into more complex philosophical 
enquiries concerning matters such as the immortality of the soul and theories of 
knowledge. Socrates is confident in these exchanges and he puts forward 
positive philosophical theories. 
5. Capable, sympathetIc and challenging respondents 
This includes Glaucon and Adeimantus in some key parts of Books II to X of 
the Republic and in particular Books II, V and VI, where their input forces 
Socrates to justify the theories that he is advancing. It is notable that Socrates 
takes these challenges, which include speeches and interruptions from Glaucon 
and Adeimantus, seriously. Indeed, they change the course of the dialogue 
and they have a negative impact on Socrates' level of confidence. 
They also alert the reader to some problems associated with the theories 
being advanced in the enquiry. They lead the reader to question what Plato is 
seeking to convey through these challenges from the respondents. 
6. Capable, sympathetic respondents who remain silent for extended 
periods 
This includes Glaucon and Adeimantus in some parts of the Republic from 
Book II, 368a onwards and in particular Books III, VIII and IX. It is also a feature 
of the respondents in much of the later works of Plato including the character 
Socrates who is a respondent in the Parmenides and the three respondents 
Timaeus, Hermocrates and Critias in the Timaeus. 
In these enquiries, the person taking the lead in the discussion, who is not 
always Socrates. is depicted as confident, knowledgeable and very much in 
control of the enquiry. 
One possible theory is that the lack of input from the respondents in these 
enquiries leads the reader to take on the role of the respondent and to question 
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the theories being outlined in these works and what message Plato is trying to 
convey. 
Plato's use of characterisation in these works suggests that certain character types are 
less suited to philosophical enquiry than others. This prefigures the dialectic enquiry in 
the Republic where Glaucon and Adeimantus are chosen, rather than Cephal us, 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, to act as respondents to Socrates from Book II, 
368a, onwards. It also prefigures the discussion of the ideal state and soul in 
Republic Book IV where Socrates and the respondents identify three classes of 
people in the ideal state, guardians, auxiliaries and workers. Importantly, in the ideal 
state, only the guardians would receive the upbringing and education that would be 
necessary for philosophical enquiry. Of the respondents who feature in the early and 
middle dialogues, Glaucon and Adeimantus are the closest in character type to the 
guardians in the ideal state. This may help to explain why Plato chose them to act as 
respondents in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic. 
In these works, Plato appears to have a wider agenda than simply advancing 
philosophical theories. Through the literary and dramatic elements of these dialogues, 
including character and characterisation and the input from the respondents and 
Socrates, Plato also appears to be putting forward messages through the dialogue 
that are relevant to the philosophical theories advanced, for example about the 
philosophical life in general and what it would require of the individual. 
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How the respondents operate In the Republic 
- Alms of this study 
The Republic is comprised of ten books. The work is presented in dialogue form. 
The main characters who feature in the work are: 
Socrates: 
Thrasymachus: 
Glaucon and Adeimantus: 
Polemarchus: 
Cephalus: 
Narrator 
Third and main respondent in Book I 
Main respondents from Book II onwards 
Second respondent in Book I 
First respondent in Book I 
Throughout the work, Socrates acts as narrator and the respondents are introduced at 
various stages of the dialogue. There are also a number of other characters present 
who form a background audience and remain silent throughout the enquiry. The 
discussion in the ten books of the Republic covers a wide range of topics including: 
morality, social structure, education, the nature of reality and politics. Nevertheless, the 
main theme of the work is an enquiry into justice in the state and the soul. In the work, 
Socrates and the respondents adopt three main methods of enquiry: elenchus, 
display oration and dialectic. 
On a first reading of the Republic, the interventions from the respondents, together 
with Socrates' reaction to these interventions, appear to be a convenient device used 
by Plato to add a dramatic aspect to the lengthy dialogue in order to draw the reader's 
attention to the philosophical theories being advanced. 
This study aims to demonstrate that a closer study of the Republic suggests that, in 
addition to this, the dramatic and literary elements in this work emphasise the 
inconclusive nature of the dialogue. They also raise a question as to whether Plato 
intended the reader to be fully convinced of the controversial theories put forward in 
the Republic, some of which are challenged by the respondents. 
This study considers the role of the respondents in the Republic, together with the 
role of Socrates. Particular attention is paid to the theme of uncertainty and 
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problematising, which runs through the dialogue in the different methods of enquiry 
adopted by Socrates and the respondents. It seeks to establish that in the Republic, 
Plato appears to be problematising his own idea. 
An example of this approach is an enquiry into the role of Thrasymachus in the 
Republic. From a philosophical perspective, in Book I, Thrasymachus puts forward a 
series of important arguments that favour injustice. Through the elenchus exchange 
with Socrates, the arguments advanced by Thrasymachus are argued by Socrates to 
be contradictory. Although he is present for the remainder of the discussion and 
makes a few minor remarks in the Republic, Thrasymachus plays no further role in the 
philosophical enquiry. 
However, from a philosophical, dramatic and literary perspective, Thrasymachus' 
presence is felt throughout the Republic. After the elenchus exchange between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I, Thrasymachus speaks up on one occasion and 
Socrates and the respondents make a number of references to him during the course 
of the dialectic enquiry. 
In addition to the direct references to Thrasymachus in the dialectic enquiry in the 
Republic, there would appear to be a number of indirect references to him. These 
are designed to make the reader wary of Thrasymachus' character and the arguments 
that he gives in Book I in support of the tyrant and of tyranny. 
These references to Thrasymachus remind the reader of the strength of the arguments 
given by him in Book I. They also suggest to the reader that the arguments 
advanced by Thrasymachus in Book I are not fully defeated by Socrates and the 
respondents in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic. The philosophical and dramatic 
role of Thrasymachus in the Republic is considered in detail in this study. 
Another example of a philosophical, dramatic and literary enquiry into the Republic is 
the role of Glaucon and Adeimantus in this dialogue. From a philosophical 
perspective, their input at the beginning of Book II is important and it sets the basis for 
the discussion in the remainder of the work. Their contribution to the enquiry in the 
remaining Books of the Republic seems, at first sight. to be of less significance 
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philosophically. However, from a philosophical, dramatic and literary perspective, the 
input from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II is not their only important contribution to 
the Republic overall. In the dialectic enquiry in the Republic, from Book II, 368a 
onwards, Glaucon and Adeimantus make a number of dramatic interruptions to the 
discussion and challenge the theories being advanced by Socrates. There are also 
examples where, in response to these interruptions, Socrates shows signs of 
hesitation and uncertainty with regard to the theories that he is outlining. 
As in early Book II, these later examples of dramatic interruptions made by Glaucon 
and Adeimantus probe the theories being advanced by Socrates in the enquiry by 
forcing him to go into more detail about the controversial aspects of these theories. 
They also raise doubts about the feasibility of the theories that have been advanced 
by Socrates so far in the Republic. 
The unexpected silence of Glaucon and Adeimantus at other points of the dialectic 
enquiry in the Republic adds to the reader's sense of uncertainty about the theories 
being advanced by Socrates in the dialogue. In a way, the reader feels the need to 
take over the role of the respondent at points in the dialogue and raise questions. As 
noted above in the typology of respondents, this is also a feature of the later 
dialogues where the respondent plays a less dramatic role with reduced input. The 
role of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic is a major area of enquiry in this 
study. 
Provisional conclusion of this study 
The above examples of the input from Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
together with Socrates' reaction to these, alert the reader to some important 
connections between the philosophical and dramatic aspects of the Republic. These 
connections would not become evident from a study of the work from a purely 
philosophical or literary perspective. They help the reader to gain a broader 
understanding of the work as a whole and what message or messages Plato may 
have been trying to convey. They also lead to a less clear-cut interpretation of the 
dialogue. 
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Synopsis of chapters 
Chapter 1 
Cephal us, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: Injustice and the elenchus 
method tested 
In chapter 1 of this study, consideration is given to the input from Cepha\us and 
Polemarchus in Republic Book I. It then investigates a number of highly dramatic 
interruptions and responses made by Thrasymachus in Book I. These are introduced 
as the enquiry into justice has just begun and after Cephalus and Polemarchus have 
outlined their views concerning justice. The level of rudeness and lack of co-operation 
displayed by Thrasymachus in these interruptions is much greater than that found in 
the remaining books of the Republic. Consideration is given to the significance of the 
interruptions and responses made by Thrasymachus and what may have prompted 
him to interrupt at this stage in the dialogue. In Republic Book 1 Socrates adopts the 
elenchus method of enqUiry. 
This chapter draws attention to the inconclusive nature of the end of Book I. It 
suggests that Plato may not have expected the reader to be satisfied with the 
outcome of the enquiry so far. The discussions in Book 1 have not provided an 
answer to the original question: what is justice? This becomes apparent in the closing 
words of Socrates in Book I. He admits at the end of the discussion with 
Thrasymachus that he has still not reached an understanding of the nature of justice. 
'For so long as I don't know what justice is I'm hardly likely to find out whether it is an 
excellence or not, or whether it makes a man happy or unhappy' (Republic, 354b, 
Book I). He notes that in the discussion he got carried away enquiring into the 
particular examples concerning justice put forward by the respondents rather than 
focusing on the core question: what is justice (354b)? 
So, although Socrates appears to have defeated the respondents Cephalus, 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, doubt is placed on the usefulness of the elenchus 
method in providing an answer to the question of what comprises justice. Also, the 
ongoing presence of Thrasymachus in the remaining Books of the Republic suggests 
that the arguments advanced by him in favour of injustice have not been fully 
defeated by Socrates in Book I. 
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Chapter 2 
Glaucon and Adeimantus: The display oration method and a challenge to 
Socrates 
Chapter 2 focuses on Republic Book II, part I, (357a-367e) where there are a 
number of highly dramatic interruptions, followed by speeche~, from Glaucon and 
Adeimantus.32 These come at a time when the enquiry into justice in Book I has 
ended inconclusively and Socrates has expressed disappointment at the outcome of 
the enquiry so far. This is a feature of the aporetic dialogue. However, the Republic 
differs from the aporetic dialogue in that the enquiry continues, despite the inconclusive 
end to Book I. In their speeches in Book II, Glaucon and Adeimantus display a high 
level of understanding of the issues relating to justice and injustice that were raised by 
Thrasymachus in Book I. This chapter considers the significance of the input from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, and what may have prompted them to 
interrupt at this stage of the dialogue. It also considers in detail the arguments 
advanced by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the response made by Socrates to these 
arguments, and the role that he plays in this part of the Republic. In Republic Book II, 
part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus adopt the display oration method of enquiry. 
Unusually, in Republic Book II, part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus take the lead in the 
enquiry, rather than Socrates. The illustrations which they provide of the fate of the just 
and unjust individuals are powerful and they appear to be representative of the view 
of Plato's contemporary society. Unlike the interruptions from Thrasymachus in Book 
I, the challenge from Glaucon and Adeimantus in early Book II gives Socrates the 
opportunity to advance the theory of justice which is outlined in Book IV and 
expanded upon in the remaining Books of the dialogue. Socrates' reaction to the 
speeches from Glaucon and Adeimantus is significant. He does not demonstrate any 
anger at this point, despite the strong challenge put to him and the enormous task set 
by Glaucon and Adeimantus to demonstrate that justice is good for its own sake as 
well as its consequences. 
32 It is important to note that the current division of the Republic into ten Books is likely to have been 
made after Plato's time. The divisions of the Republic that I refer to in this study, that is Books and 
part~ of Books, have been chosen to reflect changes in the aspects of the subjects being 
consIdered by Socrates and the respondents and the methods of enquiry adopted by them. 
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This leads to a more fruitful enquiry in the remaining Books of the Republic, where 
Glaucon and Adeimantus act as respondents with Socrates leading the enquiry. 
However, it is notable that in his defence of justice Socrates includes stories, images 
and myth which go beyond the philosophical theories advanced, in order to 
demonstrate that justice is good for its own sake as well as for its consequences. 
Chapter 3 
The dialectic method of enquiry: Socrates' response to Glaucon and 
Adelmantus 
In Republic Book II, part 2, from 368a onwards the reader and audience are 
introduced to a new method of enquiry: the dialectic method. This method is 
introduced by Socrates and it is the method that he adopts in the remaining Books of 
the Republic. with the exception of The Myth of Er in Book X. The change of 
approach has been prompted by the dramatic end to Republic Book II, part 1, 367d-
e, where Adeimantus challenges Socrates to put forward his own theory of justice. 
Chapter 3 of this study considers Socrates' initial response to Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Book II, 368a to 376c, and their reaction to his response. It gives 
detailed consideration to Republic Book IV, 427d-445e, where through the dialectic 
method of enquiry, Socrates and the respondents give an account of the just state 
and just soul. 
The role of Socrates and the respondents changes considerably from Book II, part 2, 
368a onwards. The introduction of the dialectic method of enquiry enables Socrates 
and the respondents to advance positive theories concerning justice in the state and 
the soul. Nevertheless, Plato seems to be sending mixed messages to the reader 
and audience. Despite the new found confidence displayed by Socrates in Book II, 
part 2 and Book IV of the Republic, there are examples of hesitation displayed by 
him which may place doubt on whether the reader is expected to be fully convinced 
of the theories being advanced. 
In the parts of the Republic considered in chapter 3, Plato, through the character of 
Socrates, displays hesitancy, uncertainty and a lack of resolve on a number of 
occasions: from being reluctant to commence the enquiry due to his lack of ability, to 
introdUCing a very basic community and then putting forward an expanded one. Then, 
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when considering justice in the state and individual he starts with the 'big picture' first 
Also, he is reluctant to discuss the issue of women and the family. Significantly, in 
Books VIII and IX of the Republic, Socrates and the respondents consider imperfect 
states and souls and they reach the conclusion that should the ideal state, as advanced 
in Book IV, ever become a reality, it would eventually deteriorate into a tyranny. 
Notably, this was what Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus considered to be the 
worst form of state but the one that Thrasymachus promoted in Book I. They also 
conclude that the ideal state would not become a reality in this world. 
The reluctance displayed by Socrates leaves the reader confused as to why Glaucon 
and Adeimantus are portrayed in Book IV as being in agreement with Socrates rather 
than raising doubts about the theories being advanced by him. However, this 
situation changes in Books V and VI of the Republic where Glaucon and Adeimantus 
make a number of dramatic entries into the discussion, which influence the course of 
the enquiry in the remaining Books of the dialogue. 
Chapter 4 
Adelmantus: Women and the family 
There are a number of dramatic interruptions and responses made by the 
respondents at intervals in the Republic Book II, 368a onwards. These often result in 
a change over of respondent. Some rudeness is displayed by the respondents on 
these occasions. These usually occur at a time when Socrates is putting forward a 
controversial theory, or has just done so. Chapter 4 focuses on the interruption from 
Adeimantus at the beginning of Book V, (449b·450a), which has been prompted by 
Polemarchus. Consideration is given to this interruption from Adeimantus and on the 
response to this from Socrates. In this chapter, consideration is also given to the 
controversial theories concerning women and the family as outlined by Socrates in 
Book V, the method of enquiry adopted by Socrates and the input from the 
respondents after the initial interruption at the beginning of Book V. 
The interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of Book V is significant and it 
changes the direction of the enquiry in that it forces Socrates to consider the issue of 
women and the family in the ideal state, which he was ostensibly trying to avoid. The 
interruption occurs at a time when the philosophical enquiry has just been completed 
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into justice in the city and with respect to the individual. This has resulted in a 
controversial theory of justice being outlined by Socrates and the respondents and he 
is about to embark on injustice. 
In this example, philosophical elements of the dialogue interact with the dramatic 
elements. For example, the increased dramatic tension at the beginning of Book V 
coincides with an increase in the intensity and unorthodoxy of the philosophical enquiry 
and the theories that are resulting from the enqUiry. The proposals that Socrates 
advanced prior to this interruption concerning the just state and just individual did not 
provide sufficient detail concerning the practical arrangements for implementing the 
ideal state. The enquiry into women and the family in Book V, forces Socrates and 
the respondents to think through the implications of the theories that they have 
advanced in the dialectic enquiry, which started at 368a, Book II, part 2. Indeed, Book 
V and the later Books of the Republic are concerned with the implications of the ideal 
state and soul. 
Chapter 5 
Adelmantus: The role of the philosopher In society 
Chapter 5 focuses on Book VI and early book VII of the Republic where Socrates 
and the respondents consider the role of the philosopher in society. There are 
several highly dramatic interruptions and illustrations in this part of the Republic 
including the interruption from Adeimantus at 487b-d where he accuses the majority of 
contemporary philosophers of being useless members of society. This chapter 
considers this interruption from Adeimantus together with Socrates' initial response to 
the interruption. It also looks at the defence of the philosopher as outlined by 
Socrates. Consideration is given to the significance of the simile of the sun, the image 
of the line and the allegory of the cave (502c-521 b), which provide the reader and 
audience with a graphic illustration of the level of knowledge, which the guardians 
would seek to possess as opposed to the auxiliaries and workers in the ideal state. 
The interruption from Adeimantus at 487b, together with Glaucon's reaction to 'wave 
three' at 473e-474a where Socrates asserts that philosophers should be put in 
charge of the state, has a strong impact on the enquiry. It requires Socrates to 
provide further justification for the thesis that philosophers should be put in charge in 
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the ideal state. The three waves in Book V give the impression of Socrates and the 
respondents swimming together to survive each wave. Indeed, this appears to be a 
metaphor for the dialectic method of enquiry in the Republic. It would seem that each 
time Socrates and the respondents advance positive theories in the enquiry, they are 
put in a situation where it becomes necessary for them to give further consideration to 
these theories. This is usually prompted by an interruption from Glaucon or 
Adeimantus. 
In the illustrations of the Sun, Line and Cave, Socrates shows signs of hesitation and 
uncertainty. This is because, understandably, he is only able to provide simile, image 
and allegory rather than a description of the Form of the Good itself. As a result of this, 
the core metaphysics of the Republic is based on simile, image and allegory rather 
than fact. Socrates and the respondents do not have the knowledge that the 
philosophers in the ideal state would possess. The message emerging here seems 
to point to our limited ability to gain knowledge of the Form of the Good and the other 
Forms. 
At the end of the section of the Republic discussed in this chapter, the reader is left in 
doubt as to whether they are supposed to be convinced of the theories being 
outlined by Socrates and the respondents. Nevertheless, Plato has given an 
impressive defence of the philosopher and philosophy. 
Note on this study 
Although the individual chapters of this study focus on specific areas of the Republic, 
in each chapter consideration is also given to some wider issues relating to the 
Republic as a whole. The main primary source for this enquiry is Plato's Republic. 
However, reference is also made to a number of other early and middle dialogues of 
Plato in the course of this study. In order to gain as broad an appreciation as possible 
of the Republic in translation, I have studied a number of translations of this dialogue.$ 
33 These translations include Lee (2003), Reeve (2004), and Waterfield (1998), with reference 
being made in my enquiry to the Lee translation. Reference has also been made to Emlyn-Jones 
(2007) translation of Republic Books 1-2, 368c4, and Halliwell (1998) translation of Republic Book V. 
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Chapter 1 
Cephal us, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: Injustice and the elenchus 
method tested 
Introduction 
There are a number of highly dramatic interruptions and responses made by 
Thrasymachus in the Republic Book I. These come as the enquiry into justice has just 
begun and after Socrates has carried out an enquiry with Cephalus and Polemarchus 
concerning the nature of justice. The level of rudeness and lack of co-operation 
displayed by Thrasymachus in these interruptions is much greater than that found in 
the remaining books of the Republic or anywhere else in the works of Plato. Even in 
early Book \I where Glaucon and Adeimantus advance a conventional theory of justice 
in a very assertive manner, they do not display any rudeness towards Socrates.' 
This chapter considers the input from the three respondents in Book' and in particular 
Thrasymachus. It also investigates what prompted Thrasymachus to interrupt at this 
stage in the dialogue. It draws attention to the inconclusive nature of the end of Book I 
and highlights the importance of Book I within the Republic as a whole. It also brings 
into prominence the significance of the role of Thrasymachus in the Republic overall. 
In Book I, Socrates adopts the elenchus method of enquiry. 
(Section 1) 
The dramatic entry of Thrasymachus Into the enquiry and what has 
prompted this development 
- The dramatic entry of Thrasymachus Into the enquiry 
Thrasymachus, the main respondent in Republic Book I, is introduced at 336b. He 
makes a very striking entry into the proceedings. Socrates observes that 
Thrasymachus had tried to interrupt while he had been in discussion with Polemarchus 
concerning the nature of justice. According to Socrates, Thrasymachus 'sprang on us 
1 Although at 362e, Book II, part 1, Adeimantus gets close to being rude to Socrates when he says 
'That's nonsense. But listen to what I have to say.' 
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like a wild beast, as if he wanted to tear us in pieces. Polemarchus and I were panic-
stricken, as Thrasymachus burst out' and started mocking the elenchus method of 
enquiry, which Socrates was using. Thrasymachus claims that it is easier to ask 
questions than to answer them and he urges Socrates to give an answer himself 
about what justice is (336b-d). Importantly, in complaining about the shortcomings of 
the elenchus method used by Socrates, by asserting that it is easier to ask questions 
than to put forward theories of your own, Thrasymachus is challenging Socrates to 
examine his own assumptions concerning the subject they are investigating.2 
Although the character Socrates does not provide an answer of his own in Book I, he 
proceeds to give a very long and impressive answer from Book II, 368a onwards -
effectively the rest of the Republic. 
The introduction of the character Thrasymachus gives the impression of an impatient 
respondent who is sceptical about the methods of enquiry adopted by Socrates and 
the other respondents. The image of the beast is significant in this passage. It 
suggests that there is a moral link between man and the beast with the unjust man 
having the potential to act like a beast.3 This is an image which is important later in the 
Republic when Socrates describes the appetitive element within the soul as the 
beast or the many-headed creature which needs to be controlled by the element of 
reason within the soul (58Sc-d, Book IX). Why were Socrates and Polemarchus 
depicted as being stricken by panic when Thrasymachus burst into the discussion? 
Was it because of the forceful nature of his interruption or was there some other 
explanation? It can be appreciated that in this passage Socrates, the narrator, is 
talking somewhat tongue-in-cheek, winking at the reader.4 Nevertheless, in his 
depiction of Thrasymachus' entry into the enquiry, Plato appears to be sending a 
strong message to the reader concerning the importance of the character 
Thrasymachus in the dialogue overall. 
It becomes apparent later in the Republic that Socrates' negative portrayal of 
Thrasymachus in Book I corresponds with his disapproval of the theory of justice 
advanced by Thrasymachus. Some have argued that the description of 
2 Blondell 2002, p. 186. 
3 Rutherford 1995, p. 217. 
4 It is worth observing that in his privileged position as narrator Socrates can turn the reader against 
Thrasymachus before he has opened his mouth. 
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Thrasymachus as he enters into the discussion demonstrates that Plato dislikes him.s I 
would argue that although we cannot claim to know what Plato liked or disliked, another 
possibility is that it is the theory of justice that Thrasymachus states in Book I that Plato 
disliked rather than the character Thrasymachus. Also, it is more likely to be Socrates' 
method of enquiry that Thrasymachus disliked rather than Socrates himself. Perhaps 
the immediate reaction of Socrates and Polemarchus to the interruption by 
Thrasymachus was a warning signal by Plato to the reader that the enquiry into justice 
would be difficult and that Socrates and the respondents would need to be on their 
guard against opponents such as Thrasymachus along the way,S 
This leads the reader to question what it was that caused the character Thrasymachus 
to become so upset about in the earlier discussions between Socrates and Cephalus 
and Socrates and Polemarchus. In his initial outburst, Thrasymachus expresses 
concern about the method of enquiry adopted by Socrates in his discussions with 
Cephal us and Polemarchus and the outcome of the enquiry in Republic Book I so far. 
Socrates claims to lack the ability to provide a view of his own concerning justice. In 
response to this, Thrasymachus laughs and asserts sarcastically 'There you go with 
your old affectation, Socrates. I knew it, and I told the others that you would never let 
yourself be questioned, but go on shamming ignorance and do anything rather than 
give a straight answer' (337a). Thrasymachus' entry into the discussion brings a 
change of atmosphere to the proceedings from friendly to challenging. It also 
introduces a challenge to the elenchus method of enquiry adopted by Socrates. 
Thrasymachus does not accept Socrates' apparent ignorance (336c). 
Before considering the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus, this enquiry 
considers the discussion with Socrates and Cephalus as well as the discussion 
between Socrates and Polemarchus, in order to establish what it was about these 
interchanges that prompted Thrasymachus to become so agitated and to join in the 
enquiry. In his discussions with the respondents in Republic Book I, Socrates adopts 
the elenchus or Socratic method of enquiry, which has been defined as 'eliciting from 
his victims answers to his questions, and then demolishing them by showing them to 
be inconsistent with other opinions which the victims are not willing to give up. Often 
5 Beversluis 2000, p. 222. 
6 It is important to bear in mind that all the characters who feature in the Republic and the other 
dialogues of Plato are literary creations of Plato who uses them for his own purposes. However, a 
number of his characters are named after real individuals and Plato includes some features of these 
historical characters in his works, sometimes ironically, for example, Polemarchus and Cephal us. 
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these are generally accepted views.'" An example of this can be found in the Gorgias 
in the exchange between Socrates and Gorgias. Socrates points out a flaw in 
Gorgias' argument. Gorgias has claimed that a rhetorician might use his skill for immoral 
use but also that a rhetorician cannot do wrong (Gorgias, 460a-461b). The flaw that 
Socrates is pointing to here is that Gorgias' argument is inconsistent and in need of 
revision. According to Gorgias, the rhetorician both could and could not make a wrong 
use of his oratory skills and this is an inconsistent argument. 
The elenchus method of enquiry has been described as follows: 
1 . 'The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which Socrates considers false and targets 
for refutation. 
2. Socrates secures agreement to further premises, say q, and r (each of which 
may stand for a number of associated propositions). The agreement is ad 
hoc: Socrates argues from q, r, not to them. 
3. Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q and r entail not-po 
4. Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true and that p is false. 18 
In what follows, consideration is given to the elenchus exchanges in Republic Book I. 
• The exchange between Socrates and Cephalus 
The first significant conversation in the Republic Book I is between Socrates and 
Cephalus. This begins at 328c where Cephalus welcomes Socrates and he notes 
that it has been a long time since they have seen Socrates in Piraeus and he urges 
him to visit more often. Their conversation develops into a basic type of elenchus 
exchange at Republic, 331 c, where Socrates provides the following definition which is 
intended to summarise Cephal us' view concerning justice: 'that doing right, consists 
simply and solely in truthfulness and returning anything we have borrowed.' Socrates 
7 This definition is provided by Hare (1996, pp. 41-42). 
8 This description is provided by Vlastos (1995, p. 11). Vlastos alerts the reader to the point that 
although the elenchus defeats inconsistency, it does not guarantee the truth/falsehood of 
premisses. 
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observes, however, that it would not be appropriate to return a weapon that you had 
borrowed from a friend if the friend had since gone mad.9 Socrates concludes 
therefore that justice does not consist simply in being truthful and returning what you 
have borrowed (331d). At this point in the dialogue, Polemarchus interrupts and 
asserts that Cephalus' definition of justice is correct at any rate if we are to believe 
what the poet Simonides has said (331d). Cephalus then hands over the discussion 
to Polemarchus and he leaves the gathering to attend to his sacrifice. 
The elenchus exchange between Socrates and Cephal us appears to follow Vlastos' 
standard format as outlined above. But, the exchange is too short to have an impact 
on the respondent or to provide the audience and reader with an answer to the 
question under discussion: what is justice? 
It is interesting that the discussion with Cephal us ends so quickly at 331 d and that 
Socrates moves on swiftly to discuss the matter further with Polemarchus. 
Surprisingly, Socrates does not try to persuade Cephalus to continue with the enquiry 
or to return after his sacrificial duties are complete. None of the audience ask for him to 
stay either. The reader is left with the impression that there would be little pOint in 
Socrates continuing the enquiry with Cephal us as his vision of justice is too broad to 
enable them to make any significant progress in their enquiry.10 It also suggests to the 
reader that Plato is not satisfied with the view of justice outlined by Cephal us, which 
associates justice simply with a person's character (tropos) (329d-330a), and that he 
is seeking a narrower and more focussed theory of justice to emerge from the 
dialogue in the Republic. In Book I, Cephalus refers to two character types, good 
and bad. However, in Book IV, Socrates introduces the more complex theory of the 
tripartite soul which comprises reason, spirit and appetite. He also introduces the 
theory of the tripartite state which comprises guardians, auxiliaries and workers. 
Some commentators have asserted that when Cephal us leaves the conversation to 
attend to his sacrifice, he is content to accept his traditional values rather than engage in 
9 Gifford (2001, p. 75) includes an interesting discussion on the irony associated with the fact that 
selling weapons to a madman is closely linked to the arms business in which Cephalus was 
engaged. The irony goes further: Cephalus' contented life can be contrasted with the fate of his 
son Polemarchus under the thirty tyrants. Nails (2002, p. 251) gives a useful account of 
Polemarchus' death at the hands of the thirty tyrants. 
10 As noted in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, Cephalus 
fits into the category of 'warm-up' respondents, along with Lysimachus in the Laches. 
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elenctic scrutiny of these values. 11 I would suggest that in this passage Plato may be 
alerting the reader to the danger of simply sticking to traditional values rather than 
examining one's beliefs in order to establish whether the life you are leading is just. 
Others have suggested helpfully that the dramatic presentation of Cephalus is 
designed to demonstrate Cephal us' lack of reflection in comparison with Socrates who 
has practised philosophy a" his Iife.12 Significantly, Cephalus' interest in the 
conversation with Socrates did not last long. This is despite his new interest in 
discussion, which he claims to have acquired at the beginning of the conversation with 
Socrates (328d).13 Cephal us can be contrasted here with the guardians in the ideal 
state who spend years training in philosophy. 
Cephalus is the only member of the party to leave, and his departure means that he 
will not be given the opportunity to learn more about justice on this occasion.14 This 
seems unfortunate given the warm welcome that he had extended to Socrates, and 
also the hospitality that Socrates had received from Polemarchus, Cephalus' son. 
But, it also suggests that Cephalus is simply too set in his ways to develop his view 
concerning justice. Cephalus does not seem to appreciate the significance of the 
outcome of his short elenchus style exchange with Socrates, that is, the view 
concerning justice attributed to Cephalus has been found to be contradictory. Until he 
appreciates this fact, he will be unable to move his understanding concerning justice 
forward. Importantly, Cephalus is not missed when he leaves the discussion. 
The reader is left with the impression that Cephalus would have been confused by 
the enquiry that followed. This suggests that it would take too long to educate 
Cephalus about the error of his beliefs and there was not sufficient time in the 
discussion in the Republicto make any progress in this direction.15 Nevertheless, just 
11 Blondell 2002, p. 170. 
12 Gifford 2001, p. 63. 
13 Gifford 2001, p. 73. 
14 The departure of Cephal us from the discussion in Republic Book I appears to prefigure the 
enquiry into the ideal state and soul in Book IV. Notably, in the ideal state it would not be necessary 
for everyone to have knowledge of justice. Only the guardians or rulers would be given the 
opportunity to gain knowledge of justice through their study of the Forms. The other two classes, 
the workers and auxiliaries, would only have a limited understanding of such matters. 
15 Reeve (2006, p. 9) puts forward a defence of Cephalus and he suggests an alternative reason for 
Cephal us' departure from the enqUiry. Reeve asserts that 'Cephal us shows that the elenchus is 
not necessary to produce a moral character like Socrates', and is of no use to someone like himself 
who already has such a character.' Emlyn-Jones (2007, pp. 14-15) alerts the reader to some of the 
strengths of Cephalus' position. He notes the importance that Cephal us places on tropos or 
disposition and that this is a theme which Socrates develops further after Book I of the Republic. 
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as Cephalus appears to have placed too great a reliance on the goodness or 
badness of a person's character in his overall understanding of justice, Socrates' lack of 
success in gaining knowledge through the elenchus method suggests that he may be 
placing too much reliance on this method of enquiry. 
It is interesting to consider what level of reliance Cephal us places on money.16 Apart 
from the material comforts that it provides, Cephalus values money as a means of 
paying off debts in this life and making sacrifices to the gods in order to secure a safe 
passage into the next life. In his conversation with Socrates, Cephalus comments on 
the value of wealth to the individual. He asserts 'For wealth contributes very greatly to 
one's ability to avoid both unintentional cheating or lying and the fear that one has left 
some sacrifice to God unmade or some debt to man unpaid before one dies' (331 b). 
In his account of the just state and the just soul in Republic Book IV Socrates 
advances a theory of justice that does not place reliance on money. The guardians, 
who are led by reason, will be responsible for ruling the state and they will have no 
personal property or wealth. The workers, who are led by appetite, will be the only 
members of society to own property and to accumulate personal wealth. However, 
the workers will have no say in the running of the state and they will only have a limited 
understanding of justice, unlike the guardians who will be given the opportunity to gain 
knowledge of the Forms. 
It has been argued by some that, due to his reliance on money for virtue, Cephalus' 
character represents the oligarchic character which is discussed by Socrates in 
Republic Book VIII, 553a-555b in relation to the deterioration of the just state and 
individual. 17 Socrates describes the oligarchic character as one who gives 'overriding 
importance'to money (554a). In my view, Cephal us' character more closely 
represents the workers in the ideal state.18 This is due to the fact that Cephalus does 
not appear to have any advanced views concerning justice. Also, like the workers in 
the ideal state, he has no involvement in the running of the state. This is because of 
his metic status in Athens. 19 Although Cephal us places importance on money, he is 
described by Socrates as not being over-fond of money. In conversation with 
16 Blondell (2002, p. 171) asserts that Cephalus places a high level of reliance on money for virtue. 
17 This view is held by Blondell (2002, p. 172). 
16 This view is also held by Aune (1997, p. 306). 
19 Metics were foreigners who resided in Athens but did not have the rights and obligations of the 
citizens. 
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Socrates, Cephal us notes that he is aiming to leave to his sons a little more money 
than he inherited from his father (33Gb). This is in contrast with Cephal us' grandfather 
who multiplied his inheritance several times over (33Gb). Significantly, unlike the 
workers in the ideal state, Cephalus and his family did not have the benefit of the rule 
of the guardians and the protection of the auxiliaries. Plato's portrayal of Cephal us 
brings to light the vulnerability of the individual and family in an unjust state. This is 
reflected historically in the fate of Cephal us' family after his death, when they were 
attacked by the thirty tyrants. 
Beversluis has defended Cephal us' character and philosophical understanding against 
criticisms such as those outlined above. He argues that Cephalus associates 
happiness with 'contentment and tranquility of mind.' According to Beversluis, this is a 
psychological and contingent connection unlike the logical connection that Socrates is 
seeking to establish where it would follow, for example, that justice would lead to 
happiness in the individual.2) Beversluis builds up a picture of Cephalus' character 
which suggests that Plato is portraying him as having a virtuous disposition.21 In my 
view, in his depiction of the character Cephalus, Plato is pointing to a flaw in his 
character. This is Cephal us' lack of reflection concerning justice which has resulted in his 
limited understanding of what would comprise a just life for all. 
Importantly, if Plato was as satisfied as Beversluis suggests with the character of 
Cephal us and his philosophical understanding, why was it necessary for him to write 
another nine books of the Republic in order to establish what would comprise a just 
life and soul? As observed in the introductory chapter of this study, it is a weakness 
of Beversluis that in focusing his attention on what the character Socrates is up to he 
fails to consider what Plato may have been trying to achieve in his depiction of 
Socrates and the respondents in the Republic and the other dialogues. I would agree 
with Beversluis, that it is Socrates and not Cephalus that puts forward the definition: 
that doing right or justice consists in being honest and returning any goods that you 
have borrowed (331 C).22 However, I would argue that Socrates' interpretation of the 
position advanced by Cephalus seems consistent given Plato's overall depiction of 
Socrates in Book I and his later development of ideas. 
20 Beversluis 2000, p. 191. 
21 Beversluis 2000, pp. 192-196. 
22 Beversluis 2000, p. 198. 
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In this exchange, the drama and philosophy have been carefully arranged to 
complement each other and bring out the weaknesses in the character of Cephalus 
and the philosophical views that he holds. It also highlights weaknesses in the 
elenchus method of enquiry which failed to provide an answer to the question under 
discussion and did not hold Cephalus' attention for long enough as he left the 
discussion when it had only just started. These interconnections help the reader to 
appreciate the relevance of the character Cephalus and the philosophical views which 
he holds to the Republic as a whole and how this fits in with Plato's overall aims in the 
dialogue. They also help to prepare the reader for the theory of justice outlined by 
Socrates from Book II, 368a onwards, which divides the ideal state into three distinct 
character types, which are dominated by reason, spirit or appetite, with three distinct 
roles to play within the state. 
- The elenchus between Socrates and Polemarchus 
Polemarchus enters the discussion at 331d-e where he defends the view of justice 
attributed to his father.Z3 Polemarchus rewords the definition slightly as follows: 'That it 
is right to give every man his due' (331e). We are told that the definition of justice 
outlined by Polemarchus had been inspired by the poet Simonides. In response to 
this assertion by Polemarchus, Socrates considers what the poet meant by these 
words. Socrates proceeds to examine the definition of justice given by Polemarchus 
using the elenchus method of enquiry. He notes that this would not include returning a 
weapon to a friend, if the friend that you had lent it to had since gone mad and 
Polemarchus agrees with this observation (332a). Socrates notes that 'Simonides 
must mean something different from this when he says that it is right to give every 
man his due' (332a). Unlike Cephalus, Polemarchus continues the enquiry with 
Socrates at this point rather than giving up at the first hurdle.:14 
Socrates asks Pole march us whether we should give our enemies what is due to 
them. In response to this, Polemarchus asserts that we should and that this would be 
23 As observed in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, 
Polemarchus belongs to the category of 'walkover' respondents. 
24 Another example of Polemarchus' assertive personality can be found at the beginning of Book I, 
327c, where he urges Socrates not to return to Athens straight away. Also, at the beginning of 
Book V, 449b, Polemarchus urges Adeimantus to seek further clarification from Socrates 
concerning the arrangements for women and the family in the guardian and auxiliary classes in the 
ideal state. 
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to harm our enemies (332b). Socrates then brings in the notion of a skill, and he refers 
to medicine, cookery, navigation, music etc. and he considers what the purpose of 
such skills are. He argues that if we were to ask Simonides what the purpose of 
medical skill is, he would reply that 'it is the skill that supplies the body with remedies 
and with food and drink' (332c). Similarly, the purpose of cookery is to prepare well 
flavoured food. In the discussion that follows, Socrates demonstrates that the aim of 
the skilled person is to do his or her job well. The skilled person, for example the 
doctor, does not take advantage of his or her subjects but tries to cure them. 
Socrates proceeds to consider what skill the just person would possess. In response 
to Socrates' questioning, Polemarchus asserts that the just person would have the skill 
to help one's friends and harm one's enemies (332d). Socrates then asks 'In what 
activity or occupation will he best be able to help his friends and harm his enemies' 
and they consider this question (332e). It is notable that Polemarchus does not 
question Socrates' assertion that justice is a skill, like the other skills referred to above. 
At this point in the discussion, Polemarchus could have questioned this as justice is not 
as easy to define as the other skills that Socrates has given, for example, 
shoemaking, cookery, farming etc. This could have been an opportunity for 
Polemarchus to take control of the conversation. Socrates proceeds to argue that 
justice is human excellence and Polemarchus agrees with this assertion. Socrates then 
goes on to argue that men when harmed become more unjust and just men would 
never use their justice to make others more unjust (335c-d). He concludes therefore 
that 'it is not the function of the good man to do harm but of his opposite' and 
Polemarchus agrees with him (335d). 
Through the discussion which follows, it transpires that the definition of justice provided 
by Polemarchus does not stand up to Socrates' scrutiny. Polemarchus had 
maintained that justice is giving every man his due. He had then claimed that it is right 
to harm one's enemies. However, in the ongoing discussion with Socrates, it appears 
that the just person would never harm anyone whether friend or enemy and 
Polemarchus agrees with this observation. Socrates concludes therefore that they 
must have interpreted the poet Simonides incorrectly (335e). 
The elenchus exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus ends inconclusively but 
amicably. At the close of the discussion with Polemarchus, Socrates admits that they 
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have not yet found what justice is and he asks if any other member of the audience 
would like to give a suggestion (336a). At the end of this exchange the reader is left 
somewhat perplexed and this may explain why Thrasymachus is so irritated at this 
stage in the dialogue. Polemarchus seems to have given in very easily to the pOints 
put forward by Socrates as the discussion progressed. Perhaps Polemarchus was 
not sufficiently interested in the enquiry to give an alternative theory of justice when his 
first one proved to lack foundation. Alternatively, he might not have appreciated fully 
the outcome of the discussion. Indeed, the manner in which Polemarchus is depicted 
in Republic Book I, suggests that he has never given much thought to the matter of 
justice:'5 
Beversluis accuses Socrates of coercing Polemarchus into agreeing with the skill 
analogy as put forward by Socrates . .-s He also accuses Socrates of advancing 
inconsistent arguments, which Polemarchus fails to detect, in order to establish the skill 
analogy. In particular, Beversluis notes that according to Socrates, 'unlike the musician 
and the horseman, who cannot make people unmusical and unfit riders "by their arts", 
the surgeon can make people unhealthy by his art. 'v It is worth pointing out that 
Socrates does not appear to suggest that a doctor should harm his patients. When 
Socrates and Polemarchus are considering how to interpret the definition attributed to 
Simonides that it is right to give every man his due, they just note that a doctor would 
have the ability to benefit his friends and harm his enemies in health (332d). Later, 
they agree that 'musicians will hardly use their skill to make their pupils unmusical, or 
riding masters to make their pupils bad horsemen' (335c). 
In my view it is important to take the above assertions by Socrates in the context of 
the apparent outcome of the elenchus with Polemarchus that the just person would 
never harm anyone. Socrates' treatment of Polemarchus in this elenchus exchange 
appears to be consistent with his treatment of other respondents. The elenchus 
exchange seems to be designed to bring out weaknesses in Polemarchus' view 
concerning justice which feed into the remaining discussion in the Republic. It also 
alerts the reader to weaknesses in the views held by the character Socrates in Book I. 
As in the case of Cephalus above, if Plato was satisfied with the views put forward 
by Polemarchus, there would have been no need for him to consider the matter of 
25 Gifford 2001, pp. 86-87. 
26 Beversluis 2000, p. 207. 
27 Beversluis 2000, p. 218. 
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justice further in the Republic. The reader is left somewhat frustrated with the outcome 
of this exchange and this seems to be intentional on the part of Plato. Indeed, some 
commentators have suggested that the dramatic depiction of Thrasymachus' 
annoyance at this point in the dialogue alerts the reader to the fact that the elenchus 
has the potential to alienate the reader. a! 
It is significant that Polemarchus chose to defend the notion of justice attributed to his 
father, rather than formulating a view of his own. Was this because he did not have 
any strong views of his own concerning justice? There appears to be an ironic 
connection between the life of the historical Polemarchus and the views concerning 
justice that he expresses in Republic Book 1.:9 This makes the reader and audience in 
the background aware that in choosing to defend the notion of justice adhered to by 
his father, Polemarchus may be seen as defending the arms business transactions of 
his father. This was regardless of any moral implications associated with these 
business transactions. Socrates also seems to be implying an Athenian upper-class 
contempt for 'trade'.~ 
In the exchange with Socrates, Polemarchus comes out looking like the ignorant 
participant, despite the fact that, unlike Socrates, he was willing to put forward a view 
that he believed in concerning justice, even though it was not a view which he had 
developed himself. This is a common feature of the elenchus method of enqUiry as 
displayed in the earlier dialogues of Plato, for example, Laches and Gorgias, although 
unlike Polemarchus, the respondents in these dialogues are depicted as advancing 
views of their own. Importantly, Socrates' arguments have silenced Polemarchus, but 
they have not led the reader and background audience to any greater an 
understanding of what justice might consist of. This also happened in the exchange 
with Cephalus. This leads the reader to question why the character Socrates 
continues to adopt the elenchus method of enquiry, despite his lack of success in 
identifying the nature of justice. 
28 Blondell 2002, p. 180. It is notable that in the Apology, 23c, Socrates himself mentions the 
annoyance of interlocutors. 
29 Gifford (2001, pp. 88-89) alerts the reader to the ironic relationship between the life of the 
historical Polemarchus and the views concerning justice that he expresses in Republic Book I. 
30 Emlyn-Jones 2007, pp. 139-140. 
41 
(Section 2) 
The elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus 
In Republic Book I, Socrates continues to employ the elenchus method in his 
discussion with Thrasymachus.31 It is interesting that despite the strong concern 
expressed by Thrasymachus regarding the elenchus method when he entered the 
discussion in Republic Book I, Socrates manages to entice Thrasymachus quickly into 
an elenchus exchange. Socrates does this by taking advantage of Thrasymachus' 
confidence in his opinions concerning justice. In the interchange with Socrates, 
Thrasymachus puts forward a number assertions concerning the nature of justice, which 
are clarified by Socrates. These include the following: 
1) It is 'in the interest of the stronger party' (338c). 
2) It is 'obedience to the ruling power' (339b). 
3) It is for the good of someone else and not the individual (343c). 
It is notable that the theories advanced by Thrasymachus all promote injustice rather 
than justice. His main argument is that it does not pay the individual to be just. 
At Republic, 338c, Book I, Thrasymachus claims that justice 'is the interest of the 
stronger party.' Thrasymachus then clarifies this position by asserting that justice is 
'obedience to the ruling power' (33gb). In response to this, Socrates asks 
Thrasymachus a series of questions in order to establish whether these claims can be 
confirmed. He introduces the notion of a professional skill and argues that the interest 
of the professional is to do his job well. For example, the captain of a ship aims for a 
safe voyage and the doctor aims to cure his patients of their illnesses (341 c-d). 
Socrates then asserts that 'all forms of skill rule and control their subject-matter' and he 
persuades Thrasymachus to agree with him, although very reluctantly (342c). 
Socrates includes ruling and justice among these skills. Once Thrasymachus has 
agreed with this, Socrates argues that the ruler, like all other professionals is ruled by 
his particular skill. In the case of the ruler, his skill is to look to the interest of his 
31 As observed in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, 
Thrasymachus belongs to the category of clever hostile respondents, which also includes Callicles 
in the Gorgias. 
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subjects. Socrates concludes therefore that justice is not the interest of the stronger. 
Importantly, the care that Socrates takes in considering this argument advanced by 
Thrasymachus, suggests that Plato took Thrasymachus' argument seriously as a 
theory of justice that would need to be given careful examination.32 This can be 
contrasted with the time Socrates spends in discussion with Cephalus and 
Polemarchus. The intensity of the exchange between Thrasymachus and Socrates 
also alerts the reader to the seriousness of the points being discussed. 
Thrasymachus is caught out in the discussion with Socrates when he asserts that the 
ruler and other skilled professionals cannot make mistakes. He argues that 'to be 
really precise one must say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, makes no mistake, 
and so infallibly enacts what is best for himself, which his subjects must perform. And 
so, as I said to begin with, "right" means the interest of the stronger party' (340e-
341 a). Here, Thrasymachus has accepted Socrates' notion of ruling as a professional 
skill which he could have rejected. Thrasymachus is attempting to demonstrate that 
the skilled ruler will rule for his own good. But, when Socrates later goes on to argue 
that the ruler rules for the good of his subjects and not himself, Thrasymachus cannot 
then reject the notion of ruling as a professional skill. In connection with this, although 
according to Socrates the rulers rule for the good of the state as a whole, this does not 
prove that justice is not biased in favour of the rulers.:n However, Thrasymachus does 
not take up this point with Socrates and instead chooses to give another statement 
concerning justice. 
It is surprising that Thrasymachus, like Polemarchus, did not question Socrates' use of 
the analogy of a professional skill. This could have enabled Thrasymachus to take 
back control of the discussion. Why is the character Thrasymachus portrayed falling 
into this trap? When he entered the discussion with Socrates, Thrasymachus gave 
the impression of being superior in intelligence to Cephalus and Polemarchus. But, 
like them, he quickly became a victim of Socrates' elenchus. Unlike Cephalus and 
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus became angry at his defeat and he took his anger out on 
Socrates. Notably, in his eagerness to enter the discussion and put forward his view 
32 This pOint is provided by Irwin (1995, p. 175). 
33 Irwin 1995, p. 177. Indeed, it is interesting that in the ideal state, as outlined by Socrates in 
Republic Book IV, the guardians are put in a privileged position within the state and given the 
opportunity to gain knowledge of the Forms. Nevertheless, as noted by Socrates at the beginning 
of Book IV, 421a-421c, the guardians are there to serve the state as a whole. 
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concerning Justice, the character Thrasymachus was not concentrating fully on the 
content of the discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus and he did not learn 
from that exchange. The ability to listen carefully will prove to be an important quality 
of the respondents who partiCipate in the dialectic form of enquiry as illustrated in 
Republic Book II, 368a onwards. It is also necessary to have patience which 
Thrasymachus is shown to lack in Book I. These are qualities that the guardians in the 
ideal state will be required to demonstrate. 
Despite apparently being defeated by Socrates in the enquiry so far, Thrasymachus 
is still convinced that he knows what justice is and he puts forward a further claim: justice 
is for the good of someone else and not the individual. He clarifies this position by 
asserting that 'Injustice or wrong is just the opposite of this, and rules those who are 
really simple and just, while they serve their ruler's interests because he is stronger 
than they, and as his subjects promote his happiness to the complete exclusion of 
their own' (343c-d). He argues that the just man always does worse than the unjust 
man in business, financial and other affairs, because of his honesty. Here 
Thrasymachus is portraying the unjust ruler as living a more prosperous and happier 
life than his subjects. He gives the example of the tyrant as the ultimate example of 
the unjust ruler. He argues that when the tyrant 'succeeds in robbing the whole body 
of citizens and reducing them to slavery', his subjects will think of him as happy and 
fortunate and themselves as unhappy and unfortunate (344b-c). The reference to the 
tyrant here is important in relation to the discussion of the tyrant in Books IX and X of 
the Republic, where Socrates argues that the tyrant is not as fortunate as 
Thrasymachus suggests. Unlike Cephal us and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus has not 
been silenced by his first round of elenchus with Socrates. This gives the reader and 
audience the impression that the Socratic method of enquiry is being put under strain 
by Thrasymachus' self-confidence and his lack of enthusiasm for any prolonged 
reflection on the theories concerning justice that he is advanCing. 
In response to this, Socrates asserts that Thrasymachus has not convinced him that 
'injustice pays better than justice even if it has a clear field to do what it wants', as in the 
example of the tyrant (345a). Socrates then brings in the notion of a function and he 
claims that each art and profeSSion has its own specific function which differs from the 
function of the other arts and professions (346a). Socrates claims that each 
professional skill brings its own particular benefit. He gives a number of examples 
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which include: the function of a doctor is to cure his patients and the function of a sea 
captain is to navigate safely in order to ensure a safe voyage (346a-c). Socrates 
gains Thrasymachus' agreement that each art and profession has its own particular 
benefit. 
Socrates proceeds to assert that all arts and professions operate for the benefit of the 
subject rather than themselves. Having gained Thrasymachus' agreement on this, 
Socrates concludes that the ruler, like all other professionals, rules for the benefit of his 
subjects and not himself. He claims 'For in a city of good men there might well be as 
much competition to avoid power as there now is to get it, and it would be quite clear 
that the true ruler pursues his subjects' interest and not his own; consequently all wise 
men would prefer the benefit of this service at the hands of others rather than the 
labour of affording it to others themselves' (347d). 
Now, Socrates is clearly looking towards a new theory of justice here, which he goes 
on to consider in detail in Republic Book IV. However, he does appear to be going 
beyond what Thrasymachus has agreed to at this stage of the enquiry. 
Thrasymachus agreed that each art and profession has its own particular skill which it 
puts to use for the benefit of its subjects. Thrasymachus appears to have given in 
too easily to Socrates in agreeing that each profession operates to the advantage of 
the subject. Indeed, Thrasymachus could have argued that the difference between 
the just and unjust ruler is not simply a matter of professional expertise. Socrates' 
argument implies that if the ruler or other individual possesses a professional skill he or 
she will automatically use it to the advantage of his or her subjects. Thrasymachus 
could have argued that the unjust man is not trying to gain the expertise that the just 
man has and that the unjust person is led by other considerations than expertise, for 
example, he or she could have different priorities from the just man.34 In the case of 
the tyrant, his priority would be to gain power rather than to be a good leader. 
The elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus continues from 351 a 
to 352d, Book I, where Socrates claims that injustice is a source of disunity and 
therefore a source of weakness. This statement contradicts Thrasymachus, who has 
asserted that injustice is a source of strength. At Republic, 351c, Book I, Socrates 
34 This pOint is made by Annas (1981, pp. 51-52). See also, Emlyn-Jones (2007, p. 162) who 
observes that Thrasymachus and Socrates do not have any common ground at this point in the 
enquiry. 
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gives the example of a gang of thieves and he goes on to note that because unjust 
men will be competing against each other and everyone else, they will be incapable 
of any joint action, even for their common reward and that therefore injustice does not 
pay. Socrates concludes that 'Injustice, then, seems to have the following results, 
whether it occurs in a state or family or army or in anything else: it renders it incapable 
of any common action because of factions and quarrels and sets it at variance with 
itself and with its opponents and with whatever is just' (351 e-352a). This is in stark 
contrast with the theory of justice as advanced by Socrates in Republic Book IV 
where the three elements of the city and the soul are required to play their particular 
role for the good of the city and soul overall. In defence of Thrasymachus here, he 
was not suggesting that the tyrant would seek to embark on any co-operative 
enterprises. The tyrant would use force to make people do what he or she wants. 
In the final part of the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic 
Book I Socrates claims that, based on what they have already agreed, the just person 
is happier than the unjust person. This is the opposite of what Thrasymachus had 
originally suggested. Socrates introduces the notion of a function and he asserts that 
'everything which has a function has its own particular excellence' (353b). He gives 
the examples of a horse, also eyes and ears. He notes that if these are deprived of 
their own particular excellence they are unable to perform well (353c-d). Socrates 
then proceeds to apply this argument to the mind and he notes that they had agreed 
earlier in the discussion (at 350c) that justice is the particular excellence of the mind 
(353e). It is worth remembering here that Socrates admitted at 350d that 
Thrasymachus did not give in easily to this paint, so we can feel a sense of increased 
tension building up between Socrates and Thrasymachus. 
Socrates concludes that 'the just mind and the just man will have a good life, and the 
unjust a bad life' (353e). This claim appears to go beyond what Socrates has sought 
to prove against Thrasymachus and in particular the argument concerning the function 
of the mind and virtue.as 
Although Thrasymachus does not take up this point with Socrates, it is notable that he 
distances himself from this conclusion. Thrasymachus responds by saying 'So it 
35 Irwin 1995, p. 179. 
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appears from your argument' (353e).$ Thrasymachus is also outspoken at the end of 
their discussion saying to Socrates 'This is your holiday treat, so enjoy it' (354a). 
These comments from Thrasymachus, make the reader aware that Thrasymachus is 
not convinced by this final argument advanced by Socrates. The portrayal of 
Thrasymachus as sarcastic and outspoken gives the impression of a respondent who 
is not about to give up his original opinions concerning justice and injustice. It also 
suggests that Plato does not expect the reader to be fully convinced by the 
arguments advanced by Socrates in the elenchus exchange with Thrasymachus. The 
tone of Thrasymachus' last remark in Republic Book I alerts the reader to the fact that 
Thrasymachus has not been persuaded by Socrates' method of enquiry.37 
In the final part of their elenchus exchange, Thrasymachus appears to have just 
agreed with all the points put forward by Socrates as if he had lost interest in the 
discussion and in the method of enquiry being adopted by Socrates. This differs 
from the end of the exchanges with Cephal us and Polemarchus where Socrates was 
clearly in control of the proceedings and there was no tension between him and the 
respondent. Nevertheless, the elenchus exchanges between Socrates and 
Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus have all ended inconclusively in aporia. 
This alerts the reader to Socrates' conspicuous lack of success in the elenchus 
exchanges in Republic Book I. The portrayal of Thrasymachus as distancing himself 
from the elenchus method suggests that Plato may have been preparing the reader 
for the introduction of a revised method of enquiry at this stage in the Republic which 
promotes a more co-operative approach between Socrates and the respondents. 
In these examples, the elenchus method of questioning has enabled Socrates to 
argue that the statements made by Thrasymachus concerning justice appear to be 
incoherent. It is worth noting that this is only given the correctness of Socrates' 
arguments in his exchange with Thrasymachus, which are clearly weak. It leads to 
Thrasymachus displaying anger at his defeat and to Glaucon and Adeimantus 
displaying dissatisfaction with the outcome of the discussion. Thrasymachus is 
abusive to Socrates. Glaucon says to Socrates 'you seem to have fascinated 
Thrasymachus into a premature submisSion, like a snake charmer; but I am not 
satisfied yet about justice and injustice' (358b). So, although, in theory, Socrates has 
36 In this response to Socrates, Thrasymachus appears to be parodying Socrates who tends to say 
this to his respondents. 
37 Blondell 2002, p. 183. 
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defeated Thrasymachus through the elenchus method, the respondents are not 
satisfied with the outcome of the enquiry. Importantly, Socrates is not satisfied either 
with the inconclusive outcome of the enquiry. He admits at the end of Republic Book 
I that he has made no progress towards understanding the nature of justice (3S4b). 
It would appear that one of the main stumbling blocks in the elenchus between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus is Thrasymachus' lack of faith in the elenchus method and 
his lack of co-operation in the enquiry. But, perhaps Thrasymachus is justified here. 
Socrates faced a similar situation with Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias, which also 
resulted in both of these respondents displaying anger at their defeat, and especially 
Callic1es. In the case of Callicles, it is not resolved within the bounds of the dialogue. 
It becomes apparent at this stage of the enquiry, in Republic Book I, that if Socrates is 
going to have an impact on the respondents he will need to convince them rather than 
simply defeating them in the discussion. The reader can observe at the end of Book I 
that Thrasymachus is not really convinced of the arguments put forward by Socrates. 
We can also sympathise with the defiant position taken by Thrasymachus at the end 
of Book I, due to the weakness of the arguments advanced by Socrates in his 
exchange with Thrasymachus. 
Significantly, in the exchange with Thrasymachus, Socrates asks Thrasymachus not to 
answer the questions contrary to his real opinion. In response to this, Thrasymachus 
says 'Yes, I will, to please you', 'since you won't let me speak freely' (350e). This 
comment from Thrasymachus leaves the reader in doubt as to whether Thrasymachus 
is giving his own view or not at this pOint in the discussion. The reader is surprised 
when Socrates replies to Thrasymachus 'Do as you suggest, and I will ask the 
questions' (350e). It is an important feature of the elenchus method of enqUiry that the 
respondent says what he or she really believes.:lB This raises a question as to why 
Socrates insisted on continuing with the elenchus exchange with Thrasymachus, when 
Thrasymachus refused to be co-operative and felt that he was unable to speak freely. 
Beversluis claims that Thrasymachus is being insincere in places in the Republic Book 
I and he suggests that Socrates is aware of this fact.:!} 
38 This pOint is noted by Brickhouse and Smith (1991, p. 158). 
39 Beversluis 2000, pp. 236-237, 239-240, 242-243. 
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In my view, Socrates does want Thrasymachus to answer his questions sincerely but 
he is unable to force him to do so. As Thrasymachus does not approve of the 
elenchus method of enquiry he does not appreciate the importance that Socrates 
places on sincerity in the elenchus. Nevertheless, Thrasymachus does appear to be 
sincere in the main arguments that he puts forward concerning justice. There is just 
some uncertainty concerning his sincerity at some points in the exchange in Republic 
Book I. But, without Thrasymachus' full co-operation, the elenchus exchange does not 
lead them any nearer to gaining knowledge concerning the nature of justice. At this 
point in the enquiry, Plato appears to be problematising 'Sincerity' and 'co-operation'. 
Beversluis goes beyond this, and accuses Socrates of being more concerned with 
winning arguments than finding out moral truths. He argues that in the elenchus with 
Thrasymachus, Socrates demonstrates a lack of care for the respondent's soul.40 
Admittedly, a number of the arguments advanced by Socrates against Thrasymachus 
do seem somewhat implausible, for example, that the shepherd operates in the 
interest of his flock and the ruler rules in the interest of his subjects. Also, the outcomes 
of each of the exchanges between Socrates and Thrasymachus do seem somewhat 
strained. This does not lead the reader to conclude that Socrates demonstrates a lack 
of care for the soul of the respondent. It brings to light a weakness in the elenchus 
method, in that it does not appear to be sufficient to deal with a respondent of the 
calibre of Thrasymachus. The fact that Socrates continued the discussion with 
Thrasymachus, despite his rudeness and lack of co-operation, suggests that Socrates 
did care for his soul. If Socrates was primarily concerned with winning arguments, he 
would have avoided taking on strong respondents such as Thrasymachus and 
continued his enquiry with weaker respondents such as Cephalus and Polemarchus. 
Socrates does not convince Thrasymachus and this becomes a problem. This is 
because Socrates, as depicted in Book I of the Republic, does not have an 
alternative method of enquiry available to him. The reader can appreciate the level of 
frustration that Thrasymachus was experiencing during the course of the discussion 
when Socrates reports that 'Thrasymachus' agreement to all these pOints did not 
come as easily as I have described, but had to be dragged out from him with much 
difficulty, and with a great deal of sweat - for it was a hot day' (350c-d). This also alerts 
the reader to how difficult it is for the respondent to pass the Socratic elenctic test, that 
40 Beversluis 2000, p. 244. 
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is, to advance a definition that Socrates cannot find fault with.41 This would require the 
respondent to be aware of all the other propositions that are logically related to the 
proposition that he or she is putting forward. The subject matter that the dialogues 
focus on, for example, justice and virtue, make this even more difficult for the 
respondent to overcome as they may have deeply entrenched opinions concerning 
these matters that they would find difficult to revise.42 Indeed, the difficulty 
experienced by the respondent in attempting to pass the Socratic elenctic test and 
the aggravation that this caused for the respondent, may have influenced Plato's 
decision to revise the method of enquiry adopted by Socrates in the Republic Book 
II onwards. 
In my view, in the elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in 
Republic Book I, Thrasymachus does not appear to have been fully defeated. This 
is because Thrasymachus justifiably demonstrates a lack of faith in the elenchus 
method and refuses to give up the views that he has put forward, despite being 
refuted by Socrates in the exchange. There are differing views on the outcome of the 
elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus. Recent debates have 
focussed on the question as to whether Thrasymachus provides a coherent set of 
arguments in Republic Book I. Some commentators have sought to demonstrate that 
the various accounts of justice given by Thrasymachus are incoherent.043 Others have 
defended Thrasymachus and asserted that his arguments in Republic Book I are 
coherent. 44 
In addition to raising important questions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of 
the arguments given by the respondents and Socrates and the usefulness of the 
elenchus method of enquiry, Book I appears to have a wider remit within the Republic 
as a whole. A significant feature of the role of the respondents in Book I, and in 
particular Thrasymachus, is to draw to the attention of the reader the type of views 
held by members of the wider community concerning justice and the level of 
resistance they would display towards any attempt to question or change their views. 
41 It is highly likely that any elenchus enquiry would end inconclusively in aporia. This alerts the 
reader to a negative aspect of this method of enquiry. The elenchus method does not enable 
Socrates or the respondent to advance a positive answer to the question under consideration. 
42 Frede 1992, pp. 214-215. 
43 Everson (1998, pp. 99-131) puts forward the thesis that the arguments given by Thrasymachus in 
Book I are incoherent. 
44 Chappell (1993, pp. 10-17) and (2000, pp. 101-107) advances the thesis that Thrasymachus is 
being coherent in Book I. 
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This gives the reader an appreciation of the uphill battle that Plato would have to face 
in convincing the community that the theory of justice advanced in the Republic, 368a 
onwards, would work for the benefit of the community overall. It also gives the reader 
an appreciation of how out of line the views advanced by Socrates in the Republic, 
368a onwards, may have been with the views held by the wider community 
conceming justice.45 There are some other important connections between Book I and 
the rest of the Republic and these are considered in the next section of this chapter. 
(Section 3) 
Wider Issues relating to Book I and the Republic overall 
• The ongoing presence of Thrasymachus In the Republic 
After the elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I, 
Thrasymachus remains mainly silent in the rest of the dialogue. Despite this, his 
presence is felt well beyond Book I of the Republic. He speaks up on one occasion 
and Socrates and the respondents make a number of references to him during the 
course of the dialectic enquiry. At 450a-b, Book V, Thrasymachus gives support to 
Adeimantus in his request to Socrates to provide further details concerning the 
arrangements for women and children in the ideal state. Thrasymachus says 'But what 
do you think we are here for, idle speculation or serious discussion?146 At 498c-d, 
Book VI, Socrates has been arguing that it would be possible for philosophers to be 
put in charge of the state. Adeimantus notes that Socrates would have trouble 
convincing his audience of this and in particular Thrasymachus. 
At 545a-b, Book VIII, Socrates has just started the enquiry into imperfect states and 
souls and he observes that they will consider four types of societies and individuals 
that are worse than the ideal state and also consider which type of individual would be 
the happiest. This would enable them to establish whether 'to pursue injustice with 
Thrasymachus, or justice with the argument' that they are examining. The reader is 
surprised by this comment from Socrates as they had already agreed in Book IV to 
.SBlondeli (2002, pp. 36-37) provides a useful discussion on Plato's depiction of Socrates in his 
dialogues and the significance of the execution of the historical Socrates. 
46 Interestingly, 'idle speculation' is 'smelting ore' in Thrasymachus' expression. This is 
characteristically forceful and may recall 336e, Book I, where Socrates rates the search for iustice 
above that for gold. 
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pursue justice with the establishment of the ideal state. 
At 590d, Book IX, Socrates argues that in the ideal state the workers would benefit 
by being ruled by the guardians because of the wisdom that the guardians would 
possess. Socrates asserts that 'this control is not exercised, as Thrasymachus 
thought, to the detriment of the subject, but because it is better for every creature to 
be under the control of divine wisdom.' However, the reader can observe that in both 
the ideal state and the state advanced by Thrasymachus, it is necessary for the 
workers who make up the majority of the population, to be controlled by the minority. 
These references to Thrasymachus remind the reader of the strength of the arguments 
given by him in Book I. 
In addition to the direct references to Thrasymachus in the dialectic enquiry in the 
Republic, there would appear to be a number of indirect references to him. These 
seem to be designed to make the reader wary of Thrasymachus' character and they 
attempt to undermine the arguments that he gives in Book I in support of the tyrant 
and tyranny. During the course of the enquiry into unjust states and souls in Books 
VIII and IX, Socrates describes tyranny and the tyrant as the worst type of state and 
individual. He claims that the tyrant is controlled by unnecessary desires rather than 
reason and is essentially a criminal type. He also argues that the tyrant would be the 
least happy type of character (562a-588a). 
In Book IX, Socrates provides the illustration of the three headed creature (S88b-
589c). This creature consists of a man representing reason, a lion representing spirit 
and a beast representing appetite. Outwardly, the creature takes on the appearance 
of the man. Socrates asserts that when we argue that it is better to be unjust rather 
than just, we are saying that it is better to let the beast, backed up by the lion, take on 
control rather than the man. In this example, the reader will note that Socrates relies on 
illustration to defeat Thrasymachus' pOSition. This illustration reminds the reader of 
Thrasymachus' entry into the discussion in Book I where Socrates describes him as 
acting like a wild beast. 
In Book X, Socrates relates the Myth of Er. In this myth, we are told of the severe 
punishment that the tyrants, who are said to be 'incurably wicked', would receive in the 
afterlife. They would receive worse punishment than any of the other character types. 
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This would include being bound hand, foot and neck and being impaled on thorns and 
eventually being flung into Tartarus (61Se-616a). In comparison, the souls of the just 
would be rewarded in the afterlife. It is important to note Socrates' reliance on myth 
here to attack Thrasymachus' position. 
It has been asserted by some that Thrasymachus' character is dominated by thumos 
or spirit which later emerges as the dominant characteristic of the auxiliaries in the ideal 
city, as outlined in the discussion in Republic Book IV concerning the just city and 
soul.47 The evidence provided to back up this argument includes: the images used in 
connection with Thrasymachus in the Republic Book I; Thrasymachus' bad temper 
and argumentative impulse; Thrasymachus' interpretation of Socrates' motives in the 
discussion and; the content of his arguments. Other commentators have also argued 
that the anger and shame displayed by Thrasymachus in Republic Book I make 
thumos a strong feature of the personality of Thrasymachus.48 
These commentators appear to be right in one respect but wrong in another. I would 
agree that Thrasymachus is closely linked to one of the character types described later 
in the Republic. I would also agree that Thrasymachus did display a notable degree 
of spirit in his character and that this was evident in the discussion with Socrates in 
Book I. However, I would suggest that, it was not spirit that dominated 
Thrasymachus' character but the element of uncontrollable appetite. This was later 
found to be the dominant characteristic of the tyrannical character as outlined by 
Socrates (571 a-576b, Book IX). Thrasymachus displays a lack of respect towards 
Socrates in the discussion. In addition, he displays a single-minded ness and a lack of 
co-operation which are representative of the tyrant.49 Most importantly, Thrasymachus 
did not align himself with Socrates, as would be representative of the auxiliaries in the 
ideal state, who would be dominated by spirit. Instead, Thrasymachus took on a 
combative approach against Socrates in their exchange in Book I. In my view, the 
character Socrates represents the guardians in the ideal state and the character 
Thrasymachus is representative of the tyrant as described by Socrates in his 
discussion of unjust states and souls in Republic Books VIII and IX.fO 
47 This point is made by Wilson (1995, pp. 58-67). 
48 Blondell 2002, p. 182. 
49 Aune 1997, p. 306. 
50 In Book I, 344a, Thrasymachus is explicit about 'tyranny' as the desirable end. 
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Wilson argues that 'The desire for power springs from thumos and has great 
destructive potential. '51 Here I think Wilson is mixing up the dominant characteristics of 
the auxiliaries and the tyrant. In the ideal state the auxiliaries would be dominated by 
the element of spirit and this would enable them to fight for and defend the rule of the 
guardians. Whereas in the unjust state the tyrant, who is dominated by uncontrollable 
appetite, would be the one who would seek to gain power and would have great 
destructive potential. 
Early in Book VIII, Socrates observes that in time the ideal state would decay. He 
says that 'since all created things must decay, even a social order of this kind cannot 
last for all time, but must decline' (546a). In the course of Books VlII and IX, Socrates 
provides a detailed account of how the dissolution of the ideal state would come 
about. We are told that the ideal state would deteriorate firstly into a timarchy, then 
into an oligarchy, then a democracy, and eventually into a tyranny. Likewise, the ideal 
soul would no longer be controlled by reason. Instead, it would eventually be led by 
unnecessary desires, as in the case of the tyrant. Socrates also puts forward the 
theory that the tyrant would be the least just and least happy type of person.52 
Importantly, at the end of Book IX and towards the end of the dialectic enqUiry into the 
nature of justice in the Republic, Socrates and Glaucon who is acting as respondent at 
this pOint, express doubt about the possibility of the ideal state, ever becoming a 
reality on earth. Socrates then observes 'Perhaps, it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, 
where he who wishes can see it and found it in his own heart' (592b) and Glaucon 
agrees with him. This puts in doubt all the positive theories that have been advanced 
by Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus since the beginning of the dialectic enqUiry at 
368a, Book II. Interestingly, in Book X before the Myth of Er, Socrates and the 
respondents consider the rewards of goodness in this life (612a-613e). In this 
discussion, we are told that the good person will be rewarded for doing good. 
Notably, in Book II, part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus put forward the argument that the 
just would not be rewarded. Significantly, Socrates and the respondents do not make 
any reference to the ideal state and soul at this point of the enquiry in Book X. 
51 Wilson 1995, p. 67. 
52 The significance of the deterioration of the ideal state and soul is considered in more detail in 
chapter 3 of this enquiry. 
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Despite Thrasymachus' silence at the end of the Republic, the reader is not convinced 
that he has been fully defeated by Socrates. We are left wondering why Plato 
organised the dialogue in this way and what message he is trying to give. The 
discussion of imperfect states and souls in Books VIII and IX leaves the reader with 
the strong impression that Plato may have thought that it was inevitable that the ideal 
state would deteriorate into a tyranny. Indeed, that is, if the ideal state was ever 
established in the first place. This, together with the direct and indirect references to 
Thrasymachus in the dialectic enquiry, suggest that the arguments outlined by 
Thrasymachus in Book I are still very much alive at the end of the discussion in the 
Republic. 
- The relationship between Republic Book I and the remaining Books of the 
dialogue 
In addition to the links between the depiction of Thrasymachus in Book I and the rest 
of the Republic, as outlined above, Book I contains other examples of anticipation of 
themes and theses that are developed further in the later books.53 The examples of 
anticipation of themes and theses in Book I identified by Kahn lead him to conclude 
that Republic Book I was composed as an integrated part of the Republic and not as 
an earlier separate dialogue. 54 The examples of anticipation given by Kahn are 
convincing and they do suggest that Book I was designed as an integrated part of the 
Republic. It is also possible that the links between Republic Book I and the 
remaining Books were drawn up by Plato when he was composing Books II to X 
rather than having been fully worked out when composing Book I. If this were the 
case, Book , could have been designed to brainstorm the issue of justice and lay the 
foundation for the composition of the remaining books. Alternatively, Plato could have 
started any of the Books of the Republic first and then designed the other Books 
around that Book. 
For his own reasons, Plato presented the Republic with Books I to X included. It was 
his intention that the reader should experience the elenchus exchanges in Book I 
before the dialectic enquiry of the later books. What message can we take from this? 
53 Kahn (1993, pp. 136-140) provides a number of useful examples of 'prolepsis' or anticipation of 
themes and theses between Book I and the remaining Books of the Republic. Kahn (1993, pp. 
140-142) also alerts the reader to a number of interesting links between the later Books of the 
Republic. 
54 Kahn 1993, p.139. 
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By following the process of the elenchus between Socrates and the respondents in 
Book I, the reader is given the opportunity to join Plato in his quest for an 
understanding of justice. We are also given an appreciation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the elenchus method of enquiry as depicted in Book I. This prepares 
the reader for the display oration from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part I, and 
the move to the dialectic method of enquiry which is adopted by Socrates from Book 
II, 368a onwards. The fact that Plato moves from one method of enquiry to another in 
the Republic gives the reader an appreciation of his ongoing quest to find the best 
method to be used in the attempt to gain knowledge. 
Some have argued that Book I could be removed from the Republic without having 
any substantial impact on the success of the arguments outlined in the remaining 
Books. The justification given for this view is that Books 1\ to X can be understood 
without Book I and that Book I appears to be an introduction to what follows rather 
than an integral part of the work. A further justification given for this view is that the 
challenge put forward by Glaucon in Republic Book" is far more powerful than the 
challenge advanced by Thrasymachus in Book 1.$ This is a very negative view 
concerning the significance of Republic Book I within the overall work. In my opinion, 
Book I plays a crucial role in the Republic as a whole. The challenge given by 
Thrasymachus in Book I is particularly important because it inspired Glaucon and 
Adeimantus to put forward their challenge to Socrates in Book II. Without Book I, 
where would Glaucon and Adeimantus have got their inspiration from? Without the 
challenge from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, it is uncertain what the focus of the 
remaining Books of the Republic would have been. Also, the ongoing presence of 
Thrasymachus in the Republic overall, as discussed above, suggests that Book I is 
an integral part of the Republic. $ 
At the end of Book I, the Republic could have concluded without a resolution as 
happens typically in the early dialogues of Plato, for example, Laches where they 
55 This view is advanced by Everson (1998, pp. 126-127). Chappell (2000, p. 101) expresses 
sympathy with Everson's view concerning the importance of Glaucon's challenge in Book II. 
58 Blondell (2002, pp. 196-197) observes that in Book I Plato exploits Socrates' role as narrator in 
order to discredit Thrasymachus' views by associating them negatively with his character. However, 
in Book II, the interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus alert the reader to the fact that. rather 
than being extremist, the views of justice outlined by Thrasymachus in Book I were representative 
of many ordinary people and sophists. Blondell (2002, pp. 244-245) suggests another relevance 
of Republic Book I. She argues that by including the elenchus exchanges in Book I, Plato was able 
to show dramatically that the change to the dialectic method was a response to the inadequacies 
associated with the elenchus style of enquiry. 
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had not found out what courage was comprised of and Protagoras where they had not 
identified what the nature of excellence was and whether it could be taught. However, 
Plato did not choose this way forward for the Republic and instead it includes a total of 
ten Books. It becomes clear in the next Book, that the overall structure and content of 
the Republic as a whole is very different from the earlier dialogues of Plato. Vlastos 
asserts that in his middle dialogues Plato 'proceeds to disengage Socrates from the 
elenchus' and 'the moralist of the earlier dialogues becomes the metaphysician and 
epistemologist of the middle ones.'ST 
There are a number of differing views concerning Vlastos' assertion that Plato changed 
his approach in the middle dialogues. Some have argued against Vlastos' position 
and claimed that Plato's basic view remained the same in the early, middle and late 
dialogues.58 Some disagree with Vlastos that the change from the elenchus in Book I 
to the dialectic in Book II is also a change from the Socratic method to Plato's new 
method of enquiry. The reason given for this view is that although the character 
Socrates appears to be closer to the historical Socrates in the early dialogues, it is not 
possible to confirm this thesis. $ It is suggested that a more positive approach would 
be to view the Socrates of the earlier dialogues as representing the young Plato who 
later goes on to write the middle and later works and' think this is plausible.Sl Notably, 
some other commentators do not support any developmental interpretations of the 
Republic and the other works of Plato.51 
Other commentators have put forward the thesis that the elenchus method of enquiry 
adopted by Socrates in Republic Book I does not change in a significant way and that 
Socrates continues to use this method in the later Books. The justification given for 
holding this view is that Republic Book I is not exclusively negative and the later 
57 Vlastos 1995, p. 37. 
58 Rowe (2007, pp. 41-53) argues against Vlastos' position. With regard to the Republic as a whole, 
Rowe (2007, p. 53) asserts that 'Plato retains the basic Socratic view that, as rational beings, it is the 
real good that we desire, and the real good that it is in all our interests to discover.' 
59 Kahn 1992, p. 257. 
60 Kahn 1992, pp. 257-258. 
61 Nails (1995, pp. 53-135) gives a strong criticism of the developmental interpretation of Plato's 
dialogues. According to the developmental thesis: Plato's philosophical theories developed over 
his lifetime; it is possible for scholars to determine the chronological order of the composition of the 
dialogues of Plato; and the character Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato is representative of 
the historical Socrates, whilst the character of Socrates in the middle and later works represents the 
view of Plato. Blondell (2002, pp. 1-37) eschews the developmental interpretation of Plato's 
dialogues. 
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books are not exclusively constructive.52 This position is justified by the claim that 
Republic Book II onwards has a negative aspect in that it is a type of elenchus against 
Thrasymachus' original position in Book I, which was defended by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Book II. Also, it is claimed that there is a positive aspect to Plato's 
portrayal of Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus and that, in Book I, Plato is not 
just concerned with showing Socrates winning arguments. It is asserted that the 
character types in Book I have a positive input into the Republic as a whole in that 
they feed into the character types as outlined by Socrates in the later Books of the 
Republic. The suggestion is made that Socrates represents the guardians, 
Polemarchus the auxiliaries, and Cephalus the workers as described in Book IV, and 
Thrasymachus the tyrant as described in Book IX.63 
I am not fully convinced by the thesis presented by Aune. I agree that the content of 
Book I feeds into the content of the later Books of the Republic. I also agree with the 
connections put forward in relation to the characters Socrates, Cephalus and 
Thrasymachus. However, I would suggest that Polemarchus represents the workers 
rather than the auxiliaries in the ideal state. This is because of his lack of spirit and 
ability in the elenchus exchange with Socrates. Also, unlike the auxiliaries as outlined 
in the Republic who would be expected to give support to the guardians in their new 
role as leaders, Polemarchus, like his father, did not have any of the political or military 
obligations of a citizen due to his metic status. Also, against Aune, I would argue that 
in Books \I to X of the Republic Socrates does not adopt a type of elenchus 
exchange. 
The dialectic method of enqUiry adopted by Socrates from Book II, 368a onwards, 
does have a number of similarities to the elenchus method of Book I. These include 
the continued use of the dialogue form and the question and answer format. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in Republic Book II onwards, the character 
Socrates advances substantial philosophical theories and this is not a feature of Book 
I. The dialectic method is considered in chapter 3 of this enquiry. 
62 Aune 1997, pp. 306-308. 
63 For a discussion concerning the connections between Republic Book I and the subsequent 
Books, see Aune (1997, pp. 298-302). 
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Conclusion 
The input from Cephalus, Polemarchus and especially Thrasymachus in Book I has 
proved to be negative because it has not moved the overall enquiry into justice in the 
Republic forward. The increased dramatic tension has been introduced at a time when 
the philosophical enquiry has come to a sudden stop. Socrates' reaction to 
Thrasymachus' rude interruption is interesting. What can Plato's reason be for this? Is 
it that he simply cannot accept the thesis represented by Thrasymachus that injustice 
is superior to justice. There must be a means to demonstrate that Thrasymachus has 
got this wrong. But, the elenchus method of enquiry is proving inadequate for this 
task. Indeed, we appear to have a situation where the character Socrates believes 
the things he says in the latter part of Book I are true (and Plato does too). But, 
Socrates is unhappy with the way he has tried to prove these points. 
In the early dialogues, Socrates adopts the elenchus method to bring to light any 
inconsistent beliefs that the respondent may have. But, the elenchus also appears to 
aim to make the respondent feel ashamed at having his or her ignorance made public. 
This should give the respondent a strong incentive to review his or her beliefs and 
therefore have a positive influence on the respondent.54 It is notable that although 
Socrates highlights the fact that Thrasymachus blushes in shame at being put down 
by him in Book I, the elenchus exchange with Socrates did not result in Thrasymachus 
reviewing his beliefs (350d). It took another nine Books of the Republic for Socrates 
to attempt to defeat Thrasyrnachus by setting out to demonstrate, through the dialectic 
method of enquiry, that the theory of justice advanced by Thrasymachus would lead 
to unhappiness for the individual in this life and in the next one. This is the opposite of 
what Thrasymachus asserted in Republic Book I. Despite Thrasymachus' silence at 
the end of the Republic, the reader is not convinced that the arguments advanced by 
Thrasymachus have been fully defeated by Socrates. 
Unlike Glaucon and Adeimantus, who despite their strong input in Book II and their 
key interruptions in Books V and VI, take part in a mainly co-operative enquiry with 
Socrates into justice, Thrasymachus advances his own strongly held theory of justice 
and he is taken aback and angry with the outcome of his elenchus exchange with 
64 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, p. 153-154) raise this paint. They also note that this does not 
always work and some respondents get angry. 
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Socrates.65 However, unlike Cephalus, Thrasymachus stays on to hear the rest of the 
enquiry into justice after Book 11 of the Republic. This suggests to the reader that Plato 
realised that if the just state, as outlined in Republic Book IV, was ever to get 
underway people like Thrasymachus with strong and inflexible views of their own 
would need to be persuaded of the benefits that the ideal state would bring to 
society as a whole. 
At the end of Republic Book I we are left with the strong impression that the reader is 
not supposed to be satisfied with the outcome of the enquiry so far. The discussions 
in Book I have not provided an answer to the original question: what is justice? This 
becomes apparent in the closing words of Socrates in Book I. He admits at the end 
of the discussion with Thrasymachus that he still does not know what justice is. 'For so 
long as I don't know what justice is I'm hardly likely to find out whether it is an 
excellence or not, or whether it makes a man happy or unhappy' (354b). He notes 
that in the discussion he got carried away enquiring into the particular examples 
concerning justice put forward by the respondents rather than focusing on the core 
question: what is justice (354b)? Notably, as happened in the interchange with 
Thrasymachus, the elenchus exchanges between Socrates and Cephalus and 
Socrates and Polemarchus also alerted the reader to weaknesses in the elenchus 
method of enquiry adopted by Socrates. 
In relation to the transition from Book I to Book II of the Republic, Thrasymachus could 
have provided a more complex argument for injustice by portraying the unjust person 
as someone who acts justly or unjustly according to when it is to his or her advantage 
to do so, rather than someone who always gives priority to injustice. This is the 
approach taken by Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic Book II, which is 
considered in the next chapter of this enquiry. 
65 The interventions from Glaucon and Adeimantus are considered in chapters 2, 4 and 5 of this 
enquiry. 
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Chapter 2 
Glaucon and Adeimantus: The display oration method and a challenge to 
Socrates 
Introduction 
There are a number of highly dramatic interruptions made by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Republic Book II, part I, (357a-367e). These are introduced at a time 
when the enquiry into justice in Book I has ended inconclusively and Socrates has 
expressed disappointment at the outcome of the enquiry so far. Also, Thrasymachus 
has displayed anger in the enquiry in Book 1.1 In their interruptions in Book II, Glaucon 
and Adeimantus display a high level of understanding of the issues relating to justice 
and injustice that were raised by the respondents in Book I. 
In section 1, this chapter considers the significance of the interruptions made by 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, and what may have prompted them to 
interrupt at this stage of the dialogue. In sections 2 and 3, it looks in detail at the 
arguments advanced by Glaucon and Adeimantus. It also reflects upon the response 
made by Socrates to these arguments and the role that he plays in this part of the 
Republic. In section 4, consideration is given to some wider issues relating to Book II, 
part 1, and especially its relation to Book I and Book X, part 2, of the dialogue. This 
chapter highlights the importance of Book II, part 1, within the Republic as a whole. 
(Section 1) 
The dramatic entry of Glaucon and Adeimantus Into the enquiry and what 
has prompted this development 
In the second Book of the Republic, the reader and audience in the background are 
unexpectedly introduced to a new set of participants in the discussion and a new style 
of enquiry: the display oration method. It is notable that although Socrates continues 
to feature in Book II, part 1, his role changes temporarily from that of questioner to 
respondent, with Glaucon and Adeimantus taking the lead in the discussion. Glaucon 
and Adeimantus join Socrates in his search for an understanding of justice from Book II 
, Republic Book I is considered in detail in chapter 1 of this enquiry. 
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onwards of the Republic. 2 But, they make their most dramatic entry in Book II, part 1, 
with Glaucon speaking up first, followed by Adeimantus. Neither of these 
respondents is convinced by the arguments put forward by Socrates in Book I. They 
believe that Thrasymachus has not been fully defeated as yet.3 They reformulate 
Thrasymachus' argument and provide a fresh challenge to Socrates. This leads the 
reader to question why this change has been introduced. It would appear that in 
Book II Plato is attempting to move on from the inconclusive outcome of the elenchus 
enquiry in Book I, in an ongoing attempt to find out the nature of justice. The 'new start' 
also suggests that the Book I arguments regarding techne and skill are regarded by 
the character Socrates as now inadequate. 
Socrates is taken aback, but claims to be 'delighted' when Glaucon and Adeimantus 
advance their challenge to him (368a). This can be compared with Socrates' reaction 
to the entry of Thrasymachus into the enquiry in Republic Book I where he claims to 
be 'panic-stricken' (336b). Also, it can be compared with the end of Book I, where 
Thrasymachus continues to display some rudeness towards Socrates and Socrates 
admits, with disappointment, that he has not reached an understanding concerning the 
nature of justice (354a-b). 
The reaction of Socrates to Glaucon and Adeimantus is surprising considering the 
controversial nature of the arguments given by them in Book II, part 1, and the 
enormous challenge that they put to Socrates. However, according to Socrates, 
Glaucon displays his 'customary pertinacity' here by insisting that the matter be 
considered further (357a-b). In Book II, Adeimantus supplements what Glaucon has 
asserted concerning the notion of justice. He then challenges Socrates to provide a 
theory of justice that would defend it against the theories outlined in favour of acting 
unjustly in Book I and Book II, part 1. Socrates appears to be more at ease with 
Glaucon and Adeimantus than he was with Thrasymachus and this suggests that they 
2 As noted in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, in Book II, 
part 1 of the Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus fit into the category of capable, sympathetic and 
challenging respondents. It is worth observing that Glaucon makes a brief entry into the elenchus 
enquiry in Book I where he says to Socrates 'I recognize your two kinds of reward, but I don't know 
what the punishment is or in what sense you speak of it as pay' (347a). 
3 This point is made by Irwin (1995, p. 181). Irwin (1995, p. 198) also observes that since Glaucon 
and Adeimantus believe that the question of what justice consists in has not been answered 
satisfactorily as yet, this includes the arguments advanced by Socrates in Republic Book I. The 
importance of the role of Thrasymachus in the Republic as a whole is considered in chapter 1 of this 
study. 
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may be in a better position to make progress in their enquiry into justice.4 
From Book II in the Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus are depicted as two 
respondents who are anxious to establish the truth concerning the nature of justice and 
who are prepared to speak up if they think that any of the conclusions are being 
reached too hastily. With regard to the transition from Book I to Book II of the 
Republic, there is a notable change in style and mood from the aggressive challenge 
from Thrasymachus in Book I to the calm but insistent and more systematic challenge 
from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 11.5 Although Glaucon and Adeimantus 
surprise Socrates by challenging him, they do seem to be sincere in their desire to 
establish the facts concerning justice. Glaucon and Adeimantus do not demonstrate 
any ill feeling towards Thrasymachus. This suggests that they appreciate that 
Thrasymachus was sincere but less persistent than they are in putting forward his 
theory of justice. However, they hope to find a more positive theory of justice 
through their enquiry with Socrates. 
Some have argued that Glaucon and Adeimantus are portrayed in the Republic 
overall as 'able and vigorous' with Glaucon playing a more dominant role than 
Adeimantus.6 It should be noted however that although Glaucon features in more of 
the discussion with Socrates from Book II, 368a onwards, Adeimantus is responsible 
for advancing more of the dramatic interruptions in the dialectic enquiry than Glaucon. 
The interruptions from Adeimantus and Glaucon are considered in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this study. 
Another point to note is that although the characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus come 
across as real individuals in the dialogue, the reader needs to bear in mind that 
Glaucon and Adeimantus and the other characters in the Republic are inventions of 
Plato which he builds into the work for his purposes. Also, despite the fact that they 
are Plato's inventions, we cannot assume that any of the characters in the Republic 
necessarily represent Plato's viewpoint in the dialogues, or the viewpoint of the 
4 It is worth noting that at 358c, it becomes apparent to the reader that Glaucon is acting as a devit's 
advocate and he does not believe the theories that he is advancing. At 367b, we are alerted to the 
same fact concerning Adeimantus. 
5 Rutherford 1995, p. 206. 
6 Tarrant 1955, p. 87. 
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person that they are named after.? Nevertheless, the fact that Plato wrote the 
dialogues means that he took a personal interest in the matters considered in the 
dialogues and the progress and outcome of the discussion.s These issues are 
considered in the introductory chapter of this enquiry. 
In Book II, part 1 , Glaucon makes it clear that he is not satisfied with the outcome of the 
discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I. He states 'For you seem 
to have fascinated Thrasymachus into a premature submission, like a snake charmer; 
but I am not satisfied yet about justice and injustice' (358b). Glaucon puts forward 
three kinds of good and he asks Socrates which category he would place justice in 
(357b-d): 
1. For its own sake: for example, enjoyment or pleasure. 
2. For its own sake and for its consequences: for example, wisdom, sight and health. 
3. For its consequences: for example, medical treatment and exercise.9 
Socrates asserts that he would place justice in the second of the categories of goods 
given by Glaucon: for its own sake and for its consequences (358a) and he refers to 
this as the highest category.10 Glaucon is surprised by this response from Socrates 
and he observes that most people would place justice in the third category of goods: 
for its consequences. By breaking justice into three categories, Glaucon defines the 
boundaries of the enquiry and makes it more focused. He also enables Socrates to 
7 This point is made by Frede (1992, p. 214). Also, Blondell (2002, p. 36) argues that we cannot 
take the discussions in the dialogue to be authentic historical conversations. Poster (2001, p. 2) 
observes that the reader needs to bear in mind that although the characters in the Republic, 
including Socrates, come across as real people in the dialogue, they are literary devices created by 
Plato for his own purposes. Waterfield (2000, pp. 270-276) provides a useful translation and 
commentary on some fragments of the historical sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon which differ 
from the theories advanced by the character Thrasymachus in Republic Book I. 
8 Kosman (1992, pp. 73-92) considers some difficulties in interpreting Plato's dialogues due to the 
fact that Plato does not feature in them. 
9 It is surprising that Glaucon advances three kinds of good that justice can be placed in as 
Thrasymachus did not suggest that justice was any type of good for the individual who acts justly. 
Nevertheless, in his role as devil's advocate in Book II, part 1, Glaucon proceeds to speak out in 
favour of iniustice. 
10 Annas (1981, pp. 63-64) observes that in Republic Book II Socrates offers a genuine alternative 
to the deontological (good for its own sake) and consequentialist (good for its consequences) 
theories of iustice which have dominated more recent moral debates. Emlyn-Jones (2007, pp. 
171-172) provides a useful commentary on the three classes of goods outlined by Glaucon in Book 
II, part 1, and on Socrates' choice of the second category of good. 
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make a positive statement concerning justice and where he stands on this issue. This 
is a significant advance from Book I, where Socrates was unable to provide a theory 
of justice.11 Indeed, the reader is surprised at the speed in which Socrates is able to 
identify the category of good in which justice should be placed in Book II, part 1. 
There is a change from the heated and competitive encounters in Book I to a more 
productive and in-depth investigation into the nature of justice. Glaucon and 
Adeimantus prove to be more suitable respondents than Thrasymachus because 
they are prepared to give consideration to the arguments in favour of justice as well as 
injustice. 12 
It is surprising that, unlike the elenchus method as displayed in Book I, Socrates does 
not ask Glaucon and Adeimantus for their own views in Book II after they have given 
the view concerning justice that is widely held among the people.13 It suggests that 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, as depicted in Republic Book II, part 1, do not hold any 
strong and properly argued views of their own concerning justice. This has put them 
in a vulnerable position and has meant that they are in danger of being persuaded by 
the popular view of justice that is held by members of the community. One of Plato's 
aims in advancing the theory of the just state and just soul, in Republic Book IV, is to 
ensure that the members of the community who do not have knowledge of justice, 
that is, the workers and auxiliaries, are placed under the rule of the guardians who 
would aspire to possess such knowledge. This alerts the reader to the fact that, in 
writing the Republic, Plato was prepared to advance controversial and unconventional 
theories concerning justice. 
11 Irwin (1995, p. 198) observes that the threefold division of goods is a new development in 
Republic Book II and it does not appear in the earlier dialogues of Plato. 
12 It is worth noting that although Socrates is unable to provide a theory of justice in Book I, he does 
make some progress in identifying the nature of justice. At 354a, he states that 'the just man is 
happy, and the uniust man is miserable.' 
13 The reader can appreciate that Glaucon and Adeimantus agree broadly with Socrates' conception 
of justice. However, Socrates has not yet advanced the theory of the ideal state and soul, so 
Glaucon and Adeimantus have no precise theories to agree with at this stage of the enquiry. 
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(Section 2) 
The display oration by Glaucon 
The negative outcome of the elenchus method in Book I leads to Glaucon challenging 
Socrates by providing a notion of justice which is based on the principle that humans 
are fundamentally selfish.14 This, we are told, is not Glaucon's view, but one that is 
widely held within the community and which has been inspired by Thrasymachus and 
many others (358c).15 Here, Glaucon makes a connection between the arguments 
advanced by Thrasymachus in Republic Book I and the theory that he is now putting 
forward in Book II. The fact that Glaucon's arguments in support of injustice have 
been inspired by Thrasymachus, reminds the audience and reader of the strength of 
Thrasymachus' presence in the dialogue and of the theory of justice outlined by him in 
Book I. Glaucon argues that he has never heard justice being defended against such 
views to his satisfaction and that he proposes to 'state forcibly, the argument in praise 
of injustice' in order to give Socrates a model to follow when he is given his turn to 
provide an argument in favour of justice (358d).16 
Socrates accepts this challenge from Glaucon in good spirit. This suggests that the 
approach taken by Glaucon in introducing his argument has had a positive influence on 
Socrates. It has also enabled them to move on from the inconclusive end of the 
enquiry in Book I. It becomes necessary for Plato to change from the elenchus 
method after Book I because this method only works if the respondent is convinced 
of the view that he is putting forward and this does not apply in the case of Glaucon 
and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1.17 If Glaucon had not intervened at this stage of the 
enquiry, it is difficult to envisage how Socrates could have been shown to revive the 
enquiry into justice after Book I. I disagree with Kraut (2002, p. 4) where he asserts 
that Plato does not intend the reader and audience to interpret the Socrates of Book II 
141n this part of the Republic, Plato is using the formal sophistic method (epideixis) for Glaucon to 
outline an essentially sophistic position. 
15 Interestingly, in this example, Plato is using one of his characters, that is Glaucon, to give a view 
which we are told has been inspired by another of his characters. that is Thrasymachus. In this 
example, the sophist Antiphon appears to be one of the other people that Socrates refers to. 
Waterfield (2000, pp. 258-269) provides a useful translation and commentary on some fragments 
of the historical sophist Antiphon. The dialogue form of presentation and the fact that the reader 
can identify so closely with the views advanced by the respondents in the Republic make it difficult 
to appreciate that the characters are not real. This issue is considered in the introductory chapter of 
this enquiry. 
16 Kirwan (1965, pp. 162-173) provides a useful analysis of the challenge advanced by Glaucon in 
Republic Book II. 
17 Blondell 2002, p. 190. 
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as having a new character and a new method of enquiry.1e The only other way forward 
for Socrates would have been to ask Glaucon and Adeimantus for their own opinions 
concerning justice and to hold elenchus enquiries with them. But, this does not appear 
to be a viable option in early Book II, as Glaucon and Adeimantus have not provided 
any strong opinions of their own.19 
Glaucon divides his defence of injustice into three headings. 
a) The nature and origin of justice 
Glaucon claims that people only agree to adhere to the conventional rules of justice as 
a matter of convenience and for their own personal gain in the form of external 
benefits. This includes, for example, acquiring a good reputation and respect from 
others leading to lucrative business deals. He claims to see no advantage associated 
with seeking justice, in itself, for any internal benefits which it may bring, such as a just 
soul, separate to its consequences. Glaucon asserts that justice 'lies between what is 
most desirable, to do wrong and avoid punishment, and what is most undesirable, to 
suffer wrong without being able to get redress; justice lies between these two and is 
accepted not as being good in itself, but as having a relative value due to our inability 
to do wrong' and get away with it (359a, Book II). This can be contrasted with the 
guardian in the ideal state, as outlined by Socrates in Republic Book IV, who will act 
for the good of the state overall. Admittedly, this will include the guardian's own self-
interest, but not exclusively, and it is not intended to be the main aim of the ideal state 
as outlined by Socrates.2l 
According to this line of argument, in a given situation, people choose to act justly 
because it can benefit them to do so. Nevertheless, they would rather act unjustly, if 
18 The change in approach by Socrates and the respondents in Book \I as discussed above 
suggests that there is not as much continuity between Book I and Book II as Kraut claims. I would 
suggest that Book II has been inspired by Book I but that it moves the enquiry forward in a new 
direction of its own. 
19 It is notable that at 347e, Book I, Glaucon simply agrees that the just man's life would pay better, 
without argument with Socrates. Therefore, an elenchus exchange would not work at this point in 
the dialogue because the respondent would have to start from a position that Socrates could 
refute. 
20 This appears to be a reference forward to 417b-419a in early Book IV where Adeimantus 
observes that the guardians will not be acting in their self-interest. Adeimantus asks Socrates 'how 
would you answer the objection that you aren't making your guardians particularly happy?' 
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they could get away with it.21 Therefore, as a means of self-protection men have 
decided to form agreements and make laws in order to set basic standards of 
behaviour within the community (359a). These laws and agreements work for the 
benefit of the individual and the community as a whole in promoting peaceful 
coexistence. The new laws encourage people to act justly.?2 However, there is an 
important point being put forward by Glaucon in this argument. The laws and 
agreements reached within the community can change over time. Therefore, the 
concept of justice is relative, that is, dependent on what is agreed by the community. 
As a result of this, the concept of justice is subject to change.~ This could leave the 
community vulnerable if the form of rule were to change within the city, for example, if 
it changed from being a democracy to a tyranny. Also, as there is a need to 
compromise and form agreements, no members of the community are fully satisfied 
with the outcome. 
b) Men act justly because they cannot get away with being unjust 
Glaucon continues his defence of injustice by asserting that men do not value justice 
for its own sake but for its good consequences. As a result of this, men only adhere 
to the laws and agreements made within the community because they cannot get 
away with disobeying them (359b). In order to illustrate this point, we are given the 
vivid and dramatic story of Gyges' ring by Glaucon (359d-360b). This story, 
together with the follow-up discussion at 360c-d, is designed to illustrate the pOint that 
if men were put in the position where they would be able to act unjustly and get away 
with it, that is, still appear to be just, they would follow this course of action. This story 
adds dramatic weight to the arguments already put forward by Glaucon and brings it 
to the attention of the reader and audience. Philosophically, it alerts the reader and 
audience in the background to the fact that in order to find out what justice consists in 
there will be a need to look beyond the everyday experience of the agent to a higher 
realm of thought. This prepares the reader for the discussion of the Forms, and the 
other images, including the Myth of Er, which are introduced by Socrates later in the 
21 Harman (1977, pp. 137-151) alerts the reader to some problems associated with the fact that the 
egoistic agent who is only interested in his or her own good and pleasure mayan occasions find it 
in their self-interest to act morally. 
22 Irwin 1995, p. 183. 
23 It is notable that in Republic Book II, 368a onwards, Socrates provides a theory of iustice that is 
based on knowledge of the Forms, which according to Socrates, are not subiect to change. 
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Republic.~ In section 4 of this chapter, consideration is given to some connections 
between Book II, part 1 and the Myth of Er in Book X. 
According to this story narrated by Glaucon, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of 
the King of Lydia. One day when he was at work 'there was a great storm and an 
earthquake,' 'and a chasm opened in the earth' (359d). When he entered the chasm 
he saw many fantastic things but he took just one object, a ring from a corpse and then 
he left the chasm. Some time later, Gyges discovered accidentally that the ring had 
magical powers and that it could make him invisible. He used this to his advantage 
and 'seduced the queen, and with her help attacked and murdered the king and 
seized the throne' (35ge-360b). Glaucon asserts that if they had such a ring both the 
just and unjust man would take advantage of the magical powers of the ring. He 
concludes that the just man would not have the strength of will to avoid this temptation. 
In this example, Glaucon has made a further link between Thrasymachus' argument in 
Book I where he puts forward the tyrant as the perfect example of the superiority of 
injustice (344b-c). The magical power of the ring has enabled Gyges to act unjustly 
and get away with it, resulting in him taking over the throne. Like the tyrant as outlined 
by Thrasymachus (344b-c), Gyges has now gained the respect and fear of the 
people. Notably, Gyges would be seen by the people to be just, whilst the tyrant 
as described by Thrasymachus, would be considered to be unjust.:!; 
c) A contrast between extreme examples of just and unjust men 
In his defence of injustice, Glaucon gives some extreme examples of the lives of the 
just and unjust man (360e-362c). The unjust man acts unjustly, but he does this in 
such a way as to appear to be just. Therefore, the unjust man gains the rewards for 
his unjust deeds and also the rewards for appearing to be just, that is, a good 
reputation and associated honours. Glaucon notes that 'the most accomplished form 
of injustice is to seem just when you are not' and that the unjust man must be 'perfect 
in his wickedness' (361 a). Glaucon's account of the life of the unjust man is persuasive 
24 Von Reden and Goldhill (1999. p. 263) consider the significance of images such as the cave in 
the Republic Book VII. 
25 An important difference between the theories advanced by Thrasymachus and Glaucon is that in 
the case of Thrasymachus there is no pretence: the stronger are simply happier because they gain 
the upper hand and everybody knows it. However, Glaucon introduces the polarity reality/seeming 
with regard to justice. According to Glaucon, the unjust can seem to be just and so get all the 
advantages of this. 
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and the reader is left with the strong impression that the unjust life is an attractive 
proposition. Glaucon notes that the unjust man will be in a position to make 
impressive sacrifices to the gods and he suggests that 'it is reasonable to suppose 
that the gods care more for him than for the just man' (362c). 
The account of justice outlined by Glaucon appears to be somewhat unsustainable. 
Perhaps, a city could accommodate some of its citizens acting unjustly and getting 
away with this behaviour. But, if all the people acted in this way, it would not be 
sustainable in the long term. At some time in the future, the value of appearing to act 
justly, would be undermined, as the pretence of the unjust citizens would start to 
become transparent. This would apply in particular to the unjust person living in a 
small community where the pretence of acting justly would become apparent to the 
community more quickly.a> Glaucon's example of the unjust man is in some ways less 
attractive to the reader and more underhand than the examples given by 
Thrasymachus. In the examples from Thrasymachus, the unjust man does not hide 
his injustice and he does not seek to appear to be just. Instead, he is proud of his 
injustice and so, in a sense, is more sincere. 
In contrast with this, we are given an extreme example of the life of the just person. 
Glaucon gives a very unattractive picture of the life of the just man. We are told that 
the just man acts justly but that he must avoid appearing to be just. This is so that he 
cannot be accused of acting justly for the material benefits and honour that it would 
give him, rather than being just for its own sake (361 c). As a result of this, the just man 
will have a tough life with material discomfort and he will be looked down upon by the 
people as a whole. Glaucon notes that in the extreme case 'the just man, as we have 
pictured him, will be scourged, tortured, and imprisoned, his eyes will be put out, and 
after enduring every humiliation he will be crucified' (361 e-362a). This gives the 
reader and audience a very vivid picture of the suffering of the just man in this life. It is 
clear from this example that it would require an enormous amount of commitment from 
the just man to carry on acting justly. This is brought out in Socrates' reaction to 
Glaucon's extreme examples of the life of the unjust and just man. Socrates 
observes 'you're putting the finishing touches to your two pictures as vigorously as if 
you were getting them ready for an exhibition' (361 d). 
26 Irwin 1995, p. 184. 
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There appears to be an element of parody or satire associated with Socrates' 
reaction at 361 d to Glaucon's portrayal of the extreme 'just man'. However, it is worth 
noting that in other parts of the Republic, Socrates provides extreme accounts of the 
fate of the unjust man. Examples of these include the discussion of unjust states and 
souls in Books VIII and IX and the Myth of Er in Book X. 
It is worth observing that at this point Glaucon reminds the reader and audience that 
this is not his view but the opinion of those who praise injustice (361 e). The extreme 
example of the life of the just person suggests to the reader that the people who 
have influenced Glaucon have a very negative view of justice and see no benefit in 
acting justly apart from the rewards which it would bring. It also suggests that they do 
not consider justice to be an ingredient of a fulfilling Iife.21 Admittedly, the example of 
the just life from Glaucon is an extreme one, but it is difficult to envisage a city where it 
would be so futile for the individual to act justly. The unhappy life of the just person as 
described by Glaucon is similar to the account given by Thrasymachus in Republic 
Book I where he describes the unhappy life of the just under the rule of the tyrant 
(344b-c). However, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the just man as outlined by 
Thrasymachus, continues to act justly, despite his suffering. It is not entirely clear from 
Thrasymachus' account whether the just remain just through fear of punishment in this 
life or the next one or for other reasons. Unlike the Glaucon's just man, Thrasymachus' 
just man would have a reputation for justice. 
(Section 3) 
The display oration by Adelmantus 
Before Socrates is given a chance to digest what Glaucon has said concerning justice, 
Adeimantus makes a dramatic and unexpected entry into the discussion. The 
frequent change of respondent in Book I and Book II, part 1, gives the reader a sense 
of indecision and insecurity on the part of Plato, with no firm theory of justice emerging 
at this stage of the dialogue.a! Adeimantus asserts 'You don't suppose that is a 
27 Norman (1983, p. 58) observes that in the argument advanced by Glaucon, we are encouraged to 
look to our interests first and see how justice can help us to achieve them. Whilst, in the argument 
put forward by Socrates in Republic Book II, 368a onwards, we need to identify what justice 
consists in first in order for us to appreciate what our true interests are. 
28 This situation changes from Book II, 368a onwards, where Glaucon and Adeimantus act as 
respondents enabling Socrates to advance substantial theories concerning justice and 
knowledge. 
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complete statement of the argument Socrates' and he then provides some further 
points to add to the account given by Glaucon (362d). Although he is clearly taken 
aback by this interruption from Adeimantus, Socrates is insistent that Adeimantus 
adds any points that Glaucon may have left out in his display oration. Socrates also 
indicates that he has become somewhat overwhelmed with the strong arguments 
being advanced by Glaucon in defence of injustice. He notes that Glaucon 'has said 
quite enough to floor me and make me quite incapable of coming to the rescue of 
justice' (362d). Although there is a significant amount of irony associated with 
Socrates' reaction at this point, the reader and audience are left with a sense of the 
pressure that the character Socrates is depicted as being under in Republic Book II, 
part 1. Also, the reader is made aware of the courage and resourcefulness that 
Socrates will need to demonstrate in the remaining books of the Republic in order to 
defend justice against the attacks from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II. 
The input from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book \I is, to a certain extent, emotionally 
driven with each of these respondents determined to put forward their own challenge 
to Socrates. Their input at this stage of the dialogue appears to be in response to 
Socrates' harsh treatment of Thrasymachus in Book I. Some commentators have 
noted the importance of emotion in the elenchus exchange in Republic Book I and 
other dialogues.l9 This also appears to be a feature of the input from Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Republic Book II, part 1, but to a lesser extent. There are further 
interruptions and responses from Glaucon and Adeimantus in the later Books of the 
Republic which also appear to be emotionally driven. These interruptions are 
considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this enquiry. In contrast to Thrasymachus in Book \ 
and Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, the character Socrates remains 
remarkably calm throughout the Republic and demonstrates very little emotion.31 
However, in the Republic, Socrates frequently demonstrates uncertainty and a lack of 
confidence in his ability to find an answer to the question under consideration. The 
strongest of these examples is at the end of Book \, 354-b, where Socrates admits 
that he has not been able to identify the nature of justice. 
29 Blank 1993, pp. 435-436. 
30 It is a feature of a number of the early and middle dialogues of Plato that Socrates remains calm 
while some of the other characters in the dialogue display heightened emotion. Examples of this 
include, Callicles in the Gorgias and Laches and Nicias in the Laches. 
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Adeimantus provides the following arguments in order to build upon the points raised 
by Glaucon. 
a) The arguments that people give in favour of justice 
Adeimantus considers the common arguments that people give in favour of acting 
justly rather than unjustly and the reasons that they give for this course of action. He 
notes that fathers and others in authority encourage young men to be just for the good 
consequences that it will bring for them, which include a good reputation, good family 
connections and associated benefits. Here, justice is being recommended as a 
means to its ends rather than as a good in itself.31 Unlike Thrasymachus, in this 
example Adeimantus appears to be suggesting that there are some benefits to be 
gained from acting justly. He refers to passages from Hesiod and Homer where they 
give an account of the rewards that the just will receive from the gods in this life (363a-
c). 
Adeimantus also gives an account of the rewards that the poets have said that the just 
will gain in the other world where they will 'sit them down to a banquet of the Blest' 
(363c).32 He notes that it is also believed that the rewards given to the just in this life 
from the gods are extended to future generations of their families. In comparison with 
this, Adeimantus asserts that the life of the unjust man in this life and in the other world 
is one of misery and pain and is similar to the suffering of the just man as described 
by Glaucon above (363d). The reader is reminded by Adeimantus that this is not his 
account but one that is held by others who have been influenced by the poets when 
he notes that 'This is the sort of recommendation they produce for justice' (363d). 
Notably, Adeimantus' account is shot through with irony. The gods will accommodate 
those who have been conventionally just. 
31 This fits into the third category of good advanced by Glaucon, that is, for its consequences. 
32 In the Myth of Er, which is narrated by Socrates in Book X, part 2, 613e-621 d, we are told that the 
just ~ill be r~warded in the next life. An important difference between the account given by 
Adelmantus In Book II, part 1, and the Myth of Er is that in the myth the reality of people's conduct is 
at stake. Consideration is given to the Myth of Er in the next section of this chapter. 
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b) Wrong on the whole pays better than right. Justice is merely a convention. 
Contrary to the view that he has put forward above in favour of justice, Adeimantus 
then gives an argument, which he claims can be backed up by evidence from the 
poets and ordinary conversation, in favour of injustice. Adeimantus notes that it is 
widely held that justice and self-control are good, but difficult to practice, requiring much 
effort and determination.53 On the other hand, injustice is considered to be an easier 
path to follow and requires less effort on the part of the individual (363e-364a). He 
argues that self-indulgence and injustice are 'regarded as disgraceful only by 
convention; wrong on the whole pays better than right, they say' (364a). Adeimantus 
also claims that the unjust man can gain the respect of the majority of the people if he 
is wealthy and powerful, while the just man will gain no respect from the majority of the 
people if he is poor (364a-b). Importantly, Adeimantus points out that, from books 
written by Musaeus and Orpheus, people have come to believe that through 
sacrifices to the gods they can gain remission and absolution of sins for both the living 
and the dead (364e-365a). In his display oration Adeimantus alerts Socrates and the 
reader to the difficulty in persuading people to act justly when they hear so much 
spoken in favour of acting unjustly (365a-b). Also, people can see that they can gain 
the same rewards by acting unjustly while pretending to act justly. 
It is interesting that Adeimantus is depicted advancing conflicting views of justice and 
injustice in such a convincing manner without questioning these views or seeking to 
establish a view of his own. The common views that he outlines concerning justice 
and injustice alert the reader and audience to the fact that the majority of the people 
appear to be sceptical about the benefits of acting justly and they believe that 
injustice pays. Although, Adeimantus and Glaucon claim to be putting forward the 
common view of justice which is inspired by people such as Thrasymachus, the view 
advanced by them is not identical to that provided by Thrasymachus in Book I. 
Thrasymachus asserted that justice is the interest of the stronger party, that is, 
somebody else and not the subject who takes the just action. According to 
Adeimantus' and Glaucon's line of argument, acting justly is not really in the agent's 
interest, in the sense that it would be more in their interest to act unjustly if they could 
get away with it. 
33 It is worth noting that the praise people give of justice is of a cynical nature as it concerns the 
'artificial consequences', that is, the rewards associated with just acts rather than justice itself. 
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c) Appearance has more force than reality. The unjust person must operate in such a 
way as to appear to be just. The unjust person should sin first and sacrifice later. 
Having put forward the points in favour of acting justly and unjustly, Adeimantus 
asserts that the majority of the people would conclude from this that they have more 
to gain from acting unjustly but appearing to be just. They would also conclude that 
this is a skill which the individual would need to develop. Adeimantus notes that the 
unjust person would need to 'put up a facade that gives the illusory appearance of 
virtue' and at the same time be careful not to be found out. He suggests that the 
unjust man could learn the art of persuasion and the other skills that he requires from 
professional teachers of these arts (365c-d). It would seem to the reader that this is a 
very contrived and deceitful way of operating for the unjust individual. 
Adeimantus reiterates the point that it is widely believed by the people that those 
who act unjustly can gain forgiveness from the gods by making sacrifices and giving 
offerings. This gives the unjust individual the confidence to act unjustly in this life if he 
can get away with it and not to worry about being punished in the next life. 
Adeimantus concludes that, given these arguments in favour of injustice, it will be very 
difficult to persuade people to act justly. This passage reminds the reader of the 
interchange between Socrates and Cephalus in Republic Book I, 331 b, where 
Cephal us observes that his wealth would enable him to payoff any debts that he 
owes and avoid leaving any sacrifices to the Gods unmade before he dies.34 In the 
Myth of Er, which is narrated by Socrates in Republic Book X, we are told that the 
gods cannot be paid off or be deceived and that the unjust would be punished in the 
afterlife.35 Importantly, in the ideal state as advanced by Socrates in Republic Book 
IV, justice is not connected to money, with the guardians or rulers having no personal 
wealth. 
34 This is not to suggest that the character Cephal us was unjust, but it highlights his reliance on 
money for virtue. In chapter 1 of this study, consideration is given to the exchange between 
Socrates and Cephalus in Republic Book I. 
35 In Republic Books II and III Socrates gives detailed consideration to the portrayal of the gods in 
poetry and he argues that the majority of poetry should not be permitted in the ideal state. 
According to Socrates, this is because it misrepresents the gods who are perfectly good and 
should only be portrayed in this manner. 
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d) Adeimantus' challenge to Socrates 
Adeimantus concludes his display oration by setting a challenge to Socrates on 
behalf of Glaucon and himself. He observes that Socrates has claimed that justice 
and right should be placed within the category of good that is good for its own sake 
and for its consequences. He asks Socrates 'Let us therefore hear you commending 
justice for the real benefits it brings its possessor, compared with the damage injustice 
does him.' 'Prove to us therefore, not only that justice is superior to injustice, but that, 
irrespective of whether gods or men know it or not, one is good and the other evil 
because of its inherent effects on its possessor' (367d-e). In order to defend justice 
against the theories put forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates will need to 
provide a sophisticated theory of justice which will ensure that the person who acts 
unjustly does not gain the rewards associated with acting justly.36 
In their input in Book II, Glaucon and Adeimantus differ in the examples that they give 
and the aspects of justice and injustice which they focus their attention on. But, the 
core message from them is basically the same. Both of them demonstrate that it is 
widely held among members of the community that justice is only beneficial for its 
consequences. If people could get away with being unjust they would do so. It is 
interesting therefore to consider why Plato chose to include two main respondents 
with such similar views concerning justice, and without expressing a view of their own, 
in Republic Book II onwards, rather than just one respondent. One possibility is the 
fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus both speak up in favour of injustice in Book II, part 
1, gives a stronger case for Socrates to answer. It also depicts the respondents as 
putting forward a united front against Socrates, unlike in Book I where Polemarchus 
and Thrasymachus provided different theories of justice. The accounts from Glaucon 
and Adeimantus also help the reader and audience in the background to come to 
terms with the complexity of the issues under consideration. 
Importantly, the reader of the dialogue cannot be sure of what Plato's preCise view 
was concerning justice. Nevertheless, both Glaucon and Adeimantus indicate that 
they are not convinced by the theories of justice that they are putting forward in Book 
36 Shields (2006, pp. 80-82) asserts that in Book II, part I, when Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge 
Socrates to give a defence of justice they are also asking Socrates to provide an analysis of justice. 
Shields argues, and I agree, that at this pOint in the dialogue, Plato also appears to be challenging 
himself and the reader to provide a detailed analysis of justice. 
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11. It is interesting that Glaucon and Adeimantus do not say why they are not 
convinced of the theories that they are advancing. This appears to be a weakness in 
Plato's structure in the Republic as the arguments they give seem strong and 
convincing to the reader. 
The display oration from Glaucon and Adeimantus in early Book 11 creates a distance 
between Book I and Book II, part 2, 368a onwards, and it gives the character 
Socrates a chance to recover his confidence from the negative outcome of the 
encounter with Thrasymachus in Book I. It also enables Socrates to take the lead 
again in the enquiry from Book II, 368a onwards, once Glaucon and Adeimantus have 
set their challenge to him.37 It enables Plato to develop further the points raised by 
the respondents in Book I concerning justice. This approach proceeds throughout the 
remaining Books of the dialogue where the theories raised in Books t and II are 
developed by Socrates.38 This approach helps the reader and audience to move 
their understanding forward concerning justice. The fact that Plato puts so much effort 
in early Book II into finding a way to proceed with the enquiry into justice suggests that 
he considers this to be an important issue and he is determined to move the enquiry 
forward in a new direction. 
From Book II, part 2, 368a onwards, when Socrates launches into the dialectic 
enquiry, it would have been difficult for one main respondent to keep up with the 
theories outlined by Socrates in the enquiry and also to speak up critically where 
necessary. The dialectic enquiry from Republic, 368a onwards, is considered in 
chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this study and it will be shown that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
continue to play an important role in the remaining Books of the dialogue. 
37 Rutherford (1995, p. 210) asserts that in Book II Glaucon and Adeimantus act as participants 
rather than admiring listeners. I would go further than this and suggest that although Glaucon and 
Adeimantus do not provide a theory of their own, they take the lead in the discussion in Book II, part 
1, with Socrates listening attentively to them. 
38 Blondell (2002, p. 111) observes that the fact that Plato does not feature in any of his dialogues 
suggests that it would be wrong to interpret him as adopting a developmentalist approach in his 
writings, as we cannot be sure that he endorses any of the theories that are put forward. But, how 
then do we account for the new philosophical theories that emerge in the dialogues? Although the 
reader cannot be sure that Plato supports these theories, there are clear Signs of philosophical 
development in the Republic and within the group of early and middle dialogues. Kraut (2002, pp. 
1-8) provides a useful of critique of Blondell's position concerning developmentalism. This issue is 
considered in the introductory chapter of this study. 
77 
(Section 4) 
Wider Issues relating to Republic Book II, part 1, and In particular its relation 
to Book I and Book X, part 2 
Through the characters of Socrates and the respondents, Plato adopts the elenchus 
and display oration methods of enquiry before the dialectic method. This suggests 
that there was some uncertainty as to which method of enquiry to adopt in the 
Republic. It also gives the reader an appreciation of the difficulty that Plato may have 
experienced in identifying the method of enquiry that would enable him to determine 
the nature of justice. This is in contrast with the character Socrates as depicted in the 
early dialogues who relies upon one method of enquiry, the elenchus method. 
Surprisingly, the display oration method is only featured in Book II of the Republic 
and it does not appear in any of the other Books of this dialogue. However, it 
resembles the style of the speech given by the sophist Protagoras, as depicted by 
Plato in the Protagoras (320c-328d), which is monologue in style with Socrates 
remaining silent. The change to the display oration method in Republic Book II alerts 
the reader to the limits of the elenchus method as depicted in Book 1.3:1 After Book I, 
Plato seems to have abandoned the elenchus method for now as it has not enabled 
Socrates and the respondents to move any further forward in their enquiry into the 
nature of justice.«l Like the elenchus method, the display oration method in Book II 
brings out strongly the contradictory opinions that people hold concerning justice and 
injustice. Nevertheless, like the elenchus method of enquiry, it does not enable 
Socrates and the respondents to find out the nature of justice and as such is 
foredoomed to failure: the method reflects the arguments (however successful they 
appear to be at the time). 
39 Guthrie (1975, p. 443) observes that the arguments from Socrates in Republic Book I are not 
calculated to convert Thrasymachus. However, the outcome of the elenchus exchange between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I motivates Glaucon and Adeimantus into speaking up in Book 
II, part 1. 
40 It is worth noting that at this point Plato did not abandon the elenchus method for good. He 
adopted the elenchus method again in the Theaetetu5, which is generally considered to be a later 
work than the Republic. 
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a) Similarities between Book I and Book II, part 1 
There are a number of common features between Republic Book I and Book II, part 
1. They are both highly dramatic in style with the respondents playing a key role in 
the discussion.41 The character of the respondents is strongly brought to light, 
especially in the case of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. There appear to 
be connections between the depiction of the character of the respondents and the 
philosophical theories that they provide. Thrasymachus is depicted as an impatient 
and uncooperative character and this corresponds with the negative view of justice 
that he advances as a means for the stronger party to take advantage of the weaker 
party. Glaucon and Adeimantus are depicted as more patient. Notably, they do not 
interrupt each other in Book II and they do not interrupt the other respondents in Book 
I. This enables them to advance more thought through and complex arguments 
concerning the nature of justice than Thrasymachus, who was more impetuous. 
In Books I and II, the respondents boldly and confidently advance theories concerning 
justice to Socrates, especially Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. These three 
respondents come across more convincingly than Cephal us and Polemarchus 
because of the strength of their arguments and the theories that they put forward, 
along with their characterisation which is more clearly defined. In Book II, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus challenge Socrates to give his own view of justice. This can be seen as 
a response to the complaint made by Thrasymachus in Book I that Socrates would 
not give an account of his own.42 In Republic Book I and Book II, part 1, (and other 
dialogues of Plato), the dialogue appears to be framed in such a way as to make the 
readers feel that they are partaking in the enquiry and to look to themselves for an 
answer to the question being considered.4'3 
In Republic Book II, part 1, justice is portrayed by Glaucon and Adeimantus as a 
relative notion which is dependent on the particular situation. Whether an act is 
considered just or unjust would depend on the view of justice which was generally 
accepted by the community at the time in question. This notion of justice can be 
contrasted with the Forms as described by Socrates in the Republic Books V, VI, 
41 For the purpose of this example I am including Glaucon and Adeimantus as respondents, despite 
the fact that Socrates plays more of the role of the respondent in Republic Book II, part 1. 
42 Blondell 2002, p. 191. 
43 This point is noted by Von Reden and Goldhill (1999 pp. 265-266). 
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and VII, which are eternal and changeless and the theory of the just city and individual 
as outlined in Book IV. Thrasymachus has also provided a relative notion of justice in 
Republic Book I, but one that is more radical than the theory put forward by Glaucon 
and Adeimantus because it does not allow for any compromise within the community, 
for example, by forming agreements and laws concerning action. This alerts the 
reader to the fact that the theory of justice that Socrates later outlines in Republic Book 
IV is far removed from the selfish notions of justice given by Thrasymachus, Glaucon 
and Adeimantus in Books I and II. 
b) Differences between Republic Book I and Book II, part 1 
There are many interesting differences between Republic Book I and Book II, part 1. 
In Book II, part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus are both assertive but not rude to 
Socrates. Their lack of aggression towards Socrates results in the reader 
sympathising with them and taking the arguments that they advance seriously. The 
silence of Socrates and the other respondents during this part of the enquiry, in 
comparison with Book I, supports this view. In Book II Glaucon and Adeimantus are 
not competing against each other or Socrates. Instead, they are alerting Socrates to 
the extreme case for injustice, in order to persuade Socrates to provide a positive 
theory in defence of justice. Also, the input from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II 
gives a sense of urgency to this task. 
This can be compared with the reaction of the reader to the interruption by 
Thrasymachus in Book I. The rudeness and impatience displayed by Thrasymachus 
in Book I and the reaction of Socrates to this is intended to put the readers on their 
guard against Thrasymachus. It also appears to be designed to make the reader 
wary of the theories concerning justice that Thrasymachus advances.44 As they enter 
into the dialectic exchange in Book II, part 2, Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates are 
all in agreement on what it is they are enquiring into and how they are gOing to 
proceed with the enquiry (368a). In Book II, part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus give a 
challenge to Socrates that is as intellectually challenging as the one outlined by 
Thrasymachus in Book I. But they do not display any of the hostility and 
441n chapter 1 of this study, consideration is given to the strength of the arguments advanced by 
Thrasymachus in Republic Book I and the ongoing presence of Thrasymachus in the dialogue as a 
whole. 
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competitiveness of Thrasymachus which had such a negative impact on the enquiry.45 
Also, Thrasymachus displayed a lack of systematic exposition as opposed to 
Glaucon and Adeimantus. 
The positive end of Book II, part 1, can be compared with the aporia (deadlock) and 
sense of dissatisfaction experienced by Socrates and the respondents, Polemarchus 
and Thrasymachus, at the end of Book I and the lack of an obvious way forward for 
them to proceed with the enquiry. From Republic Book \I onwards, the roles played 
by Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates in the dialogue appear to prefigure the 
philosophical role of the guardians in the ideal state, as outlined in Book IV, who will 
seek to gain knowledge of the Forms. In my view, in the dialectic enquiry from 368a 
onwards, Socrates represents the guardians and Glaucon and Adeimantus represent 
the junior guardians in the ideal state. Indeed, the fact that the other respondents 
remain almost silent from Book II onwards, suggests that they do not have the right 
disposition for philosophical enquiry in the dialogue or perhaps in the ideal state.46 
This appears to prefigure the notion of specialisation of labour in the ideal state, as 
outlined in Republic Book IV, where the guardians are the only members of society 
who would be given the opportunity to embark on philosophical study and seek to 
gain knowledge of justice and the other Forms. 
The reader can appreciate the importance of the role that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
play in Book II, part 1, in enabling Socrates to progress with the enqUiry into justice, 
despite the inconclusive end of Book I. It enables Socrates to proceed with the 
enquiry in Book II, part 2, without having to confront Thrasymachus directly. 
Nevertheless, the comment from Socrates at the beginning of Book II, part 2, where 
he displays a lack of confidence in his ability to provide an answer to the challenge 
from Glaucon and Adeimantus, alerts the reader to the struggle ahead facing the 
character Socrates and the respondents in their dialectic enquiry into justice.47 Socrates 
notes that 'I don't see how I'm to help you; I don't think I've got the ability - witness 
my failure to convince you just now, when I thought I had demonstrated the superiority 
45 Blondell 2002, p. 199. 
46 Beversluis (2000, p. 381) asserts that Glaucon and Adeimantus have a good nature which makes 
them inclined to be just, despite what Thrasymachus and others have preached to them. This 
makes them more suitable as respondents in the Republic than Thrasymachus. 
47 Although it can be appreciated that there is some irony associated with these negative comments 
from Socrates, the theme of uncertainty is one that also features in Books III to IX of the Republic 
and it reduces the reader's confidence in the theories being advanced by Socrates in the Republic. 
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of justice in my discussion with Thrasymachus' (368b). This gives the reader a sense 
of the struggle that Plato faced in moving from the elenchus method to the dialectic 
method of enquiry. The dialectic method of enquiry requires a much greater level of 
input from the person leading the enquiry, that is, the character Socrates in the 
Republic. Importantly, it requires Plato as the author of the dialogue to put forward 
positive theories, which he mayor may not support, concerning the nature of justice. 
This is the most significant development in the Republicfrom Book II, 368a onwards. 
It is notable that Socrates plays a different role in Republic Book II, part 1, than he 
does in the rest of the dialogue. In Book II, part 1, Socrates is depicted listening to 
Glaucon and Adeimantus rather than asking them questions and he remains silent for 
long periods of time. This can be compared with Book I where Socrates conducts 
elenchus enquiries with three respondents: Cephalus, Polemarchus and 
Thrasymachus, taking the lead and asking the questions. It can also be compared with 
Book II, 368a onwards, where Socrates leads the dialectical enquiry into justice with 
Glaucon and Adeimantus acting as respondents. There is a change in approach in 
Book II, part 1, with Glaucon and Adeimantus providing a comparative thesis of 
justice in order to establish whether the just or unjust life leads to happiness for the 
individual. This is unlike Socrates in Book II, part 2 onwards, who sets out to establish 
the just state and soul. Glaucon and Adeimantus enquire into the nature of justice from 
a different angle than Thrasymachus. Glaucon breaks new ground by introducing 
three different categories of reasons for acting justly: for its own sake; for its own sake 
and its consequences; and for its consequences. However, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
appear to comply with Thrasymachus' core view that the unjust life seems to be 
preferable to the just life.48 
It is worth considering Plato's intention in his depiction of Socrates in Book II, part 1. It 
seems that in order to find the appropriate method of enquiry for the remainder of the 
work, a change of approach is required in Book II, part 1. Here the character Socrates 
gives Glaucon and Adeimantus a chance to outline their position more clearly and 
thoroughly than Thrasymachus and Polemarchus in Book I. However, it is notable that 
Socrates does not give his agreement to any of the arguments put forward by 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1. This is unlike the role of the respondents 
in the other books of the Republic who are asked to give their agreement to Socrates 
48 Irwin (1995, p. 189). 
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as the enquiry proceeds, including the elenchus in Book I and the dialectic method in 
Book II, 368a onwards. The only point that Socrates agrees with in Book II, part 1, is 
to take up the challenge from Glaucon and Adeimantus and to defend justice against 
the attacks from them. 
c) Connections between Book II, part 1 and the Myth of Er in Book X49 
There appear to be some connections between the display oration given by 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Republic Book II, part 1, 357a-367e, and the Myth of Er, 
which is the story of Er's encounter with the other world, or world after death, as 
narrated by Socrates in Book X, part 2, 613e-621d.oo Both the display oration 
method in Book II and the method of presentation adopted by Socrates in Book X, 
part 2, are monologue in style with the respondenVs remaining mainly silent.51 In 
Book II, part 1, Glaucon and Adeimantus are not advancing their own view but the 
view of another. The same applies to Socrates in Book X, part 2. Also, in these 
parts of the Republic, the lead speaker does not gain the approval of the respondent 
and indeed the agreement of the respondent is not sought. This is different from the 
elenchus and dialectic methods where the approval of the respondent is sought on a 
regular basis and it is required in order for the enquiry to move forward. 
In Book II, part 1 , Socrates encourages Glaucon and Adeimantus to put forward the 
view of justice that is widely held among the community. He says to Glaucon 
'Nothing could please me better,' 'for it's a subject which all sensible men should be 
glad to discuss' (358e). When Adeimantus enters into the discussion in Book II, 
Socrates welcomes his input and says 'if your brother has left anything out, lend him a 
hand' (362d). When Socrates offers to narrate the Myth of Er in Book X, Glaucon 
remarks encouragingly 'There are few things I would hear more gladly' (614b). This 
can be contrasted with Republic Book I where Thrasymachus bursts into the 
discussion without being invited to speak and Socrates' initial reaction of alarm and 
dismay at the interruption (336b-e). 
49 Halliwell (2007, pp. 445-473) provides a useful study of the Myth of Er. See also Annas (1982, 
pp. 119-143) who considers the myths at the end of the Gorgias, Phaedo and Republic. 
50 Kahn (1993, pp. 140-141) alerts the reader to some interesting images that appear in Book II, part 
2, which prefigure the later Books of the Republic. 'would add this example from Book II, part 1, to 
his account. 
s, For the purpose of this example, , am taking the respondent in Book II. part 1, to be Socrates 
because of the dominant role that Glaucon and Adeimantus play in the enquiry in this part of the 
Republic. In Book X, part 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus act as the respondents. 
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In both Republic Book II, part 1, and Book X, part 2, incredible stories are told: the 
story of Gyges' ring and the story of what happens to the souls of the dead in the 
other world.52 In both cases the stories are given to back up the arguments that have 
been put forward and they bring the enquiry to a different level of understanding.53 
The story of Gyges' ring supports the account of justice advanced by Glaucon in 
Book \I and the story of the other world backs up the account of justice given by 
Socrates from Book II, 368a onwards in the Republic. In the display oration from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus and the Myth of Er from Socrates, we are given an account 
of the extreme positions of the just and unjust man and how they fare. Notably, 
according to the Myth of Er, the just souls are rewarded in the other world, whilst the 
unjust souls are not. From a theological point of view, the Myth of Er contradicts 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II. In Book II the afterlife is depicted as something 
which unjust people can enjoy if they have made the right sacrifices. In the Myth of Er, 
the unjust are punished. 
The Myth of Er related by Socrates in Book X is designed to give additional weight to 
the theory of justice advanced by Socrates from Book II, part 2, 368a onwards.54 
Through the Myth of Er, Socrates gives a speculative account of the rewards and 
punishments that the agent will receive in the next life rather than providing any 
additional theories concerning justice. When embarking on the Myth of Er, Socrates 
notes that so far in the enquiry he has given the rewards and punishments in this life 
but that they are nothing in comparison with those of the next life (613e-614a, Book 
X). Socrates then gives an outline of the punishments that will be given in the next life 
for wrong dOing in this life and the rewards that will be given to the good (615a-b). 
Contrary to the assertion of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, Socrates 
seeks to demonstrate through the Myth of Er that those who get away with wrong 
52 Gill (1993, p. 86) asserts that Plato's use of myth is designed to characterise a form of knowledge 
that is beyond the reach of the characters depicted in the dialogue. 
53 Rutherford (1995, p. 210) notes this in relation to the Myth in Book X. I would suggest that it also 
applies to the story of Gyges' ring in Book II. 
54 Laird (2001, pp. 23-24) alerts the reader to some connections between the story of Gyges' ring 
and the Myth of Er. Unlike Laird, I would suggest that the myth in Book X is introduced to back up 
the arguments already given by Socrates concerning justice rather than to provide an ultimate 
answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus. This is because in the arguments advanced by him in Book II, 
part 2 to Book X, part 1, Socrates has attempted to demonstrate sufficiently that justice pays for the 
individual and SOCiety as a whole. Hollander (1983, pp. 211-213) also considers some interesting 
connections between the story of Gyges' ring and the Myth of Er. 
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doing in this life will be punished in the next life. This will apply in particular to the 
tyrant who will be severely punished in the next life. We are given the example of 
Ardiaeus the tyrant who has been 'bound hand and foot and neck, flung down and 
flayed, and then impaled on thorns by the roadside' to be flung later into Tartarus 
(615c-616a). This is the punishment given to all tyrants as they are deemed to have 
incurable souls. Notably, the character Socrates uses the Myth of Er, to contradict 
another myth, the story of Gyges' ring as given by Glaucon. Importantly, according to 
the Myth of Er, Gyges may get away with his crimes in this life, but not in the next 
one.a; 
In the examples of the display oration method in Book II and the Myth of Er in Book 
X, Plato is using a similar method of presentation for different purposes. In Book II, it 
is used to provoke Socrates into giving his defence of justice. In Book X, it is used in 
an attempt to demonstrate conclusively that injustice never pays. Glaucon and 
Adeimantus admit that they are not advancing their own view. Although they find the 
view, which has been inspired by Thrasymachus and others, persuasive they still 
hope that through the enquiry with Socrates they will be able to prove that justice is 
valuable in its own right. Similarly, in the Myth of Er, Socrates relates a myth rather 
than a view of his own. But, he appears to be convinced by the Myth of Er. This 
becomes clear at the end of Book X where he suggests that if they are guided by the 
Myth of Er and believe that the soul is immortal, they will pursue justice and wisdom 
and be at peace with the gods in this life and the next one (621 c). The links between 
Republic Book II, part 1 and Book X, part 2, as outlined above, highlight the 
importance of Book II in the work as a whole and in particular the connections between 
it and the rest of the dialogue. 
Myths are included in other dialogues of Plato.!6 As in the case of the Republic, these 
are used to provide further backing to the theories advanced by Socrates in the 
dialogues. Like the Republic, the Gorgias ends with Socrates narrating a myth, the 
Myth of the Judgement of Souls (523a-527a). This myth in the Gorgias is designed 
to provide further backing to the thesis outlined by Socrates in that dialogue that 
55 Annas (1981, pp. 69-70) observes that in order to demonstrate that it pays for Gyges to act justly, 
even though he can get away with acting unjustly, Plato will need to provide a theory of justice that 
goes beyond the common-sense intuitions about justice. Annas asserts that the account given by 
Socrates in the Republic, will apply to 'extreme hypothetical cases as well as what actually happens 
in the real world.' 
56 Partenie (2004) provides a useful commentary on a selection of Plato's myths. 
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justice is the route to happiness. As in the Republic, the myth in the Gorgias is 
related by Socrates after the enquiry with the respondents has come to an end and 
they are not given the opportunity to provide a response to the myth. It is notable 
that in the Gorgias the elenchus enquiry has reached aporia or deadlock prior to the 
myth with the respondent Callicles displaying anger and a complete lack of co-
operation, whilst the dialectic enquiry in the Republic has ended amicably prior to the 
myth. In both myths the just are rewarded and the unjust are punished in the next life. 
In addition to narrating the Myth of Er at the end of the Republic, Plato includes other 
images in this dialogue. These include the simile of the sun, the image of the line and 
the allegory of the cave, which are given by Socrates in Books VI and VII.57 These 
provide the reader with a graphic illustration of the level of knowledge which the 
guardians would possess as opposed to the workers and auxiliaries in the ideal state. 
This prepares the reader for the discussion of stage two of the education of the 
guardians in Book VII, 521 c-541 a, and especially dialectic as outlined from 531 d-
534e. As in the case of the Myth of Er, these illustrations are provided by Socrates in 
order to give further backing to the theories that he is putting forward in the dialectic 
enquiry. 
The use of myth and illustration in the Republic can make it difficult for the reader to 
distinguish between fact and fiction with regard to the theories being advanced by 
Socrates who uses this to his advantage at some points in the dialogue. An example 
of this is the simile of the sun. It is important to note that although this is introduced as 
a simile and Socrates admits that he cannot provide a description of the Form of the 
Good itself, he assumes the existence of the Form of the Good in the remainder of 
the dialogue. Similarly, in the Myth of Er, it is assumed by Socrates that there is an 
afterlife and that the just will be rewarded and the unjust punished in the afterlife. 
It is worth observing that in Book X, part 2, the silence of Glaucon and Adeimantus 
appears to be designed to suggest that they are in agreement with Socrates. 
However, as they have not been given the opportunity in the Republic to respond 
to the Myth of Er, we cannot be sure of what their reaction would have been. Halliwell 
(2007, pp. 471-472) questions whether Glaucon, to whom Socrates addresses the 
57 The significance of the illustrations of the Sun, Line and Cave is considered in chapter 5 of this 
study. 
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Myth of Er, has been persuaded by the myth. With regard to the Myth of Er, 
Halliwell observes (p. 472), and I agree, that 'Despite the almost vatic tone in which 
Socrates anticipates the soul's eternal well-being, the work's denial of a final reaction to 
Glaucon functions as a signal of its own philosophically incomplete status: Annas 
(1982, p. 133) alerts the reader to a problem associated with the reincarnation of 
souls as outlined in the Myth of Er. She asserts that 'the more my life is shown to me 
as being part of an unending cycle of events over which I have no control, the less I 
can feel that rewards for being just, or punishments for being unjust, really answer to 
what I have done and chosen.' In my view, it is likely that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
would have wanted to raise questions with Socrates about this and other points 
concerning the Myth of Er. 
Importantly, the silence of Glaucon and Adeimantus at this point in the enquiry makes 
the reader want to act as respondent and raise some questions concerning the myth, 
which goes beyond what Socrates has attempted to establish in the dialectic enquiry. 
There are other points in the dialectic enqUiry in the Republicwhere Glaucon and 
Adeimantus remain silent when the reader would expect them to raise questions 
concerning the theories being advanced by Socrates and these are considered in the 
remaining chapters of this study. 
Conclusion 
The input from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, together with the input from 
the respondents in Book I, especially from Thrasymachus, suggests that when Plato 
started working on the Republic, there was some indecisiveness on his part as to 
which method of enquiry to adopt. This gives the reader an appreciation of the 
struggle that Plato may have faced in formulating the theories that feature in the 
Republic. Also, the reader can appreCiate the originality of the theories included in the 
Republic, 368a onwards, as outlined by Socrates. The theory of justice that Socrates 
outlines in Book IV of the Republic is controversial and radically different from the 
theories provided by the respondents in Books I and II. This suggests that one of 
Plato's aims in writing the Republic, was to encourage the readers of the dialogue to 
try to reach their own understanding of justice rather than being led by the views held 
by the majority of the people. 
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Chapter 3 
The dialectic method of enquiry: Socrates' response to Glaucon and 
Adelmantus 
Introduction 
In Republic Book II, part 2, from 368a onwards the reader and audience in the 
background are introduced to a new method of enquiry: the dialectic method. This 
method is introduced by Socrates and it is the method that he adopts in the remaining 
Books of the Republic. 1 The change of approach has been prompted by the 
dramatic end to Republic Book II, part 1, 367d-e, where Adeimantus challenges 
Socrates to provide a theory of justice. 
In section 1, this chapter considers Socrates' initial response to Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Book II, 368a to 376c, and their reaction to his response. In section 2, 
detailed consideration is given to Republic Book IV, 427d-445e, where through the 
dialectic method of enquiry, Socrates and the respondents put forward an account of 
the just state and just soul. Section 3 looks at some wider issues concerning Republic 
Book II, part 2 and Book IV and espeCially how they relate to the earlier and later 
Books of the dialogue. In particular, it looks forward to the significance of the doubt 
expressed by Glaucon and Socrates at the end of Book IX, 592a-b, concerning the 
possibility of the ideal state. 
(Section 1) 
Socrates' Initial response to Glaucon and Adelmantus 
This section focuses on Book II, part 2, 368a-376c, where Socrates makes his initial 
response and on the response to this from Glaucon and Adeimantus. Socrates' initial 
reaction to the challenge from Adeimantus to provide a theory of his own concerning 
justice is interesting and surprising. The reader would have expected Socrates to 
have difficulty in formulating a response at this stage of the Republic, after the robust 
challenges put to him by the respondents in Book' and Book II, part 1. Despite the 
, With the exception of Republic Book X, part 2, 613e-621d, where Socrates gives the account of 
the Myth of Er. 
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strength of the arguments given by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, and 
the forceful nature of the challenge from Adeimantus at 367d-e, Socrates claims to be 
'absolutely delighted by what they had said' (368a). He then praises Glaucon and 
Adeimantus for their ability to put forward the case for injustice so strongly and yet 
hold onto the belief that justice is better than injustice (368a).2 This comment from 
Socrates is important because the new method of enquiry that he adopts at this stage 
of the Republic requires the help of respondents who share the same basic 
conviction concerning justice as Socrates, that it is better than injustice.3 This can be 
compared with the elenchus exchange with Thrasymachus in Republic Book I where 
Socrates and the respondent did not share this understanding. Thrasymachus, in 
particular, would not be a suitable respondent in the dialectical enquiry, from Book II, 
368a onwards, due to the inflexible nature of his convictions concerning justice and 
injustice.4 
Notably, Socrates expresses uncertainty about his ability to rise to the challenge from 
the respondents and he seeks their support. Socrates claims 'I don't see how I'm to 
help you; , don't think I've got the ability - witness my failure to convince you just now, 
when I thought I had demonstrated the superiority of justice in my discussion with 
Thrasymachus' (368b). Nevertheless, he agrees to take on the challenge in order to 
come to the rescue of justice. It is difficult to interpret how sincere the character 
Socrates is being portrayed at this point of the enquiry. Plato may be expressing his 
own uncertainty here through the character Socrates. Perhaps it is a warning to the 
reader and audience that the enquiry into justice will be difficult and that it may lead to 
some controversial conclusions. The courage displayed by Socrates at this point 
shows him in a strong light. This encourages the reader to sympathise with him and to 
listen to what he has to say. 
Socrates is encouraged by Glaucon and the others present who we are told begged 
him 'to come to the rescue and not let the argument drop, but to try to find out what 
justice and injustice are and what their real advantages' are (368c). This makes a 
2 Socrates suggests that Glaucon and Adeimantus 'must indeed have something divine' about 
them (368a). 
3 Blondell (2002, p. 205) notes that Glaucon and Adeimantus both admire Socrates and share his 
interests and convictions. 
4 Importantly, at 348e, Socrates realises that they have no basic assumption in common with regard 
to their understanding of iustice. Thrasymachus ranks iniustice with wisdom and excellence 
whereas Socrates ranks these attributes with justice. 
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connection with Books I and II and reminds the reader that the respondents and wider 
audience are still present and following the discussion. The level of support that 
Socrates gains at this point in the dialogue can be compared with Cephalus, 
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus who did not receive such 
support from the wider audience present in the dialogue. It can be compared 
especially with Thrasymachus, who made such a rude entry into the enquiry in Book I, 
336b-d, without being invited to do so and despite the attempt made to prevent him 
by those sitting near him (336b). However, the fact that Socrates is only given the 
chance to put forward the theory of justice in Book IV, after the theories given by 
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, gives the reader an 
appreciation of the level of opposition that Plato may experience to the theory of 
justice as outlined in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic. 
Surprisingly, despite their eagerness for Socrates to give his theory concerning justice 
at this stage of the enquiry, the wider audience remains mainly silent for the remainder 
of the work, with Glaucon and Adeimantus acting as respondents. Indeed, 
Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and the wider audience appear to be somewhat 
silenced by the dialectic method of enquiry. But, the occasional input from 
Thrasymachus and Polemarchus in the remainder of the dialogue reminds the reader 
that they are still present.5 However, their silence during most of the dialectic enquiry 
appears to be designed to suggest that they are in agreement with Socrates. This 
encourages the reader to take seriously the theories outlined by Socrates. 
The dialectic method of enquiry involves question and answer and in this respect it is 
similar, in surface form, to the elenchus as adopted by Socrates in Book 1.6 However, 
in the dialectic method Socrates appears to be more in control of the discussion with 
the respondents following his lead. This enables Socrates to advance positive 
theories concerning justice and knowledge.7 This can be contrasted with the elenchus 
5 Polemarchus makes an entry into the discussion at 449b-d where he urges Adeimantus to ask 
Socrates to provide further details concerning the arrangements for women and the family in the 
ideal city. Nails (2002, p. 289) gives detailS of the entries made by Thrasymachus into the 
discussion after Book I. The input from Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book I and the role of 
Thrasymachus within the Republic as a whole is considered in detail in chapter 1 of this study. 
6 For a discussion of the dialectic method in the Republic, see (Kahn 1999, pp. 294-296). 
7 Socrates gives an outline of the dialectic method in Republic Book VII, 531d-534e. But, it is 
important to note that the dialectic enquiry in the Republic has not yet reached this level of 
perfection. Socrates and the respondents appear to be portrayed as less experienced than the 
guardians at this method. Also, in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic, Socrates and the 
respondents Glaucon and Adeimantus do not gain knowledge of the Forms. 
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in Book I,. where Thrasymachus provides a number of theories concerning justice and 
Socrates questions him, but with the enquiry ending inconclusively. In the dialectic 
method, Glaucon and Adeimantus assist Socrates in the enquiry and speak up when 
they require clarification or disagree with what Socrates is saying.a The dialectic also 
differs from the display oration method which is adopted by Glaucon and Adeimantus 
in Book II, part 1 , where they take the lead in the discussion putting forward theories 
concerning justice, with Socrates remaining mainly silent. 
Hare provides a useful distinction between the elenchus and dialectic methods as 
adopted by Plato. According to Hare, the elenchus method is developed further by 
Plato into the dialectic method. 'The development is chiefly in the method proposed 
for setting out in a systematic form the definitions which were the answers to Socrates' 
questions' in the earlier method. In the dialectic method, 'in order to say what 
something is, one has first to give its genus, assigning it into the class of things' which it 
belongs. 9 An example of this is the enquiry into the just state and just soul in Republic 
Book IV. 
It is notable that Socrates quickly gains confidence in Book II, part 2 as he commences 
with the dialectic enqUiry. This may be as a result of the support that he received from 
the respondents and wider audience. Alternatively, it may be driven by his 
determination to come to the rescue of justice. Socrates notes the obscure nature of 
the enquiry that they are about to embark upon and he suggests that they start their 
enquiry with the bigger picture first, that is, the community and then consider the 
smaller picture, that is, the individual (368c-369b). He receives approval from 
Adeimantus who is responding on behalf of Glaucon and himself. Adeimantus replies 
'We know what we are in for, go on' (369b). Socrates' reason for choosing to look at 
the bigger picture first is that he claims that they are not very clever (368d). Although 
Socrates is still uncertain at this stage of the enquiry, he has clearly gained some 
confidence since the end of Book I where he admitted that he still did not know what 
justice consists in (354b) as he did not have any knowledge concerning justice. 
Socrates proceeds with the dialectic enquiry by conSidering the basic needs of a 
community and how these might be acquired. 
8 As noted in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, in the 
dialectic enquiry with Socrates in Republic, 368a onwards, Glaucon and Adeimantus act as capable. 
sympathetic and occasionally challenging respondents and at some points of the dialogue they 
remain Silent for extended periods. 
9 Hare 1996. pp. 41-44. 
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During the course of Book II, part 2, Socrates' confidence continues to increase 
gradually as he takes the lead in the enquiry with the respondents. While Socrates 
begins to take on more of the role of a tutor, the chief respondents Glaucon and 
Adeimantus become quieter and they demonstrate willingness to engage with 
Socrates in a shared enquiry at this point in the dialogue.1o This is the opposite to 
what happened in Book II, part 1, where Glaucon and Adeimantus took the lead in the 
enquiry with Socrates playing more of the role of the respondent. But, importantly in 
Book II, part 1, Socrates did not give his agreement to the theories put forward by 
Glaucon and Adeimantus. This, along with the fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus were 
acting as devit's advocates, suggests that Plato does not wish the reader to agree 
with the theories of justice outlined by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1. 
However, it is Socrates' challenge in the dialectic enqUiry to convince the respondents 
and the reader of the theories advanced concerning the ideal state and soul. 
Early in the dialectic enquiry, Socrates brings in the notion of speCialisation of labour. 
He asserts that the community will need skilled people to supply its needs. This 
includes a farmer, builder, weaver and shoemaker (369d). He then claims that each 
man has a natural capacity for one job and that he should stick to that role within the 
community. It is surprising that Adeimantus gives his agreement to this point without 
raising any questions (369d-370c). There is no obvious reason at this stage of the 
enquiry why it would be wrong for a member of the community to engage in more 
than one area of work.11 Later, at 374a, Glaucon asks whether the citizens could fight 
for themselves. In response to this Socrates asserts that the state would need a 
speCialist army and Glaucon gives his agreement to this without seeking any 
clarification (374c-e). The notion of specialisation of labour that Socrates raises in 
connection with the simple community appears to prefigure the theory of the just state 
and just soul as outlined by Socrates in Republic Book IV. Specialisation of labour 
10 Blondell (2002, p. 200) alerts the reader to the dominance of the character Socrates in this 
method of enquiry and the faith in his authority displayed by the respondents. However, this 
observation from Blondell does not take account of the significant interruptions made by Glaucon 
and Adeimantus in the dialectic enquiry in Republic Books V and VI. These interruptions are 
considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this study. 
11 Socrates' reason for advancing the theory of specialisation of labour becomes clearer in Book IV 
and particularly at 434a-c, where he notes that it would be especially harmful for the state for a 
worker to enter the auxiliary class or for an auxiliary to enter the guardian class. He asserts that it 
would be the worst of evils for the three classes to interchange their jobs. This issue is discussed 
further by Socrates and the respondents in Republic Books VIII and IX, where they consider the 
decline of the ideal state and soul and they conclude that the ideal state would eventually become a 
tyranny. The decline of the ideal state and soul is considered in section 3 of this chapter. 
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proves to be an essential element of the just state and soul.12 
Significantly, by introducing the notion of specialisation of labour, Socrates provides 
an alternative to the view championed by the fictitious character Thrasymachus, the 
sophist in the Republic Book I. Socrates is trying to find what would comprise a just 
state for the good of all its citizens. Whilst Thrasymachus is concerned with what he 
calls justice, which is really injustice, can offer to the individual and in particular the ruler. 
It also moves the discussion away from the interruptions from Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, where they assert that justice is only good for the 
benefits that it brings to people and not in itself. As the enquiry continues in Book II, 
part 2, Adeimantus gives his approval to the points being advanced by Socrates 
and he seeks clarification where necessary. When they have reached agreement on 
the basic elements of a civilised society, Socrates asks where justice can be found 
within the community (371 e). 
At this point there is an unexpected and dramatic interruption from Glaucon who 
protests about the basic nature of the society that Socrates has described. With 
regard to the food and drink that the community would consume Glaucon asserts 'that's 
pretty plain fare for a feast, isn't it' (372c). He then goes on to say 'Really, Socrates, 
that's just the fodder you would provide if you were founding a community of pigs' 
(372d). In response to this interruption from Glaucon, Socrates agrees to look 
beyond the very basic needs of a community in the hope of discovering 'how justice 
and injustice are bred in a community' (372e). 
This is the first significant interruption since the dialectic enquiry began at 368a. It 
demonstrates to the reader that Glaucon is still following the enquiry closely and 
participating in the discussion. The interruption is positive in that it results in Socrates 
expanding upon the initial community that he described. This can be compared with 
the interruptions from Thrasymachus in Book I which were negative as they did not 
result in any positive theories concerning justice being established. The interruption 
from Glaucon lays the foundation for the enquiry into the just state and just soul in Book 
IV and the theories that are outlined in the later books. These theories would not have 
been relevant to the basic community outlined by Socrates in Book II, part 2. 
12 Kahn 1993, p. 140. 
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This is an example where Glaucon feeds into the dialectical enquiry by making 
Socrates change his position. This did not happen in the elenchus exchanges in Book 
I. I would go further than Blondell who sees Glaucon as simply enabling Socrates to 
develop the argument further in this example. 13 I would also go further than Guthrie 
who claims that Glaucon's interruption at this point in the dialogue is simply a contrived 
interruption to the main argument. 14 The interruption from Glaucon at this stage of the 
dialogue leads the reader to question why the character Socrates is depicted by Plato 
as putting forward the very basic community first rather than a more recognisable 
picture of society. This leaves the reader somewhat confused as to which of the two 
communities Plato wished to promote. It is interesting that later in the enquiry in the 
Republic it becomes apparent that the tripartite state as outlined by Socrates and the 
respondents, is an ideal, like the basic community, and it is unlikely that it could ever 
exist in reality (592a-b, Book IX).1S 
The interruption from Glaucon also appears to be a breakthrough in that it seems to 
give the characters Glaucon and Adeimantus the confidence to interrupt later in the 
dialectic enquiry, when they are not fully satisfied with the account that Socrates is 
giving. This sets a trend for the remainder of the dialectic enquiry in the Republic. The 
other significant interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus in the remaining Books of 
the Republic are considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this study. 
As Socrates sets about looking into an enlarged community in response to Glaucon's 
interruption, he makes a surprising comment concerning the basic community. He 
asserts that 'For though the society we have described seems to me to be the true 
one, like a man in health, there's nothing to prevent us, if you wish, studying one in a 
fever' (372e). This suggests that the basic community that Socrates puts forward in 
the first instance appeals to him. Nevertheless. the basic community would not 
appear to comply with the requirements of the just state and just soul as outlined by 
Socrates in Book IV and the later theories concerning knowledge included in the 
13 Blondell 2002, p. 207. 
14 Guthrie 1975, p. 446. 
15 Morrison (2007, pp. 250-254) provides an interesting discussion on the possibility of the basic 
community, which was advanced by Socrates in Republic Book II. He asserts that the basic 
community is a utopia that could exist on earth. However, he considers the ideal state, as outlined 
by Socrates in Republic Book IV, to be a paradigm that could not exist in reality. In my view, both the 
basic community and the ideal state are presented by Plato as ideals, rather than communities that 
could exist on earth. 
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remaining Books of the Republic. 16 Indeed, in his response to Glaucon, Socrates 
says 'All right, I understand. We are to study not only the origins of society, but also 
society when it enjoys the luxuries of civilization' (372e). Importantly, the enlarged city 
allows for the introduction of the guardians and auxiliaries who will playa key role in the 
just city. 
Socrates and the respondents proceed to consider the needs of an enlarged state. 
He observes that there will be a need for people within the state to engage in a wider 
range of occupations in order to meet the requirements and demands of the 
population (373a-c). The increase in population will result in the state seeking to 
increase its territory. As a result of this, the state will be forced to engage in wars with 
neighbouring states in pursuit of territory (373d). 
Although Glaucon and Adeimantus both act as respondents in the dialectic enquiry, 
Socrates engages with only one of these respondents at anyone point in the 
dialogue. This is in keeping with the elenchus method in Book I where Socrates 
engages with one respondent at a time, Cephalus, then Polemarchus and then 
Thrasymachus. It is also in keeping with the display oration method in Book II, part 1, 
where Glaucon and Adeimantus carry out individual exchanges with Socrates. 
Nevertheless, as the dialectic enquiry continues, from Book II, part 2 onwards, the 
characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus become more alike with one or other of them 
taking the lead in the discussion with Socrates.17 Also, in the later Books of the 
Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus take turns in interrupting at strategic points in the 
enquiry. Perhaps the length of the enquiry in the Republic prompted Plato to include 
two main respondents in order to make it more realistic dramatically. Notably, the 
characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus would not have been suited to the elenchus 
method as it requires respondents who display strong views of their own, which they 
are unwilling to give up, for example, Thrasymachus and Polemarchus.18 
18 As Annas (1981, p. 78) observes, the basic city advanced by Socrates does not appear to have a 
clear place in the overall moral argument of the Republic. It would appear to the reader that Plato's 
reason for introducing the basic city was to establish the specialisation principle. 
17 Blondell 2002, p. 220. 
18 As observed in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, 
Polemarchus is depicted as less aggressive than and not as clever as Thrasymachus in the 
Republic. 
95 
At the end of Book II, part 2, Socrates concludes that 'our properly good Guardian will 
have the following characteristics: a philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed, and 
strength' and in response to this Glaucon says 'I entirely agree' (376c). This is an 
important development in the dialogue. It enables Socrates and the respondents to 
move forward with the discussion that follows concerning the first stage of the 
education of the guardians. The positive conclusion to the enquiry at this stage can be 
compared with the negative end to each of the elenchus exchanges in Book I which 
ended in aporia or deadlock. It also demonstrates that despite his earlier interruption 
at 372c-e, Book II, part 2, Glaucon has now reached agreement with Socrates 
concerning the basic needs of the community. The silence of Adeimantus, 
Thrasymachus, Polemarchus and the wider audience appears to be designed to 
suggest that they agree with the theories being outlined by Socrates at this point and 
are willing to let him develop these theories further.19 
This leaves the reader with some concern regarding the dialectic method. From 375a-
376c Socrates considers, with the help of the respondents, the qualities required in 
the guardians. Significantly, the guardian class has not yet been split into guardians 
proper and auxiliaries. Despite the controversial nature of what Socrates is putting 
forward in this passage, there is no significant reaction from Glaucon or Adeimantus. 
This is surprising as the qualities that are required in the guardians are not those 
normally associated with a ruler. These include 'gentleness towards his own fellows 
and neighbours' and 'a philosophic disposition and a love of learning' (376b-c). 
Perhaps, the lack of intervention by the respondents when Socrates gives the 
qualities required in the guardians is because of the recent change to the dialectic 
method of enqUiry in the dialogue. Some have argued that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
are being depicted at this stage as agreeing with Socrates in order to encourage the 
reader to do so too.:;O Another possibility is that the respondents may need time to 
adjust to this method and to know when to speak up and when not to do so. 
Perhaps, it is necessary for them to remain mainly quiet for long spells to enable 
191n the discussion on wider issues in chapter 1 of this study, it is argued that Thrasymachus' silence 
at the end of the Republic does not convince the reader that Thrasymachus is in agreement with 
Socrates. Similarly, in the discussion on wider issues in chapter 2, it is noted that the silence of 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book X, part 2 after the Myth of Er, does not convince the reader that 
they are in agreement with Socrates. 
20 As noted in the introductory chapter of this study, Kraut (2002, p. 7) asserts that Plato's aim in 
constructing philosophical dramas including the Republic is to persuade the reader to adopt the 
positions being advanced in the dialogue. 
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Socrates to advance substantial theories that can then be reviewed where necessary. 
Likewise, the reader and audience need time to adjust to this new method of enquiry. 
Another possible explanation, is that Plato intends the reader to be concerned at this 
point of the dialogue and to be critical of the theories being advanced through the 
dialectic method. The reader begins to feel the need to take on the role of the 
respondent at some pOints in the enquiry and this becomes a feature of the dialectic 
method of enquiry in the Republic. This is a complex issue. The reader recognises 
that there are some pOints in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic where the silence of 
Glaucon and Adeimantus appears simply to represent their agreement with Socrates. 
However, the silence of Glaucon and Adeimantus at other points in the dialectic 
enquiry becomes a cause of concern to the reader as the enquiry proceeds. 
(Section 2) 
The dialectic method of enquiry: Justice in the state and the soul 
Having laid the foundations of the state in Book II, part 2 and Book III, Socrates 
proceeds to consider justice in the state and the individual. In Book IV, Socrates and 
the respondents continue to adopt the dialectic method of enquiry, which enables 
them to provide positive theories concerning justice. On a first reading of the dialectic 
enquiry in Book IV, the reader gains the impression that Socrates is in control of the 
discussion and confident about the theories that he is putting forward. But, a more 
detailed study of Book IV suggests to the reader that this is not necessarily the case. 
While giving a positive thesis overall, there are a number of examples in book IV 
where Socrates shows signs of hesitation. This section considers the theories outlined 
by Socrates in Book IV concerning justice in the state and soul and the input from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in the enqUiry. 
a) Justice In the state 
At the beginning of Book IV, Adeimantus makes an interesting and important 
objection. He asserts 'But look here, Socrates. how would you answer the objection 
that you aren't making your guardians particularly happy' (417b-419a)? He then 
argues that the guardians, as described by Socrates, would be more like "hired 
mercenaries" than rulers (420a). In response to this objection from Adeimantus, 
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Socrates observes that as they continue with the enquiry they are likely to find that the 
guardians will live very happy lives in the ideal state (420b). He also notes that the 
purpose of establishing the ideal state is for the happiness of the community as a 
whole and not just one of the classes within the community (420b). In the Republic 
Book IV Socrates proceeds to consider what would comprise a just individual. This 
involves looking at justice in the city first and then in the individual.21 He observes that 
'We thought it would be easier to see justice in the individual if we looked for it first in 
some larger field which also contained it. We thought this larger field was the state, 
and so we set about finding an ideal state, being sure we should find justice in it 
because it was good' (434e). Socrates claims that a just state would possess three 
essential virtues or qualities: wisdom, courage and self-discipline. Moreover, a just 
state would be comprised of three distinct groups of people: guardians, auxiliaries 
and workers (427e-432b). 
Socrates asserts that the guardians would rule over the state and through their 
knowledge they would make the state wise. Their education and upbringing would 
make them knowledgeable and it would prepare them for this role within the state. 
They would have knowledge of the Forms. This would provide the guardians with the 
ability to plan overall for the good of the city. Socrates asks 'is there any form of 
knowledge to be found among any of the citizens in the state we've just founded 
which is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a 
whole, in such a way as to benefit the state both in its internal and external relations' 
(428c-d)? According to Socrates, the guardians would fulfil this role within the state. 
Unlike some traditional rulers, the guardians would aim to rule for the good of the state 
rather than for their personal gain or honour.22 It is worth pointing out that the guardians 
would also gain personally from the introduction of the ideal state. It would provide 
them with the environment in which they could seek to gain knowledge of the Forms 
and also put this knowledge into practical use in ruling the state. It would also give 
philosophers a higher status within the community. 
21 Rutherford (1995, p. 211) observes that the Republic becomes more difficult and demanding for 
the reader as it progresses. The enquiry into the just state and just soul in Book IV is a good 
example of this aspect of the dialectic method. 
22 Here Socrates appears to be looking ahead to the second stage of the education of the 
guardians as outlined in Republic Books VI and VII, which includes studying the Forms. However, 
at this pOint in the Republic, the reader has only been introduced to the first stage of the education 
of the guardians as outlined in Book III, which does not include knowledge of the Forms. 
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It is notable that Socrates appears to be very much in control of the discussion at this 
stage of the enquiry with Glaucon following his lead. In response to a question from 
Socrates, Glaucon acknowledges 'All you can reasonably expect of me is to follow 
your lead and see things when you pOint them out' (432c). This can be compared 
with the way Glaucon is depicted in Book II, part 1 , where he adopts the display 
oration method with confidence and challenges Socrates. However, the change in 
approach by Socrates and the respondents has resulted in the enquiry becoming 
less focussed on individual concerns relating to justice and injustice and it has enabled 
them to explore wider issues.~ Nevertheless, despite his newly found confidence, 
Socrates also shows signs of doubt when he admits that they have reached a 'pretty 
impassable' and 'obscure' point in the enquiry (432c). 
Through the dialectic enquiry Socrates and the respondents agree that the role of the 
auxiliaries would be to fight for and defend the state, under the rule of the guardians. 
Their education and upbringing would make them courageous and this would enable 
them to fulfil their role (42gb-c). The workers would produce the food and goods for 
the state and also trade with other states. They would be expected to act in 
deference to the guardians and the auxiliaries. In order to do this, they would need to 
display the quality of self-discipline (430e). Indeed, all three classes in the ideal state 
would be required to display the quality of self-discipline by recognising their place 
within society. But, the quality of self-discipline would be displayed differently in the 
different classes within the state. Socrates asserts that a state which is self-disciplined 
would be master of itself, that is, the better part would rule the worse part (431 b). In 
the ideal state, the workers would be ruled by the guardians and they would be 
protected by the auxiliaries. Now that Socrates and the respondents have identified 
the three classes within society and their corresponding virtues, they are left with the 
task of identifying what comprises justice within the state. At this point in the enquiry. 
Socrates appears to recover his confidence. He says 'Tally ho, Glaucon! 'think we 
are on the traCk, and our quarry won't altogether escape us' (432d). Following further 
consideration, Socrates and the respondents conclude that justice in the state is self-
discipline, that is, 'keeping what is properly one's own and doing one's own job' 
23 Blondell 2002, p. 209. 
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(433d-434a) .ll4 
In the course of the dialectic enquiry into the just state, Socrates gains approval from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus at regular stages, with Glaucon speaking on behalf of both 
of them. Examples of the responses given by Glaucon include: 'That's true' (428a), 
'That is all perfectly true' (429a), 'Then I accept your description of courage' (430c), 'I'm 
quite sure of it' (431 e), and 'It must be' (433c). However, at one stage, Glaucon 
demonstrates impatience and complains that Socrates is taking a long time leading up 
to what he has to say (432e). Once they have found what justice in the state consists 
in, Socrates asserts that if they find that the pattern that they have established for the 
state also applies to the individual then they can accept this tripartite division. But, if 
they find that it does not apply to the individual, they will need to start the enquiry into 
the just state and soul again (434d). 
The enquiry into the just state ends with Glaucon saying 'I entirely agree with what you 
say' (434d). This section of the enquiry alerts the reader to an important difference 
between the dialectic method and the two earlier methods of enquiry adopted by 
Plato in Book I and Book II, part 1, that is, the elenchus and display oration methods. 
Through the dialectic enquiry into the just state, Socrates and the respondents put 
forward positive theories, following from the initial discussion in Book II, part 2, on the 
basiC state. This constructive method of enquiry enables Socrates and the 
respondents to provide the positive theories concerning knowledge in the remaining 
books of the Republic. Nevertheless, the lack of input from Glaucon and Adeimantus 
continues to cause some concern for the reader and this seems intentional on the part 
of Plato. Glaucon and Adeimantus could have raised some serious objections to the 
tripartite division of the state at this stage of the enquiry as these divisions appear to 
be rather unnatural and in particular with regard to the mix of people that would be 
included in the class of workers.25 However, they do raise serious issues later in the 
Republic and these are considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this enquiry. 
24 The reader needs to bear in mind that the just state as outlined by Socrates is inward looking in 
that it does not appear to be concerned with establishing just relationships with other states. 
Likewise, justice in the individual is concerned with the relationship of the parts of the individual's 
soul rather than the way the individual behaves towards other people. 
25 Mitchell and Lucas 2003, p. 26. 
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b) Justice In the Individual 
Now that Socrates and the respondents have established what a just state would be 
comprised of, they proceed to consider how this might be applied to the individual. 
Importantly, in the enquiry into justice in the individual, Socrates concentrates on the 
inner workings of the agent. This differs from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 
1, where they concentrate on the actions taken by the agent and the rewards and 
punishments associated with these actions. Socrates observes 'So there will be no 
difference between a just man and a just city, so far as the element of justice goes' 
(435b). Glaucon gives his agreement here on behalf of Adeimantus and himself. At 
435c Glaucon jokes with Socrates about the length of the enquiry that they have 
embarked upon at this point in the dialogue. This is followed by an interesting 
comment from Socrates where he appears to be referring to the theories that come 
up in the later Books of the Republic. Socrates says 'we shall never find an exact 
answer by the method of argument we are using in our present discussion - to get 
one we should have to go much further afield but we can probably find one that will 
be satisfactory by the standards we have so far used in our enquiry' (435c-d). Here 
Plato seems to be suggesting to the reader that there is a limit to what can be 
achieved by Socrates and the respondents in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic and 
that it is only the start of the enquiry into justice. 
Socrates and the respondents agree to proceed on this basis. But, the reader is left 
with the impression that there is some uncertainty about the method of enquiry being 
adopted at this stage of the enquiry. As a result of this, the reader is unsure how 
seriously to take the theories being put forward by Socrates and the respondents in 
Book IV. Nevertheless, the lack of confidence displayed here by Socrates can be 
compared with the high level of confidence displayed by Thrasymachus, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus in Books I and II, part 1. Perhaps Plato is attempting to warn the reader 
and audience in the background not to be taken in by the confidence of the speaker. 
Socrates regains his confidence and he sets out to establish that there are three parts 
to the soul: reason, spirit and appetite.26 In order to demonstrate that there is a 
division between reason and desire within the soul, Socrates gives the prinCiple of 
26 For an appreciation of the historical impact of the tripartite division of the soul as advanced by 
Socrates, see (Mitchell and Lucas 2003, p. 31). For a comparison between Plato and Aristotle on 
the relationship between the elements within the soul, see (Norman 1983, pp. 51-55). 
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opposites 'one and the same thing cannot act or be affected in opposite ways at the 
same time in the same part of it and in relation to the same object' (436b). If this was 
the case, then there would be more than one element within the same part of a 
particular thing, for example the soul. Socrates develops this point further by 
considering whether something can be at rest and in motion at the same time, with 
regard to the same part of itself. We are given the possible counter-example of a 
man who is standing still, but at the same time moving his hands and his head. With 
regard to this example, Socrates notes that because it is two different parts of the 
man that are at rest and in motion at the same time, this does not demonstrate that 
there is a division within one part of him (436c). In order to demonstrate this, one part 
of the man, for example his leg, would have to be at rest and in motion at the same 
time. 
Socrates also gives the possible counter-example of an archer pulling the bow with 
one of his hands and pushing it with the other. Again, this would not be an example 
of something being at rest and in motion at the same time with regard to the same part 
of itself (439b). For this to be the case, the archer would have to be pulling and 
pushing the bow at the same time with just one of his hands. Socrates then gives the 
possible counter-example of a spinning top which is both at rest and in motion at the 
same time. He considers whether it is the same part or two different parts of the 
spinning top that are doing the opposite thing at the same time. With regard to the 
spinning top example, Socrates concludes that 'it is not the same parts of such 
bodies that are at rest and in motion; they have both an axis and a circumference, and 
their axis, as it has no inclination in any direction, is at rest, but their circumference is in 
motion' (436d-e). 
At this stage of the enquiry, Glaucon and Adeimantus remain mainly silent with 
Glaucon responding on behalf of both of them. He gives positive responses to 
Socrates which include: 'Granted' (436c), 'That is quite correct' (436e), 'Yes, that's the 
thing to do' (437b). Having been given this support from Glaucon, Socrates 
broadens the discussion to include opposite states of the mind or soul as well as 
opposite actions. He asks 'would you not class assent and dissent, impulse and 
aversion to something, attraction and repulsion and the like as opposite actions or 
states - no matter which' (437b)? We are given the example of a person being 
thirsty but at the same time being unwilling to drink. Socrates argues that, given the 
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principle of opposites, in such a situation 'there is one element in their minds which 
bids them drink, and a second which prevents them and masters the first' (439c). 
Socrates asserts, on the strength of his argument, that the soul is comprised of at least 
two parts, reason and appetite (439d). In this example, reason is acting for the good 
of the soul overall. Notably, in response to this, Glaucon answers in agreement 'Yes, 
that is a reasonable view to take' (43ge). 
In Book IV, once Socrates has put forward the case for there being two parts to the 
soul, that is reason and appetite, he proceeds to consider whether there is a third part 
to the soul. He gives the example of Leontius, son of Aglaeon, who was on his way 
from Piraeus one day when he noticed some corpses lying on the ground nearby with 
the executioner standing by them. Leontius found that he had a strong desire to look 
at the corpses. At the same time he felt angry with himself for having this desire, but 
his desire won over him in the end and he looked at the bodies. Socrates asserts that 
in this case it is the appetitive part of the soul which is urging the agent to look at the 
bodies and it is another part of the soul, spirit or indignation, which is causing him to 
feel angry with himself. This leads Socrates to conclude that there is a division 
between desire and spirit within the soul and that therefore there is a third element 
within the soul, that is, spirit (43ge-440a). In response to this, Glaucon answers in 
agreement 'Yes it does' (440a). 
With regard to this example, Socrates argues that 'we often see other instances of a 
man whose desires are trying to force him to do something his reason disapproves 
of, cursing himself and getting indignant at their violence' (440a-b). He gives the 
example of political groups struggling against each other with spirit or indignation taking 
the side of reason. Here, spirit takes the side of reason against appetite because it 
appreCiates that reason knows what is the best course of action to be taken for the 
overall good of the individual.27 In the example of Leontius, the element of spirit within 
his soul is fighting on the side of reason to win over the desire to look at the bodies, 
but it loses the fight. Socrates suggests that in the majority of situations this would not 
happen and that the agent's reason, backed up by his or her spirit, would succeed in 
overcoming any unsavoury desires, which the agent may have. He notes 'I don't 
suppose you've ever observed indignation, either in yourself or in anyone else, 
taking the side of the desires and resisting the decision of reason' (440b). 
27 Irwin 1995, p. 212. 
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Importantly, the element of spirit within the soul can be educated unlike the appetitive 
element. 
As the dialectic enquiry into justice in the individual proceeds, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus remain mainly Silent, with Glaucon continuing to make positive comments 
at regular intervals and occasionally seeking clarification. The positive comments from 
Glaucon at this stage of the enquiry include: 'So it seems' (439c), 'It looks like it' 
(439d), 'No certainly not' (440b). At 438b, Glaucon seeks clarification by saying 'I 
don't understand.' At this point in the enquiry, the respondents are surprisingly quiet. 
It would seem that as the dialectic enquiry proceeds in Book IV the respondents are 
depicted as being more in agreement with Socrates and providing little input into the 
discussion. Some have suggested that the superiority displayed by Socrates in the 
dialectic method of enquiry in the Republic leads to the respondents accepting the 
controversial theories that he is outlining.:i9 However, this state of affairs does not 
continue for the rest .of the Republic, with Glaucon and Adeimantus making significant 
interruptions at strategic intervals in some of the remaining Books. 
Socrates seeks to establish a division between spirit and reason. He gives the 
illustration of an agent who thinks that he is being wronged. In this example, the 
agent's spirit or indignation makes him boil over with anger and it leads him to fight for 
what he thinks is right. This would lead the agent to suffer hunger and cold, and even 
death for what he or she thinks is right. Socrates notes that it is the element of reason 
within the soul which is responsible for contrOlling the spirit and 'calls it back to heel and 
calms it, like a shepherd calls his dog' (440c-d). The suggestion here seems to be 
that if spirit were left unchecked it would be detrimental to the agent. Unlike spirit, the 
element of reason within the soul is capable of taking an objective view overall for the 
good of the individual.29 This leads Socrates to conclude that there is a division 
between spirit and reason within the soul and that the soul is comprised of three 
distinct elements, reason, spirit and appetite. Notably, Glaucon responds in 
agreement 'There must be a third element' (441 a). 
Having given his examples for the division of the soul into three distinct elements 
(434d-441 c), Socrates claims that, as in the state, an individual soul has three parts or 
28 Blondell 2002, p. 210. 
29 Irwin 1995, p. 215. 
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elements: reason, spirit, and appetite.3l It is worth observing at this point that serious 
questions have been raised concerning the tripartite soul as outlined by Socrates in 
Book IV. Some have found fault with the principle of opposites as put forward by 
Socrates. 31 While, some hold that Plato is wrong in his assumption that having a 
desire to do something and having a desire not to do something are incompatible 
opposites, for example, being thirsty but not drinking.32 It is surprising that Glaucon 
and Adeimantus do not ask any questions concerning the tripartite soul. There are 
many other questions that have been raised by recent commentators that Glaucon 
and Adeimantus could have asked. At this pOint in the dialogue, the reader feels the 
need to take on the role of the respondent and this seems to be intentional on the part 
of Plato. 
One problem that the respondents could have considered is that each of the three 
elements within the tripartite soul as put forward by Socrates appears to be tripartite, 
leading to a vicious regress. In order for the three elements within the soul to play their 
prescribed role, they appear to need a bit of a\l three elements. This would explain 
how they make choices. For example, it would appear that the appetitive element 
within the soul would need a degree of reason, in order to appreciate and be led by 
the element of reason overall within the soul.33 Another question that they could have 
considered is whether the city/soul analogy provided by Socrates is sound. This 
takes the reader back to the beginning of the dialectic enquiry at 368a-e where 
Socrates alerts the respondents to the difficulty and obscurity of the subject that they 
are enquiring into. 
According to Socrates, the elements within the soul correspond with the three classes 
which were found within the state, that is: the guardians, auxiliaries and workers. A just 
soul would be one where each of its three elements were playing their prescribed 
role with reason in control and supported by the element of spirit. In the case of the 
30 Irwin (1995, p. 217) observes that the relationship between the three elements of the soul as put 
forward by Socrates is asymmetrical. Reason and spirit are both opposed to appetite but appetite is 
not opposed to either of them. Furthermore, reason is opposed to spirit on some occasions. The 
tripartite theory of the soul provides Socrates with grounds for asserting that different actions can 
be attributed to different parts of the soul. 
31 Robinson 1971, pp. 38-48. 
32 Stailey 1975, pp. 110-128. 
33 Irwin (1995, pp. 218-222) asserts that Socrates can avoid this objection by showing that the 
elements of spirit and appetite are capable of being led by the element of reason within the soul 
without having a separate rational element of their own. 
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guardians, the element of reason would be dominant within the soul and they would 
display the virtue of wisdom.34 The dominant element in the soul of the auxiliaries 
would be spirit and they would display the virtue of courage. In the case of the 
workers, the appetitive element would be dominant within their souls and they would 
display the virtue of self-discipline (441 c-444e). Here Socrates is pointing to the 
internal benefits of justice which lead to mental happiness for the guardians.35 
Significantly, in Republic Books I and II, part 1, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon 
and Adeimantus all associated justice with the individual's behaviour rather than their 
inner state. 
It is important to note that the souls of the auxiliaries and workers are comprised of all 
three elements but that spirit or appetite is in control rather than reason. It has been 
suggested by some that the workers in the ideal state are driven purely by desire.$ 
Some have recognised that Socrates describes the appetitive element differently in 
different parts of Republic, sometimes emphasising the bodily desires, and 
sometimes giving it a broader role.37 In his depiction of the just state and the just soul, 
Socrates sets out to demonstrate that justice can be good in itself and not only for its 
consequences. We are told that justice is good in itself because of the internal 
benefits which it provides for the agent. In comparison with this, Socrates asserts that 
injustice is a form of civil war with the wrong element of the soul in control (444a-b). 
The auxiliaries and workers would only have partly just souls. The guardians would 
be the only members of the state who would be in a position to achieve full 
happiness. It has been suggested by some that because they share the first stage 
of education with the guardians, the auxiliaries would value justice for the effect that it 
has on their souls. But, I think this goes too far as it is only in the second stage of their 
education that the guardians gain a full picture of justice in the city and the soul.38 
34 In contrast to the just soul of the guardian as outlined in Book IV, Socrates provides the striking 
illustration of the many headed beast in Book IX. This comprises the many headed beast 
(representing appetite), the lion (representing spirit) and the man (representing reason). In the 
case of the unjust soul, the many headed beast is in control rather than the man (Book IX, S88c-
S89a). 
35 For a useful discussion on justice in the individual in Republic Book IV, see Norman (1983, pp. 
22- 31). See especially p. 27 where consideration is given to the repression of desires in the 
tripartite soul. 
36 Scott 2000, pp. 19-37. 
37 Sayers 2002, p. 72. 
38 Kamtekar 1998, pp. 315-339. 
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Significantly, the guardians would be the only members of the city with perfectly just 
souls, that is, with reason in control. Another point to note is that it is likely that the 
guardians could experience some tension between their duty to take their turn in ruling 
the city and their personal desire to contemplate the Forms. It is likely that they would 
be happier contemplating the Forms than ruling. Some have argued that the 
guardians would be led by obedience to the laws to take their turn in ruling.m 
However, in some parts of the Republic, the guardians are portrayed as being 
above the law, for example in the founding myth of the ideal state where they 
manipulate the people (414b-415d and 540e-541 a). Also, in the drawing of lots for 
the mating of the guardians (460a-b). Some have suggested that by taking their turn 
in ruling the guardians would be able to satisfy their desires more completely.«l 
Another concern is that the guardians could experience difficulty in applying the 
knowledge that they have gained of the Forms to ruling the city.41 
The enquiry into justice in the state and the individual in Book IV ends with Socrates 
saying 'So we shan't be very far wrong if we claim to have discovered what the just 
man and the just state are, and in what their justice consists.' Glaucon gives his 
approval to this by saying 'No, we shan't' and they agree to make the claim (444a). 
The silence of Glaucon, Adeimantus and the wider audience during the course of the 
dialectic enquiry in Book IV, leaves the reader in doubt as to Plato's aim in portraying 
them in this way. Indeed, at this stage of the enquiry, Thrasymachus could have 
argued that Socrates has not yet proved that the person with a perfectly just soul 
would perform just actions as he could pursue selfish interests instead.42 Also, it 
appears that Socrates has not fully answered Adeimantus' objection at 419a that the 
guardians would not be particularly happy in the ideal state. 
The theory of justice outlined by Socrates in Book IV relies on the theories that are 
provided in the later Books of the dialogue. In the later Books of the Republic, 
Socrates needs to demonstrate that he has an argument for justice, rather than an 
argument for psychic order, which can defeat the arguments advanced by the 
respondents in Books I and II, part 1. In particular, in his consideration of unjust states 
and unjust souls in Books VIII and IX of the Republic, Socrates seeks to provide 
39 Brown 2000, pp. 1-17. 
40 Vernezze 1992. pp. 331-349. 
41 For further consideration of some of these issues, see (Darter 2001, pp. 335-356). 
42 Mitchell and Lucas 2003, p. 35. 
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further backing to the arguments given by him in Book IV.43 But, the discussion of 
unjust states and souls in Books VIII and IX also raises some doubts about the ideal 
state. This issue is considered in the next section of this chapter. 
The importance of the role of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the dialectic method of 
enquiry becomes clearer in Books V and VI of the Republic, where they make a 
number of dramatic interruptions into the dialogue. These interruptions result in another 
change of direction in the enquiry. The interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus in 
Books V and VI are considered in detail in the remaining chapters of this study. 
Section 3 
Wider issues concerning Republic Book II. part 2, 368a-376c, and Book IV 
and In particular how they relate to the earlier and later Books 
a) The decline of the Ideal state as outlined In Books VIII and IX 
Early in Book VIII, Socrates observes that in time the ideal state would decay. He 
states that 'since all created things must decay, even a social order of this kind cannot 
last for all time, but will decline' (546a). In the course of Books VIII and IX, Socrates 
provides a detailed account of how the dissolution of the ideal state would come 
about. Importantly, this discussion is prompted by Glaucon at 543c-544b, Book VIII, 
where he reminds Socrates that they were about to consider the question of imperfect 
states at the end of Book IV, before the interruption from Adeimantus concerning 
women and the family in the guardian class at the beginning of Book V. This forces 
Socrates to provide further detail about an issue that he had previously referred to 
briefly at the end of Book IV and the beginning of Book V, 445b-449a. 
In their consideration of unjust states and souls, Socrates and the respondents 
conclude that the ideal state would deteriorate firstly into a timarchy, then into an 
oligarchy, then a democracy, and eventually into a tyranny. Likewise, the soul would 
no longer be controlled by reason. It would deteriorate in the same pattern as the 
ideal state and would eventually become unjust and be led by unnecessary desires, 
as in the case of the tyrant. Socrates provides an interesting discussion of the 
happiness and unhappiness of the different character types (576b-588a, Book IX). 
43 Irwin 1995, p. 256. 
108 
He concludes that the tyrant would be the least just and least happy type of person. 
This is intended as a direct attack on the arguments given by Thrasymachus in Book I 
in support of the tyrant. 
Notably, at the end of Book IX and towards the end of the dialectic enquiry into the 
nature of justice in the Republic, Socrates and Glaucon, who is acting as respondent at 
this point, express doubt about the possibility of the ideal state ever becoming a 
reality on earth. Socrates then observes 'Perhaps, it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, 
where he who wishes can see it and found it in his own heart' (592b) and Glaucon is 
depicted as agreeing with him.44 In my view, this is one of the most puzzling aspects 
of the Republic. It puts in doubt all the positive theories that have been advanced by 
Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus since the beginning of the dialectic enquiry at 
368a,Bookii. 
In his attempt to defeat the theories advanced by Thrasymachus in Book I and 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, Socrates has provided an elaborate 
theory of an ideal state that is highly unlikely ever to exist. Also, should the ideal state 
ever become a reality, it would decline and eventually become a tyranny. Some 
commentators have defended Plato against the criticism that the ideal state is a utopia 
that would not exist on earth. They note that the ideal state provides a useful 
theoretical example of a just state:'6 However, it seems clear to the reader that in their 
challenge to Socrates in Book 11, part I, Glaucon and Adeimantus were expecting 
Socrates to provide a theory of justice that could be put into practice. The lack of input 
or objection from Glaucon and Adeimantus at this stage of the enquiry makes the 
reader want to act as respondent and question the usefulness of the theory of the 
ideal state and soul as outlined by Socrates in the Republic. In addition, the reader 
would want to ask questions concerning Plato's intention in portraying the ideal state 
and soul in this way. 
44 Morrison (2007, pp. 232-255) provides a useful discussion on the utopian character of the ideal 
city as advanced by Socrates in the Republic. He concludes, and I agree, that the ideal city is a 
paradigm, which is useful as an account of justice in the soul, but not for the city. Morrison asserts 
'All in all, despite its magnificent rhetoric, Socrates' appeal to the heavenly city in 592 is not very 
successful' (p. 250). 
45 Burnyeat (1999, pp. 297-308) considers the practicability of the ideal state as advanced by 
Socrates in the Republic. He asserts that the fact that the ideal state has not existed does not make 
the theory false (p. 308). Schofield (2006, pp. 194-249) considers the utopian nature of the ideal 
state as outlined in the Republic. He notes the difficulty that Plato and other philosophers have 
faced in formulating a theory of justice that could be put into practice (pp. 239-240). 
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b) Other Issues relating to Book II, part 2, 368a-376c, and Book IV and the 
remaining Books of the Republic 
There are a number of examples in Book IV that appear to pre-figure the later Books 
of the Republic. In Book IV, we are told that the guardians will be led by the element 
of reason within their souls and that they will display the virtue of wisdom. This 
provides a link with Book VI, where we are given the account of the Form of the Good 
as the ultimate object of knowledge (S02c-S09c), which the guardians will aspire to 
comprehend. In the ideal state, the guardians will be the only members of the state 
who will have the capacity to gain knowledge of the Forms. This knowledge will make 
the guardians wise. The second stage of the education of the guardians, as outlined in 
Book VII, will enable them to attempt to gain knowledge of the Form of the Good. 
Likewise, the account of the just state and just soul proves to be central to the defence 
of justice as advanced by Socrates in the Republic as a whole. But, it also relies on 
the theories concerning knowledge that are provided by Socrates in Books VI and VII 
of the Republic. 
Socrates' use of the dialectic method has resulted in an original and highly controversial 
theory of justice being advanced by Socrates, with the apparent agreement of the 
respondents. The proposals that Socrates puts forward concerning the just state and 
just individual would require a complete change in the way that society is organised. It 
would result in the guardians ruling the state. The fact that Plato has linked knowledge 
with ruling is designed to make the suggestion to put the guardians in charge of the city 
more acceptable to the reader. This provides a link with the discussion of the role of 
the philosopher in society in Books V and VI. It also makes a connection with the 
discussion of imperfect states and souls in Books VIII and IX as discussed above 
where Socrates illustrates what would happen when reason is no longer in control. 
The connections between Book IV and the later Books, lead the reader to question 
whether Plato had already worked out these later theories concerning knowledge 
when he wrote Book IV. If this was the case, it would have seemed more 
appropriate to include consideration of this directly after the discussion of the just state 
and the just soul in Book IV. However, at the end of Book IV, Socrates begins to 
enquire into unjust souls and states rather than providing any further clarification 
concerning the theory of justice outlined in Book IV. Another possibility is that the later 
110 
theories were formulated by Plato as he progressed with the enquiry into justice in the 
Republic, in order to provide backing for the theories outlined in Book IV of the 
dialogue. 
It is also possible that Plato put forward the theory of justice in stages to enable the 
reader to digest it in small pieces without becoming confused. This would also cause 
less upset to anyone who might be offended by the theories being advanced. Once 
the reader has accepted the theories outlined in Book IV, the later theories are easier 
to accept, for example, the philosophers being put in charge of the state. It is also 
possible that Plato was reluctant to provide the finer details concerning the just state 
and just soul at first because he was worried that it might be too controversial. 
Nevertheless, the dialectic enquiry from Book II, part 2 to Book IV of the Republic, 
prepares the reader and audience for the theories that are outlined by Socrates in the 
later Books of the Republic. 46 
In the dialectic enquiry in the Republic Book IV the character Socrates would appear 
to represent the guardians in the ideal state. But importantly, unlike the guardians, he 
has not yet gained knowledge of the Forms. Also, Socrates and the respondents 
have not yet perfected the dialectic method. Glaucon and Adeimantus would appear 
to represent the junior guardians, due to the fact that they assist Socrates in the search 
for knowledge of justice, but at times they do not display as high a level of 
understanding of the issues discussed as Socrates.47 The silent audience in the 
background of the dialectic enquiry, which includes Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, 
seems somewhat representative of the workers in the ideal state due to their low 
level of input into the dialogue after Book I. This is in keeping with the ideal state 
where the workers would have no involvement in political matters or philosophical 
enquiry. 
As noted above, the unjust souls as outlined by Socrates in Books VIII and IX are 
unjust because they do not have the correct element in control and are led by spirit or 
appetite rather than reason. This can be linked to the elenchus enquiries with 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book I. In these elenchus enquiries, the wrong 
character type takes the lead in each of the discussions. Polemarchus, who appears 
46 Kahn 1993, p. 142. 
47 Blondell (2002, pp. 211-213) identifies links between the characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus 
and the qualities required of the guardians in the ideal state. 
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to represent the workers (led by necessary and unnecessary appetites) in the ideal 
state and Thrasymachus who seems to represent the tyrant (led by unnecessary 
appetites) as outlined by Socrates in Republic Book IX take the lead in these 
enquiries, rather than Socrates, who represents the guardians (led by reason). 
Similarly, Glaucon and Adeimantus, who appear to represent the junior guardians, 
take the lead in the display oration method of enquiry in Book II, part 1, rather than 
Socrates, who represents the guardians. The role played by Glaucon, Adeimantus 
and the other respondents in the dialectic enquiry suggests to the reader that the 
elenchus and display oration methods as outlined in Republic Books I and II, part 1, 
are somewhat representative of the unjust state and unjust soul. 
As the dialectic enquiry proceeds from Book II, part 2 to the end of Book IV, 
Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus gradually become settled in their new roles with 
Socrates taking the lead and Glaucon and Adeimantus remaining fairly silent. 
Socrates' confidence continues to develop in this part of the Republic. In Book IV, 
the respondents appear to have less influence over the direction of the enquiry. This 
is a change from Book II, part 1, 357a-367e, where the interventions from Glaucon 
and Adeimantus set the challenge for Socrates which takes up the rest of the 
Republic. It can also be compared with the interruption from Glaucon in Book II, part 
2, which led to Socrates broadening the enquiry to include a less basic community 
(372d). As the dialectic enquiry progresses in Book IV, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
seem to change, for now, into more passive characters. This leads the reader to 
question why Plato did not introduce two new characters at this point of the dialogue. 
Perhaps Plato is suggesting here that by practising the dialectic method the agent will 
change for the better. Another possible aim of Plato is for the reader to change for the 
better by studying the dialogue and philosophy. 
It is interesting to consider what would have happened if Plato had gone straight from 
Book IV to the discussion of imperfect states and souls in Books VIII and IX and left 
out the Books in-between. Would the just state and just individual as put forward by 
Socrates in Book IV have provided a sufficient account of justice? Would it have 
provided a sufficient answer to the challenge from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, 
part 1? It is likely that it would have left too many questions unanswered and it would 
have required a sequel in the form of Republic, part 2, to provide the missing details.48 
48 For some consideration ofthis issue. see (Rutherford 1995. pp. 211-212). 
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In his attempt to defend justice against the attacks from Glaucon and Adeimantus in 
Book II, part 1, and Thrasymachus in Book I, Socrates relies on the content of the 
remaining Books which includes, among other matters, consideration of women and 
the family in the guardian and auxiliary classes and the role of the philosopher in 
society. 
Importantly, at the beginning of Book V, 449b-450a, Adeimantus makes a dramatic 
interruption to the dialectic enquiry, which results in a change in the direction of the 
discussion. This forces Socrates to give detailed consideration to the issue of women 
and the family in the guardian and auxiliary classes within the ideal state. The 
interruption from Adeimantus and the subsequent enquiry into the arrangements for 
women and the family in the guardian and auxiliary classes are the subject of the next 
chapter of this study. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter consideration has been given to Socrates' initial response to the 
challenge from Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1. This included consideration 
of Book II, part 2 and also Book IV, where the theory of justice in the state and the 
soul is put forward by Socrates. Consideration has also been given to some wider 
issues relating to Book II, part 2 and Book IV of the Republic and in particular the 
decline of the ideal state and soul, as outlined by Socrates in Books VIII and IX. 
During the course of this enquiry it has become apparent that the role of Socrates and 
the respondents changes considerably from Book II, part 2, 368a onwards. The 
introduction of the dialectic method of enquiry has enabled Socrates and the 
respondents to advance positive theories concerning justice in the state and the soul. 
However, Plato seems to be sending mixed messages to the reader with Socrates 
putting forward theories in the Republic, which are questioned later by the 
respondents. 
Despite the new found confidence displayed by Socrates in Book II, part 2 and Book 
IV of the Republic, there are examples of hesitation displayed by him, which raise a 
question as to whether Plato expected the reader to be convinced of the theories 
being advanced. In the parts of the Republic considered in this chapter, Plato, 
through the character of Socrates, has shown hesitancy, uncertainty and a lack of 
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resolve on a number of occasions: from being reluctant to commence the enquiry due 
to his lack of ability, to introducing a very basic community and then putting forward an 
expanded one. Then, when considering justice in the state and individual he starts 
with the big picture first. Also, he is reluctant to discuss the issue of women and 
children. This culminates in the doubt expressed by Socrates at 592a-b concerning 
the possibility of the ideal state. 
I would go further than Blondell who suggests that the instances in the dialogue from 
Book II, part 2 onwards, where Socrates professes ignorance, are there to reassure 
the reader that the character Socrates is not being dogmatic.4a Indeed, the reluctance 
displayed by Socrates encourages readers to think for themselves about the issues 
raised concerning justice in the state and the individual and raise questions regarding 
these theories. It also leaves the reader confused as to why Glaucon and 
Adeimantus do not interrupt at this stage of the enqUiry. However, the situation 
changes in the next and later Books of the Republic where Glaucon and Adeimantus 
make a number of dramatic entries into the discussion which influence the course of the 
enquiry. These are considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this study. 
49 Blondell 2002, pp. 201-202. 
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Chapter 4 
Adeimantus: Women and the family 
Introduction 
There are a number of dramatic interruptions and responses made by the 
respondents at intervals in the Republic Book II, 368a onwards. These often result in 
a change over of respondent. Some rudeness is displayed by the respondents on 
these occasions. These usually occur at a time when Socrates is putting forward a 
controversial theory or has just done so. There is a need for elaboration as 
Adeimantus points out that 'what is right needs explanation' of how it will come about 
(449c). This chapter considers the interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of 
Book V, 449b-4S0a. 
In section 1, consideration is given to the interruption from Adeimantus and on the 
response to this from Socrates. Sections 2 and 3 focus on the theories concerning 
women and the family as outlined by Socrates in Book V. They also focus on the 
method of enquiry adopted by Socrates and the input from the respondents Glaucon 
and Adeimantus. In section 4, consideration is given to some wider issues concerning 
the interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of Book V and how this relates to 
the Republic overall. In particular, this chapter alerts the reader to the idealistic nature 
of the just state as advanced by Socrates in Book IV, which would appear to work 
better in theory than in reality. 
(Section 1) 
The Interruption from Adelmantus at the beginning of Book V and the Initial 
response from Socrates 
Once Socrates has put forward the theory of the tripartite state and individual, he starts 
enquiring into the nature of imperfect states and characters.1 At this point, there is an 
unexpected and dramatic interruption from Adeimantus who has been prompted to 
1 At this pOint in the dialogue, Socrates acts like he has more or less finished the enqUiry. This also 
happened at the end of Book I when the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus was 
completed. However, unlike this example from Book IV, Book I ended inconclusively in aporia. 
115 
speak up by Polemarchus (449b-450a, Book V). We are told that Polemarchus, 
who was sitting near Adeimantus at the time, 'stretched out a hand and took hold of his 
coat at the shoulder.' He then asked Adeimantus 'What shall we do? Shall we let it 
go' (449b)? In response to Polemarchus, Adeimantus is abrupt with Socrates and 
urges him to provide more detail about the living arrangements for women and 
children in the auxiliary and guardian classes.2 Here, Adeimantus is referring back to 
423e, Book IV, where Socrates made a brief reference to women and the family and 
said 'a good many things we have for the moment omitted, such as the position of 
women, marriage, and the production of children, all of which ought so far as possible 
to be dealt with on the proverbial basis of "all things in common between friends".' 
Adeimantus accuses Socrates of being lazy and proceeding to consider other forms 
of constitution rather than dealing with this issue. Glaucon and Thrasymachus also 
speak up in support of Adeimantus here (450a).3 Glaucon then acts as respondent in 
this part of the dialogue.4 
This interruption from Adeimantus takes the reader by surprise. It is the first significant 
interruption from Adeimantus since Book IV, 419a, and since 357a-367e, Book II, 
where Glaucon and Adeimantus gave their challenge to Socrates to demonstrate that 
justice is desirable for its own sake as well as for its consequences.s It is unexpected 
because at the end of the enquiry into the just state and soul in Book IV, Socrates and 
Glaucon appeared to be in full agreement. It is interesting that the four main 
respondents in the Republic all feature in this interruption at the beginning of Book V. 
This interruption from Adeimantus and the other respondents in Book V, together with 
the expressions of doubt from Socrates, should not be dismissed by the reader as 
simply dramatic devices deployed by Plato. Instead, they should be considered 
along with the arguments being advanced in the dialogue.s 
2 This is in character with Adeimantus who is also abrupt with Socrates at other pOints in the 
Republic including his comments at 362d-e, Book II, where he commences his display oration. 
3 Then at 450b, Thrasymachus asks 'But what do you think we are here for, idle speculation or 
serious discussion?' This reminds the reader of the comment from Socrates at 336e, Book I, where 
he observes that finding justice is more valuable than finding gold. 
4 At this point of the enquiry in Republic Book V Glaucon and Adeimantus are acting as capable, 
sympathetic and challenging respondents, as discussed in the typology of key respondents in the 
introductory chapter of this study. 
5 At 419a, Book IV, Adeimantus interrupts Socrates and argues that the guardians would not be 
happy in the ideal state due to their lack of money and private property. 
6 Halliwell 1998, pp. 6-7. Halliwell concludes that together these elements give the reader the 
impression that the arguments being put forward in Book V are somewhat provisional. 
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This is the first appearance of Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus since Book F It 
reminds the reader that they are still present and following the discussion. It also alerts 
the reader to the fact that Socrates will need to convince members of society who 
hold views similar to those of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus of the benefits of the 
ideal state that he is proposing. Importantly, the fact that the character Adeimantus 
was prepared to speak up on behalf of the respondents demonstrates that he was 
not satisfied with Socrates' approach at this stage of the enquiry. The full significance 
of this interruption becomes clearer as we work through the controversial theories 
outlined by Socrates in Book V and the remaining Books of the Republic. 
Socrates responds calmly but hesitantly to the interruption from Adeimantus. This is 
interesting given the strength of this interruption. Socrates says 'What trouble you're 
causing by holding me up like this.' 'It's an enormous subject, and you're really starting 
again from the beginning just as I was congratulating myself on having finished with our 
state, and was feeling glad that no one had questioned the description I had given' 
(450a-b). Socrates then agrees, somewhat reluctantly, to proceed with the enquiry 
into women and children in the guardian and auxiliary classes. Indeed, at 450b 
Socrates admits that he had been trying to avoid discussion of this subject. The 
response from Socrates suggests to the reader that if Adeimantus had not 
interrupted, Socrates would have been prepared to proceed with the enquiry without 
enquiring further into the issue of women and the family, not to mention the much larger 
central topics of Books VI and VII concerning the philosopher ruler. Socrates returns 
to the issue of imperfect societies in Book VIII. 
This leads the reader to question what message Plato is trying to give here concerning 
Socrates and the dialectic enqUiry. Importantly, the reader would not expect a fully 
trained guardian to try to avoid enquiring into an issue of such significance. This 
reminds the reader that, although Socrates demonstrates a higher level of 
philosophical understanding than the respondents in the dialectic enquiry, he has not 
reached the level of understanding of the guardians. Also, Plato appears to be 
saying something here about his own conception of the difficulty of the topic under 
consideration. Was he really going to allow Socrates to omit the central thesis? 
Although this appears to be a dramatic ploy, it suggests that Plato may have lacked 
7 Page (1991 , pp. 26-27) notes the importance of this interruption, which was backed by the four 
respondents at the beginning of Book V, and he suggests that it results in a new start to the 
dialogue and to the ideal city that they are enquiring into. 
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confidence in his ability to deal with this area of the enquiry. The lack of confidence 
displayed by Socrates at this point may be designed to gain the support of the 
reader before the controversial theories concerning knowledge and the Forms are 
outlined later in the dialogue. Another point to note is that the guardian rulers are 
prepared to use deceit in the ideal state, for example in the drawing of lots for mating 
festivals (460a). The issue of the guardian rulers using deceit is considered later in this 
chapter. 
It is notable how the respondents react to Socrates at this point in the dialogue. 
When Socrates points out the enormity of the task that is being set for him, 
Thrasymachus is unsympathetic with him whilst Glaucon gives him encouragement. 
Thrasymachus says 'But what do you think we are here for? Idle speculation or 
serious discussion' (450b)?8 Glaucon makes a number of encouraging remarks in 
which he urges Socrates not to give up the enquiry (450b-c) and he assures Socrates 
that they are a sympathetic audience (450d). In response to Glaucon, Socrates is 
grateful for the support that he is being given but he continues to display signs of 
hesitation. 
With regard to the difficult nature of the enquiry, Socrates explains that 'when one is 
doing what I am doing now, and trying to discuss things about which one is far from 
certain,' he is in danger of coming to false conclusions and leading his friends astray 
(450d-450e). The responses from Thrasymachus and Glaucon suggest that Glaucon 
is a more suitable respondent for this stage of the enquiry in the Republic because 
he is less aggressive and more supportive.9 Indeed, this has been the case since the 
introduction of the dialectic method of enquiry at 368a, in Book II, part 2. Interestingly, 
Glaucon seems more prepared than Adeimantus to join in the dialectic enquiry with 
Socrates. However, Glaucon is also less critical than Adeimantus is of Socrates. For 
example, at 449a, Glaucon is asking Socrates for further details concerning imperfect 
states and souls, whereas, shortly after at 449c, Adeimantus bursts into the discussion 
and forces Socrates to enquire into the arrangements for women and the family in the 
8 Thrasymachus appears to be making an important point here. Socrates is trying to avoid 
discussion of women and the family, which is a vital component of the ideal state. Is Socrates 
avoiding the subject because it will lead to trouble and is this what Thrasymachus is suggesting? 
9 Blondell (2002, p. 249) alerts the reader to the suitability of the characters Glaucon and 
Adeimantus to the dialectic enquiry, as opposed to Thrasymachus. She also notes that 
Thrasymachus speaks for the last time at the beginning of Book V (450a-b) and she points out 
some of the advantages of him remaining silent after that paint (p. 243). Thrasymachus is referred 
to later in the Republic at 498c-d and 590d. 
118 
guardian and auxiliary classes. Nevertheless, Plato's depiction of Thrasymachus at 
450b in the dialectic enquiry seems to highlight a weakness in that method of enquiry. 
It appears to be a serious criticism of the character Socrates for his attempted 
avoidance of discussion of women and the family in the ideal state and an admission 
that this is a vital issue for the ideal state. 
In response to this, Glaucon gives further encouragement to Socrates and reassures 
him that if they are led to false conclusions through the enquiry, they will not blame or 
punish him for this outcome. The response from Glaucon here is particularly 
supportive and rather amusing 'if we are led into error by this discussion, we'll acquit 
you of manslaughter, absolve you of fraud, and discharge you without a stain on your 
character' (451b).10 Socrates then agrees to proceed with the enquiry. There 
appears to be something significant going on at this point in the dialogue. The strong 
expression of support from Glaucon leaves the reader wondering what message 
Plato is giving here? Is this a reference to Socrates' real imprisonment and death? 
The reader is left confused as to why Glaucon chose these particular charges and 
whether to take Glaucon seriously. Also, it is surprising that Adeimantus and the other 
respondents do not speak up at this stage. Their silence suggests that they are in 
agreement with Glaucon. However, even the strong encouragement from Glaucon to 
Socrates leaves the reader unprepared for the theories concerning women and the 
family that Socrates outlines in Book V. 
Significantly, Socrates displayed a similar level of hesitancy at the beginning of the 
dialectic enquiry in Book II, part 2, 368a-c. At that point, he also received 
encouragement from the respondents who, led by Glaucon, begged him to proceed 
with the enquiry into justice. This articulates the structure turning pOints. In addition, it 
appears to be designed to encourage the reader to empathise with the character 
Socrates and the theories that he advances. It also raises the level of importance and 
urgency of the present enquiry and helps to gain the attention of the reader and 
audience. However, another outcome is that the reader is left questioning Plato's 
purpose in portraying Socrates in this negative manner. It also alerts the reader to the 
revolutionary nature of what is proposed by Socrates and to question these theories 
10 This exchange reminds the reader of the banter between Socrates and Thrasymachus at 337d, 
Book \, where Thrasymachus asserts that he can give a far better definition of justice and Socrates 
says that he will have to pay the penalty for his ignorance, that is, to learn from those who have 
knowledge. Notably, this is followed at 337e, Book \, with Thrasymachus accusing Socrates of 
never giving his own views. 
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and this seems to be intentional on the part of Plato. 
(Section 2) 
The Introduction of the female guardian 
Following the encouragement received from Glaucon, Socrates quickly regains his 
confidence and proceeds with the enquiry into the role of women in the guardian class. 
In Book V, Socrates and the respondents continue to adopt the dialectic method of 
enquiry which was introduced in Book II, 368a onwards. 11 Socrates introduces the 
controversial thesis that male and female guardians should share the same duties 
within the state (451 e). He refers to this as wave one (457b). Importantly. Glaucon, 
who acts as respondent at this pOint of the enquiry agrees to this arrangement. But, 
Glaucon notes that the females would be treated as the weaker and the males as the 
stronger guardians (451d-e). 
It is surprising that Glaucon gives his agreement so quickly to this controversial theory 
from Socrates and that the other respondents remain silent. This is despite the high 
level of input from the respondents at the beginning of Book V. It is also surprising 
how quickly Socrates regains his confidence in Book V. The low level of resistance 
displayed by Glaucon after the initial interruption in Book V, leaves the reader puzzled 
as to why Socrates is portrayed as being so anxious at the beginning of this Book. 
The comment from Glaucon at 451d-e concerning male guardians being stronger than 
the female guardians is significant as it is a theme that runs through Book V of the 
Republic. 
Sometimes when referring to male and female guardians in Republic Book V 
Socrates refers to male and female watchdogs. 12 The fact that Socrates refers to 
watchdogs rather than guardians is interesting. It creates a link between the male and 
female watchdogs that are being considered in Book V, and the men and women in 
Plato's contemporary society who may have the potential to become guardians in the 
ideal state. The suggestion that human beings can be trained, like animals, to behave 
in certain ways, links in closely with the ideal state and soul as outlined in Book IV, 
which requires a high level of discipline within the three classes. Members of each of 
11 The dialectic method of enquiry is considered in chapter 3 of this study. 
12 For a useful summary of the references to animals in Republic Book V, see (Halliwell 1998, p. 17). 
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the three classes are required to play their designated role within the state. In the ideal 
state, the guardian and auxiliary classes would be educated to act appropriately. The 
workers would be kept under control by the guardians who would be backed up by 
the auxiliaries. It also links in with the strict living arrangements for the guardian 
community as outlined by Socrates later in Book V. 
It is in Book II that Socrates first introduces the analogy of the guardian as watchdog 
(37Sa). Interestingly, he asserts that the watchdog possesses a philosophic 
disposition, which is something that the guardians will need to possess. Socrates 
explains that the watchdog's ability to recognise a friend as opposed to a stranger, 
that is, the familiar and the unfamiliar, suggests that it has a love of knowledge (376a-
b). Although it is a joke, this and the other references to watchdogs can be compared 
with some other references that Socrates makes to animals in the Republic. 
Examples of these include the reference to the wild beast in relation to Thrasymachus' 
entry into the discussion at 336b, Book I and the description of the many-headed 
beast at S88c-e, Book IX. These other references to animals seem to be designed 
to show the character Thrasymachus in a negative light and the guardians in a positive 
light. Nevertheless, the reader will also note that in the ideal state characters such as 
Thrasymachus would have to be controlled by the guardians by force. Perhaps this is 
one reason why Socrates does not feel the need in the Republic to demonstrate 
conclusively that he has convinced Thrasymachus of the theories concerning the ideal 
state and soul. 
In Book V, Socrates develops his theory further by asserting that the female 
guardians will receive the same training, both physical and mental, as the male 
guardians and he gains qualified agreement from Glaucon. Socrates notes that these 
proposals may 'seem ridiculous if they were put into practice' (4S2a). This leads to 
some amusement as they contemplate the female guardians exercising nude with the 
male guardians (4S2a-b).13 Some have argued that there are connections between 
Republic Book V and Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae and in particular at Republic 452c 
where Socrates refers to the critics and he asserts that they will ask them to be serious 
13 McDonnell (1991, pp. 182-193), explores the question of when the Greeks began to exercise in 
the nude. He also considers what source Plato used in the assertion in the Republic that it had 
recently been introduced in Greece (452c-d). 
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for once. 14 In my view, the most important feature that these two works share is the 
fact that in order to progress women are required to act like men. 
During the course of the enquiry into female guardians, Glaucon responds on behalf of 
himself and the other respondents. Apart from the occasional request for further 
clarification, the responses from Glaucon are in agreement with Socrates. These 
include: 'You are quite right' (452c), 'That is certainly true' (452e), 'True enough' 
(453d), 'Yes entirely' (454d), and, 'No one will deny that' (455c). The silence .of 
Glaucon and the other respondents at this stage of the dialogue continues to worry the 
reader. The reader is left puzzled as to what Plato's motive is in portraying the 
respondents in agreement with Socrates for large sections of the dialogue. It appears 
that the dialectic method of enquiry as advanced from Book II, 368a onwards, requires 
the respondents to remain silent for long periods of time. However, the active 
responses from the respondents at key points in the dialogue, including the beginning 
of Book V, demonstrate that they are playing a key role in the enquiry and that they 
have an impact on its direction. 
As Socrates proceeds with the argument for introducing female guardians, it becomes 
clear that what he has in mind is female guardians being trained to act as closely as 
possible to male guardians.15 In considering whether this thesis is possible or not 
Socrates asks 'Is the female of the human species naturally capable of taking part in all 
the occupations of the male, or in none, or in some only' (453a)? He then introduces 
an imaginary critic and he asks questions on behalf of the critic.16 
The reader is left confused as to why Glaucon and Adeimantus or the other 
respondents did not ask questions at this pOint, considering the enthusiasm they 
displayed at the beginning of Book V, in raising the issue of women and the family. 
By introducing an imaginary critic, the character Socrates takes control of the questions 
and the answers, (although, of course, they are all being controlled by Plato). It is 
14 For a useful summary of the similarities and differences between Plato's Republic Book Vand 
Aristophanes' Ecc/esiazusae, see (Halliwell 1998, p. 11 and pp. 224-225). For consideration of the 
women in the plays of Aristophanes including Ecclesiazusae see (Cartledge 2001, pp. 32-42) and 
(Nails 2002, pp. 55-56). 
15 Halliwell (1998, p. 8) paints out that these arrangements are for the benefit of the state as 
opposed to the individual male or female guardian. Annas (1999, pp. 265-279) argues that Plato is 
not a feminist. 
16 The introduction of the imaginary critic is a literary device used by Socrates quite often in the 
Republic and in other dialogues. 
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worth observing that the argument put forward by the imaginary critic at 453b is quite 
strong and convincing. Indeed, some have argued that the imaginary critic has a 
strong impact on the enquiry.17 I think this is an exaggeration, but it leaves the reader 
confused as to whether the view of Socrates, the imaginary critic, or neither of these, is 
representative of Plato's view at this stage of the dialogue. 
At 453b, Book V, the imaginary critic alerts the reader to the importance of the notion 
of specialisation of labour that they agreed to in the dialectic enquiry into the just state 
and just soul in Book IV. Socrates asserts that the imaginary critic would argue that the 
natural differences between men and women would make it appropriate for them to 
play different roles in the ideal city. Following this, Socrates expresses doubt again in 
his ability to proceed with the enquiry and he is given encouragement by Glaucon to 
continue (453c-e). As the enquiry with the imaginary critic proceeds in Book V, 
Socrates makes an interesting comment concerning the method of enquiry that they 
are adopting. He observes 'You know, Glaucon, it's extraordinary how powerful the 
influence of debating technique can be' (454a). He then asserts that, in discussion, 
some people focus their attention on scoring points rather than arguing seriously and 
he suggests, as Adeimantus asserts at 487b, Book VI, that this may be happening 
to them as they proceed with the enquiry. 
This reminds the reader of the input from Thrasymachus in Book I, where he interrupts 
the elenchus enquiry between Socrates and Polemarchus (336b) and advances the 
thesis that injustice is superior to justice. It also reminds the reader of the display 
oration method as adopted by Glaucon and Adeimantus, in Book II, part 1, where 
they challenge Socrates to demonstrate that justice is good for its own sake as well as 
its consequences (357a-367e). Unlike the dialectic method of enquiry, the elenchus 
enquiry in Book I and the display oration method of enquiry in Book II, part 1, did not 
result in a positive thesis being put forward concerning justice. 
Socrates suggests that, as a way forward, they should consider the similarities and 
differences in nature between the male and female. This is in order to establish 
whether females would have the capacity to become guardians (454b). Glaucon 
gives his agreement to this approach on behalf of himself and Adeimantus. Socrates 
sets out to establish that there is no administrative function that is peculiar to the male 
17 Blondell 2002, p. 210. 
123 
or female (455d). He asserts that there are some among the female sex who 
possess the characteristics that make them suitable to become guardians. These 
include: being athletic and having the capacity to become a good soldier and also 
being spirited. Importantly, some women have the ability to be philosophic (455e-
456a). This leads Socrates to conclude 'Then there will also be some women fitted to 
be guardians: for these natural qualities, you will remember, were those for which we 
picked our men guardians' (456a). Notably, with regard to the possibility of 
introducing female guardians, Socrates is being theoretical. Unfortunately, there are no 
female examples from their contemporary society for them to identify with in the 
enquiry. Surprisingly, Glaucon gives his agreement to this without any further 
questioning. 
Significantly, in order to become guardians, women must display the characteristics of 
the male guardian. As a result of this, the administration of the ideal state will in effect 
be dominated by male values and goals. In order for the ideal state to function as 
outlined in Republic Book IV, it will be necessary for female guardians to become, in 
effect, male guardians. This issue is explored further in the next section of this chapter, 
where it becomes apparent that the female guardians are introduced primarily in order 
to provide the next generation of guardians. Like all other members of the ideal state, 
the female guardians are required to act in the interest of the state overall, rather than 
any individual interests that they may have. 
The theories advanced by Socrates in Book V seem too far removed from the roles 
of both the male and female in Plato's contemporary society. Also, in the ideal state, 
new opportunities were only being opened up to guardian women who would 
represent a small percentage of the female population overall. There seems to be a 
paradox in the role of the female guardian in the ideal state. Women guardians would 
have to be like male guardians, but their female role would be vital if the state as 
outlined by Socrates was to have a chance of survival. Some have argued that the 
theories advanced by Socrates and the respondents in Book V are not designed to 
treat guardian women any worse than guardian men.1B I would argue that Socrates has 
proposed that the family be destroyed in order to allow the ideal state to come into 
existence and that therefore the guardian female role is surely only a means to an end. 
18 Annas (1976, pp. 307-321) asserts that Socrates is interested primarily in the good of the state 
overall, rather than equality issues between male and female guardians or the individual interests of 
the male guardians. 
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Others have asserted that the theories in Book V demonstrate a recognition of the 
ability and potential of women. 19 Others have noted the importance of Book V for its 
evaluation of men and women alike, based on their ability to use their reason.a:> It is 
significant that the question of women and the family in the guardian and auxiliary 
classes does not really feature in the rest of the enquiry in the Republic after Book V. 
Socrates asserts that the introduction of female guardians would be possible and that 
it would be the best arrangement for the ideal state. Female guardians will be given 
the same education that is required to make a man into a guardian (456c). The male 
guardians will be the best men in the state and similarly the female guardians will be 
the best females in the state (456d-e). Socrates concludes that the female guardians 
should engage in all the duties of the male guardians, including taking part in war and 
administrative duties within the state (457a-b}.21 It is surprising that there is no 
opposition expressed by the respondents or by the imaginary critic to the proposal 
to introduce female guardians.22 Indeed, the imaginary critic has gone quiet all of a 
sudden. Perhaps, Plato intends the readers to be concerned about the lack of 
response at this point in the dialogue and to act as critic for themselves. Maybe, the 
fact that the female guardians would be required to display the characteristics of the 
male guardians, makes it more acceptable to the respondents for females to be 
introduced into the guardian community. 
As Socrates and the respondents have agreed (451e and 455d) that in general 
terms the female guardian will be weaker than the male guardian, this could result in 
some unexpected outcomes for the ideal state. There are a number of issues that 
could have been raised by Glaucon, Adeimantus and the other respondents or 
indeed by the imaginary critic. One possibility is that a higher proportion of females 
would reach the rank of auxiliary rather than philosopher. This would result in an army 
19 Vlastos (1997, pp. 115-128) observes that although the theories advanced in Book V are 
concerned with the good of the state overall, they also demonstrate that in the plans for female 
guardians in the ideal state, Plato was not influenced by the subordinate role they played in his 
contemporary SOCiety. For further consideration of feminist issues relating to Plato, see Tuana 
(1994, pp. 25-130). 
20 Levin 1996, p. 26. 
21 Levin (2000, pp. 81-97) considers the arrangements for women in the Laws, which are less 
favourable than what is proposed in the Republic. This alerts the reader to the fact that the views 
put forward in the dialogues of Plato may have changed over time. 
22 For an appreciation of the subservient role women actually played in fourth century Athens, see 
(Whitehead 1986, pp. 109-114). This alerts the reader to the controversial nature of the theories 
advanced by Socrates in Republic Book V. See also (Pomeroy 1994, pp. 79-92) for a useful 
account of the role of women in Classical Athens. 
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which lacked the physical strength of enemy armies. Another possibility is that there 
would be fewer females than males in the philosopher class and that the majority of 
those in charge of that class would be male. In my view this could result in three 
classes within the guardian and auxiliary community: a) Male and female auxiliaries. 
b) Female guardians and the male guardians who do not succeed to the rank of 
guardian ruler. c) Male guardian rulers. 
The education of the philosopher begins with a shared programme with the auxiliaries 
and then progresses to the study of the Forms. The ultimate goal of the philosopher 
is to gain knowledge of the Form of the Good.~ However, it is likely that the majority 
of female guardians would not be in a position to gain knowledge of the Form of the 
Good and as a result of this they would fail to reach their full potential as guardians.:!4 
Socrates acknowledges that the female guardians will be the weaker sex and he 
asserts that they will be given a lighter share of the guardian duties than the male 
guardians (457a). This is likely to result in the female guardians feeling inferior to their 
male counterparts. In addition to there being fewer female philosophers, pressure 
would be put on the top female guardians to procreate. This would take them away 
from their administrative role within the city for periods of time, leaving even fewer 
women active administratively within the guardian class. 
Another point that Glaucon and Adeimantus could have raised is that no females 
feature in the dialogue the Republic. This leads the reader to question how females 
can aspire to become guardians, if they are excluded from philosophical enquiry. The 
dramatic scene of the Republic purports to reflect real life in the 420's. Therefore, no 
women would have been permitted to attend. In the Phaedo, which is depicted 
earlier, the women are removed before Socrates talks to his friends. In addition to 
this, the one woman who is referred to in the course of the main philosophical enquiry 
in the dialogues of Plato is not treated in the same way as the men. Diotima in the 
Symposium, who is referred to by Socrates as a female prophetess, is wiser than 
23 Cooke (1999, pp. 37-44) provides a useful account of the educational development of the 
guardians, including the shared stage with the auxiliaries. 
24 Buchan (1999, p. 142) goes further than this. She asserts that the male guardian's soul would be 
superior to the female guardian's soul and that this would prevent the female guardians from 
reaching their full potential. According to Buchan 'It is the masculine soul, the superior sort, which 
falls in earthly existence into the body of a male. The inferior sort which have seen less of the 
celestial vision, (that is the Forms) the less philosophical or non-philosophical souls, are those 
which end up in the body of a woman. For a critical analysis of Buchan's views concerning Plato's 
arrangements for women, see (Brown 2002, pp. 189-193). 
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Socrates and she possesses knowledge of the Forms, like a female guardian. It 
would have been interesting if Plato had included a female character like Diotima in the 
Republic, to give the reader and audience a picture of what a female guardian might 
be like. ~ Some may argue that it does not matter to the ideal city as a whole whether 
the majority of guardians and guardian rulers are male, as long as they maintain justice 
within the city. However, the stability of the city overall depends on the guardian and 
auxiliary classes remaining stable.a; It is likely that the female guardians would 
become dissatisfied with their role within the ideal state in the long-term and would be 
unwilling to co-operate. 
(Section 3) 
The guardian community 
Having concluded that it would be in the best interest of the state for female guardians 
to take on the same duties as male guardians, Socrates and the respondents consider 
what the appropriate living arrangements would be for the guardian class. Socrates 
observes that they have survived the first wave without drowning and he alerts the 
reader and audience to the fact that the theory he is about to put forward is much more 
controversial. He refers to this as the second and bigger wave (457c).27 Socrates 
asserts that 'men and women guardians should be forbidden by law to live together in 
separate households, and all the women should be common to all the men; similarly, 
children should be held in common, and no parent should know its child, or child its 
parent' (457c-d). In response to this, Glaucon notes that this is a much bigger wave. 
It is likely to lead to a sceptical reaction from the community about the possibility of 
introducing this and whether it would be to the advantage of the community (457d). 
At this point, rather than expanding on this theory with confidence, Socrates 
demonstrates uncertainty about his ability to proceed with the enqUiry. He admits that 
25 Reeve (2001) provides a useful set of dialogues on themes from Plato's Republic, which feature 
women in philosophical discussion with Plato and Aristotle. 
26 The long-term stability of the ideal state and soul is considered in detail by Socrates and the 
respondents in Republic Books VIII and IX. This issue is discussed in chapter 3, section 3a, of this 
study. 
27 At 473c-e, Book V, Socrates introduces the third and biggest wave of the Republic. This is 
considered in the next chapter of this enqUiry. For a useful account of the three waves in the 
Republic, see (Roochnik 2003, pp. 57-69). Sedley (2007, pp. 256-283) alerts the reader to the 
cumulative nature of the three waves with the third wave threatening to cause a 'philosophical 
tsunami, a veritable cataclysm of incredulity that threatens to wash away' the entire pOlitical agenda 
as advanced by Socrates (p. 256). 
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he had hoped that he had already convinced the respondents of the advantages of 
introducing these arrangements for women and the family and that in the enquiry they 
could focus on whether it would be possible or not (457e). In response to this, 
Glaucon observes that Socrates has not been successful in convincing them of either 
of these points and that Socrates should be 'charged on both counts' (457e). that is, 
beneficial and viable. This is an unexpectedly firm response from Glaucon. It 
demonstrates that he is following the arguments carefully and ensuring that Socrates 
provides more detail on some issues that need to be considered further. Importantly, 
at the beginning of Book V Socrates admitted that he had hoped to avoid discussing 
the issue of women and the family (450a-451 b). Up to this point, Glaucon had been 
portrayed as being sympathetic with Socrates and had encouraged him to embark on 
this enquiry. In this later example at (457c-d), Glaucon appears to be justified in 
seeking further explanation from Socrates. This is because Socrates has provided 
insufficient detail concerning the advantages or possibility of introducing the theories 
outlined with respect to women and the family. 
What is Plato's purpose in portraying Socrates in this manner? Is Plato trying to avoid 
going into detail about controversial matters? It would appear that the heSitancy 
displayed by Socrates is designed to alert the reader and audience to the enormity of 
the task facing Socrates and the respondents in enquiring into the subject of women 
and the family. Perhaps it is deSigned to encourage the reader to be sympathetic 
towards the character Socrates as well as the theories that he is putting forward. It 
may also indicate Plato's heSitancy in introducing the theory concerning women and the 
family. However, the critical response from Glaucon encourages the readers to think 
through the issues for themselves and consider the implications of what is being 
agreed. As Socrates provides further details concerning the arrangements for women 
and the family in Book V, the reader becomes aware of the gap that is developing 
between the theory of the tripartite state as outlined in Book IV and the practical 
implications concerning its introduction. 
In response to Glaucon, Socrates makes a surprising comment. He says 'I must 
stand my trial, then' (457e). Socrates then expresses further feelings of doubt. He 
explains that he is 'not feeling very strong' and he asks if he can put off consideration 
of the practicalities of the theory concerning women and the family at this stage 
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(458b).:iS For now, he wants to concentrate on how the guardians would put these 
arrangements into practice in the ideal state. Also, on how these arrangements would 
benefit the state as a whole (458b). Later in Book V, Socrates shows further signs of 
hesitation when he asserts that they are looking for an ideal pattern rather than trying to 
demonstrate that the ideal city could actually exist (472c.ci).~ The lack of confidence in 
his ability displayed by Socrates as the enquiry proceeds in Book V, can be 
compared with the confidence displayed by the character Socrates at the end of Book 
IV having outlined the theory of justice in the state and soul. The expressions of 
uncertainty from Socrates are becoming a regular feature of the Republic and they are 
beginning to undermine the reader's confidence in the theories that Socrates is putting 
forward. This appears to be intentional on the part of Plato. 
Interestingly, and despite the firmness he displayed at (457e), Glaucon gives in 
easily to Socrates and grants him his request to put off conSideration of the practical 
issues (458b). Indeed, during the remainder of the enquiry into the living 
arrangements of the guardian community, the responses from Glaucon are in 
agreement with Socrates with the occasional request for further clarification. Examples 
of the responses from Glaucon include: 'A reasonable supposition' (458c), 'That will 
certainly be necessary' (460a), 'I quite agree' (461e), 'That is very true' (462c), and 
'Yes, we said that' (464c). The silence of the respondents continues to be a worry for 
the reader at this stage.3:l This is also raised as a cause for concern in chapters 3 and 5 
of this enquiry.31 Indeed, in these examples, Plato appears to be encouraging the 
reader to take over the role of the respondent in these parts of the dialogue. 
Socrates and the respondents proceed to consider how the guardians would 
implement the arrangements for women and the family. They agree that the male and 
female guardians would live, train and exercise together as a group and that they 
28 Interestingly, in the Republic, Socrates does not return to the issue of the practicalities of the 
theory of women and the family. The significance of Socrates' avoidance of this issue is considered 
in section 4 of this chapter. 
29 This passage appears to prefigure the discussion between Socrates and Glaucon at the end of 
Book IX, where they express doubt about the possibility of the ideal state ever existing in reality and 
Socrates concludes that 'it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, where he who wishes can see it and 
found it in his own heart' (592a-b). 
30 At this point in the dialogue, Glaucon and Adeimantus fit into the last category of respondents as 
discussed in the introductory chapter of this study, that is, capable, sympathetic respondents who 
remain silent for extended periods of time. 
31 Blondell (2002, pp. 249-250) suggests that the lack of resistance from Glaucon and Adeimantus 
in the dialectic enquiry encourages the reader and audience to question the theories that Socrates 
is advancing and to think for themselves. 
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would not be permitted to own private property (458c-d). There would be no 
traditional marriage between guardians. Instead, mating festivals would be held so 
that the next generation of guardians could be bred. Socrates once again introduces 
an analogy with animals. He considers the arrangements for breeding hunting dogs 
and game birds and notes that the best dogs and birds are bred by those in their 
prime (459b). He observes that the same applies to horses and other animals. 
Socrates then asserts that the same approach should be taken in order to produce the 
best guardians. 
Socrates then reintroduces a controversial element into the discussion. He asserts that 
the ruling guardians would need to deceive the male and female guardians in the 
arrangements relating to their mating.32 He argues that 'our rulers will have to employ a 
great deal of fiction and deceit for the benefit of their subjects; and you will remember 
that we agreed that they might be used as a kind of medicine' (459c-d). Here 
Socrates is referring back to Book II, 382b-d and Book JII, 389b where, in relation to 
the education of the guardians, Socrates and the respondents agreed that the ruling 
guardians would need to use falsehood as a form of medicine, for the good of the 
state overall. In Book V, Socrates and the respondents proceed with the enquiry and 
agree that in order to produce the next generation of guardians, the best males will 
need to mate with the best females. In order for this to be achieved, Socrates asserts 
that the ruling guardians will need to arrange mating festivals for the males and females 
to come together to breed (45ge). This will be done through a system of drawing 
lots. To ensure that the best males and females mate with each other, the ruling 
guardians will need to 'devise an ingenious system of drawing lots, so that our inferior 
guardians can, at each mating festival, blame the lot and not the rulers' (460a). 
At this point in the enquiry, the reader is left with some concerns with regard to the 
feasibility of the ideal state. The reader would not expect to find the rulers of the 
ideally just state using deceit, even if it is deemed to be in the interest of the state 
overall. In the ideally just state as outlined by Socrates, there is no system in place to 
monitor the rulers. This could lead to the deterioration of the ideal state in the long-
term, with the rulers taking advantage of their situation and employing deceit for their 
personal gain, rather than for the good of the state overall. In Books VIII and IX of the 
32 For consideration of the exploitation of the sexual desires of the guardians see (Halliwell 1998, 
p. 8). 
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Republic, Socrates and the respondents consider how the ideal state and soul could 
deteriorate. Interestingly, in their enquiry into imperfect states and souls, Socrates and 
the respondents do not consider the use of deceit by the rulers, as a factor that could 
lead to the deterioration of the ideal state. 
Another concern in relation to the drawing of lots is that it presumes that the rulers will 
be able to judge which guardians should be picked for the purpose of producing the 
best offspring. There is no guarantee that their calculations will be correct or that the 
offspring of the best guardians will have the good attributes of their parents. Indeed, it 
is likely that the guardians will rely more on their military and political ability than the 
drawing of lots for mating festivals, for the survival of the ideal state.33 Notably, 
Socrates observes in Book VIII that the rulers may fail in their calculations with regard 
to the breeding of guardians. According to Socrates 'reason and observation will not 
always enable them to hit on the right and wrong times for breeding; some time they 
will miss them and then children will be begotten amiss' (546b). We are told that this 
is how the deterioration of the ideal state could begin, with it changing initially from an 
ideal state to a timarchy (546c-547c). 
There is also a presumption that the inferior guardians will fail to notice their lack of luck 
in the lots. This seems unlikely given the high standard of education that the guardians 
and auxiliaries will receive in the ideal state. Socrates asserts that male guardians who 
distinguish themselves at war will be given more frequent opportunities to sleep with 
women in the mating festivals (460b). In my view, it is unlikely that the other 
guardians will fail to notice this arrangement either. This could lead to frustration and 
discontent within the guardian class. It could also lead to a lack of trust among the 
guardian community in the guardian rulers. This could have a destabilising impact on 
the ideal state. In their consideration of imperfect states and souls, Socrates and the 
respondents do not consider this as a potential threat to the long-term stability of the 
state.34 
The continued silence of the respondents at this point in the enquiry, following their 
dramatic interruption at the beginning of Book V, leads the reader to question Plato's 
motive in portraying Glaucon and Adeimantus in this manner. Plato may be alerting 
33 Halliwell 1998, p.18. 
34 Significantly, early in Book VIII, Socrates observes that 'as long as the ruling class remains united, 
even if it is quite small, no change is possible' (545d). 
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the reader to a weakness in the dialectic method of enquiry.:!; Although this method of 
enquiry enables Socrates and the respondents to advance positive theories 
concerning justice in the city and the soul, the theories put forward in the enquiry 
appear to lack feasibility in the short and long-term. This raises a question as to 
whether Plato intended the reader to accept these theories. 
Socrates does not say, but presumably female guardians who distinguish 
themselves at war would be entitled to the same reward as their male counterparts. 
This could have a potentially negative impact on the state. It would result in the best 
female warriors being kept away from the battlefields for periods of time on a regular 
basis, due to pregnancy. In addition to this, it would put their long-term health at risk, 
due to the possible medical complications associated with pregnancy and childbirth. It 
is unclear in Book V how regularly the mating festivals between male and female 
guardians would be held. If they were held on a regular basis, some of the best 
female guardians would not be able to take part as they would be pregnant.36 Some 
have asserted that in Book V it is not being argued that female guardians should be 
given the same reward as male guardians for dOing well in battle. Also, that the 
female guardians would be placed in a subordinate role sexually to the male 
guardians in the ideal state.37 In relation to this, it is likely that the proposals outlined by 
Socrates concerning female guardians would have gained a negative response from 
the Athenians of Plato's day, both male and female, as they differed significantly from 
contemporary practices.:l8 This may explain why the point was not raised by 
Socrates concerning sexual rewards for the female guardians. It also raises a question 
as to the seriousness of Plato's intention at this point in the enquiry. 
Socrates and the respondents proceed to consider the arrangements for guardian 
children. Socrates proposes and the respondents agree that following their birth, 
guardian children will be taken to state nurseries where they will be taken care of. The 
nursery workers will come from outside the guardian community (460b-c). The only 
involvement that the guardian mothers would have with the guardian infants would be 
35 Notably, the elenchus enquiry in Republic Book I alerted the reader to some weaknesses in the 
characters Cephal us, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus and also to a weakness in the elenchus 
method, i.e. that it did not provide an answer to the question under consideration. 
36 Reeve 1997, p. 140. 
37 Buchan 1999, pp. 147-148. 
38 Halliwell (1998. p. 9) provides a summary of the differences between the proposals outlined by 
Socrates in the Republic Book V for female guardians and the practices that existed in 
contemporary Athens. 
132 
to share in the breast-feeding of them. The guardian fathers would have no 
involvement in the rearing of their children. The officials running the nurseries would 
make every effort to ensure that the female guardians would not recognise their own 
children (460d). With regard to these arrangements, Glaucon observes that 'Child-
bearing will be an easy job for the guardians' wives on those conditions' and Socrates 
agrees with him (460d). 
It is important to note the reference to duty in this process. The female guardians are 
required to breed in the interest of the state, rather than for their own personal benefit. 
Similarly, the male guardians play their prescribed role in the breeding process for the 
benefit of the state. The aim of this exercise is to produce the next generation of 
guardians, which will consist of male and female guardians both acting like males.~ In 
this arrangement, the female guardians would be playing their required role within the 
tripartite state, as outlined in Republic Book IV. This helps the reader and audience to 
understand why Socrates put so much emphasis on the importance of each person 
keeping to their prescribed role within the ideal state.4l Notably, some guardian 
children will not be accepted into the guardian nursery, but taken elsewhere. These 
would include infants of inferior parents and also defective infants (460c). This is 
another example of the level of power that the ruling guardians would have over the 
guardian class as a whole, but it would be necessary to keep the guardian community 
intact 
Once they have agreed on the establishment of a state nursery for guardian children, 
Socrates and the respondents consider and agree that the guardians should breed in 
their prime. Socrates asserts that female guardians would be in their prime for twenty 
years and male guardians for thirty years (460e) and they agree on the precise age 
when each sex would be in its prime. The reader and audience are again reminded of 
the level of control that the rulers will maintain over the guardian class. Socrates 
asserts that it will be a crime for guardians who are not in their prime to conceive 
(461 a). It would also be a crime for guardians who are in their prime to mate outside 
the mating festivals (461 b), which are controlled by the ruling guardians. A point that 
could have been raised by Glaucon is that the female guardians would be in their 
39 Price 1997, p. 170. 
40 Page (1991, pp. 28-29) alerts the reader to the strength of parental ties and how this could cause 
a conflict of loyalty for the guardians, between the family and the state, if the family was not 
abOlished. 
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prime for ten years less than the male guardians. Hence there would need to be 
more female than male guardians in the ideal state. This would be to ensure that there 
were sufficient female guardians for the mating festivals. 
In the ideal state, the rulers would also use their power to regulate mating between 
guardians who are past their prime. This would include disposing of any children born 
as a result of these unions (461 c). Socrates states and Glaucon agrees that it will be 
necessary to prevent guardians mating with their own children and grandchildren at 
mating festivals and when they are past their prime. In order to ensure this, Socrates 
asserts that 'a man will call all males born in the tenth or the seventh month after he has 
been a bride-groom sons and all the females daughters, and they will call him father; 
similarly, he will call their children grandchildren, and they will in turn call his marriage-
group grandfathers and grandmothers' (461 d). In addition, Socrates asserts that 'all 
who are born during the period when their mothers and fathers were producing 
children will call each other brothers and sisters' (461d-e). This would require the 
guardian rulers to keep complex records of each of the mating festivals and the 
children born as a result of them. 
Over a number of generations of guardians it could become more difficult for the rulers 
to keep track of which guardians are potentially the parents and grandparents of which 
children. Importantly, the fact that the lots for the mating festivals would be rigged in 
favour of the best male and female guardians could have an impact here. It would put 
additional pressure on this group of guardians to attend mating festivals and breed 
regularly. This would result in the best female guardians being pregnant on a regular 
basis. Therefore, it may become necessary for the best male guardians to breed 
with some of the inferior female guardians. 
An important issue that could have been raised here by Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
and where the reader feels the need to take on the role of the respondent, is the 
negative personal impact that the proposed arrangements could have on both the 
male and female guardians. Their education and training would prepare them mentally 
and physically for the life they would lead as members of the guardian community. 
However, it is questionable as to whether this would prepare them fully for the 
guardian way of life. Although the guardians would be part of an extended 
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community, it is likely that they would feel somewhat isolated, without the support of 
close family ties. It is possible that there would be competition between guardians to 
distinguish themselves at war and to be seen to be the best of their class. The 
suppression of female qualities within the guardian class could have a negative impact 
emotionally on the female guardians. The separation of female guardians from their 
children would be likely to cause them upset and pain.41 
Now that they have reached agreement on the arrangements for the establishment 
and survival of the guardian class in the ideal state, Socrates and the respondents 
consider some wider benefits of the living arrangements of that class. Socrates 
argues that, unlike traditional rulers, the guardians will live cohesively within their 
community. Their lack of private property and close family ties will make the guardians 
less preoccupied with individual concerns (464c-d).42 This will enable them to focus 
their attention on their work. Guardians will consider their fellow guardians as part of an 
extended family of guardians. They will not compete with each other for money and 
possessions. Socrates asserts that in the ideal state the three classes will call each 
other fellow-citizens, rather than master and slave. In addition to this, the workers in the 
ideal state will call members of the other two classes their protectors and defenders. 
The guardians and auxiliaries will respect the workers for providing them with their food 
and other necessities (463a-b). According to Socrates, the community of women and 
children is a key element in the unity of the guardian class (464a) and the state as a 
whole. In my view, as discussed in this section, there are important weaknesses 
associated with the arrangements for women and the family in the guardian 
community. It is likely that these weaknesses would lead to the collapse of the ideal 
state in the long term. 
Importantly, Socrates notes that in order to maintain diSCipline within the guardian class, 
the older members will have the power to discipline the younger members (465a). 
This reminds the reader of the level of control that the guardian rulers would maintain 
over their class as a whole. Socrates then asserts that because they are not fighting 
among themselves, the guardian class will live in peace with one another. This will 
enable them to live at peace with the other classes within the community as well 
41 For a useful discussion of the treatment of women in the ideal state and the difficulties that they 
may experience see (Reeve 1997, pp. 129-141). 
42 Price (1997, p. 189) observes that over time the terms such as father and son that were 
introduced into the guardian community from the established community would lose their original 
force. 
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(465b). Socrates asserts that the guardians will lead 'a far more blissful life than any 
Olympic victor' (465d). It is worth observing that Socrates is putting forward a rather 
idealistic picture here. It shares some of the attributes of the basic community as 
outlined by Socrates in Republic Book II, part 2, where we are told that the people 
would live in peace and harmony with one another. However, that earlier model was 
rejected by Glaucon because it was too basic (36gc -372d). 
Socrates reminds the reader that in the enquiry into justice they are seeking to 
establish the happiness of the city overall, rather than the happiness of a particular 
class.43 He asserts however, that the guardians will lead very happy lives within the 
ideal state, despite their lack of property and close family ties (465e-466c). Glaucon 
gives his agreement to this on behalf of himself and Adeimantus. It is surprising that 
Glaucon does not seek any further clarification from Socrates concerning this point. 
This appears to be a weakness in the dialectical method. As observed above, there 
are a number of issues relating to the proposed living arrangements for the guardian 
community that may lead to competition and dissatisfaction among the guardian class. 
This may result in some guardians being happier than others within the ideal state. 
The better and more talented guardians who receive the rewards for their talents, are 
likely to be happier than the less talented members of their class. It is likely that the 
male guardians will be happier than the female guardians as they are more likely to 
rise to high positions within their community.44 
Another concern is that, in the long term, the guardian rulers may find it more difficult 
than expected to regulate and control the working class within the city, who will make 
up the majority of the population. In addition to this, the auxiliaries may become 
dissatisfied with their role in the city, having to make the sacrifices of the guardians but 
not gaining the same rewards. In chapter 5 of this enquiry, consideration is given to 
some possible tensions that the guardians may experience between their desire to 
contemplate the Forms and their duty to the city. It is worth pointing out that, in the 
43 At the beginning of Republic Book IV Adeimantus expresses concern that the Guardians would 
not be happy in the ideal state (419a). This comment from Adeimantus alerts the reader to his 
philosophical ability, as it is central to the arguments outlined in Book V and the later Books of the 
Republic. 
44 Crossman (1963, p. 122) asserts that the abolition of marriage would be in the interest of women 
as it would give them the same status as men. But, in my view, the image of the guardian as put 
forward by Socrates in the Republic, is too closely associated with the male in Plato's contemporary 
Athens. Annas (1976. pp. 320-321) disagrees with Crossman and she asserts that Plato's primary 
concern in the Republic is the establishment of the ideal state. 
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future, the guardians may be able to overcome some of these issues as their 
knowledge of the Forms increases. 
(Section 4) 
Wider Issues concerning the Interruption from Adelmantus at the beginning 
of Book V and In particular how It relates to the Republic overall 
Adeimantus' interruption at the beginning of Book V appears to be well founded. It 
seems uncharacteristic for Socrates to make a very brief reference to such an 
important issue in relation to the ideal state, when he has been prepared to go into 
such detailed considerations of other aspects of the state. Examples of these include, 
the education of the guardians, the censorship of poetry, and justice in the state and 
the individual. It also raises a question as to why prior to this interruption, where 
Socrates is putting forward other controversial theories, he is not interrupted by the 
respondents. Examples of these include, the enquiry into the education of the 
guardians in Books \I and III, especially, the censorship of poetry.45 Also, the enquiry 
into the just state and soul in book IV. Should this lead the reader to conclude that 
Plato wanted to highlight the issue of women and the family in the Republic? The 
theories in Book V appear to be designed to provide further explanation and to 
justify the theories that are outlined in the earlier Books and in particular Book IV 
concerning the just state and soul. 
In his interruption at the beginning of Book V, Adeimantus may not only be picking up 
on Socrates' lack of detail concerning women and the family in the guardian and 
auxiliary classes. He may also be expressing a note of caution concerning the 
dialectic method and the controversial theories that are resulting from it. In particular, he 
may be bringing to the reader's attention the level of control that would need to be 
maintained over the individual and state as outlined in Book IV. In Book VI of the 
Republic, Socrates puts forward further controversial theories concerning the role of 
the philosopher within society, which he refers to as wave three. Consideration of this 
is included in the next chapter of this study. The interruption at the beginning of Book 
V may also be a warning that the dialectic method of enquiry cannot be rushed, as it 
requires that the issues raised be investigated thoroughly. Importantly, the issue of 
control is proving to be central to the dialectic enquiry itself, with Socrates and the 
45 For detailed conSideration of Plato on poetry, see (Murray 2008) and (Gill 1993, pp. 42-51). 
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respondents playing their role and Socrates maintaining control of the discussion 
overall. Notably, in the dialectic method of enquiry, the respondents act in a more 
controlled manner than Thrasymachus in the elenchus method in Book I. 
This alerts the reader to a difference between the elenchus and dialectic methods of 
enquiry. In the elenchus method, as displayed in Republic Book I, Thrasymachus 
interrupts Socrates continually as Socrates engages with him in the enquiry. In the 
elenchus exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus, they fail to establish what 
justice consists in. Importantly, Thrasymachus' lack of patience was a strong 
contributing factor to this failure.46 However, in the dialectic enquiry from Book II, 36Ba 
onwards, Glaucon and Adeimantus interrupt less frequently. This gives Socrates the 
time required to provide an outline of and build upon the theories in the Republic. In 
addition, the interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus in the dialectic enquiry are 
constructive rather than destructive. They challenge Socrates but they also enable 
him to proceed with the enquiry. Nevertheless, the reader could argue that Socrates 
is given too much scope to develop the theories that he puts forward through the 
dialectic method of enquiry in Book V and that this may be a weakness of the dialectic 
method. But, it is also worth observing that Socrates has studied philosophy all his 
life and Glaucon and Adeimantus (or indeed the reader) cannot be expected to reach 
his level of understanding during the course of one dialogue.47 
An important advantage of the dialectic method of enquiry as displayed in Republic 
Book V is that it will lead to more and more informed theories emerging in the 
discussion between Socrates and the respondents, over time. Perhaps, the 
Republic represents the start of the dialectic enquiry into justice rather than the final 
theory from Plato. The reader can appreciate that, once the guardians gain knowledge 
of the Forms, they may be able to overcome the difficulties that the character Socrates 
and the respondents experience in formulating theories in the enquiry. This may help 
to explain the lack of confidence displayed by Socrates at points in the dialogue. It 
may also explain why the reader may not agree with the theories concerning women 
and the family as outlined by Socrates in Book V, as they may be provisional at this 
stage. The theories put forward by Socrates in the Republic are likely to be 
enhanced by the guardians as their knowledge deepens. However, as this is in the 
46 There are other reasons for the failure of the elenchus exchanges in Book I. These are 
considered in chapter 1 of this enquiry. 
47 Blondell 2002, p. 248. 
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future, it does not address any of the present doubts that the reader has about the 
theories outlined in the Republic. 
An interesting similarity between the elenchus and dialectic methods of enquiry is that 
in both of these Socrates demonstrates uncertainty and a lack of resolve, but in 
different ways. Notably, in Book I, Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus were 
all confident about the theories that they gave. It was Socrates who admitted at the 
end of Book I that he still did not know what justice was (354b). However, there is a 
change in the dialectic method in Republicwhere in addition to Socrates, the 
respondents Glaucon and Adeimantus also demonstrate uncertainty at points in the 
enquiry. Another similarity between the elenchus and dialectic methods of enquiry in 
the Republic is the fact that Plato does not feature in person. The reader can 
appreciate that this works to Plato's advantage in Republic Book V as it enables him 
to advance controversial theories without necessarily endorsing them.<IB 
In Republic Book IV Socrates displayed reluctance by providing an outline of the big 
picture, that is, the ideal state first before putting forward the ideal soul. In Book V, 
Socrates continues to show hesitancy when he refers to wave one, that women could 
become guardians, and wave two, the abolition of the family in the guardian and 
auxiliary classes. With regard to the guardian community, Socrates is reluctant to 
enquire into the practicalities concerning the theories that he is advancing. Instead, he 
seeks permission to concentrate on how the arrangements would be put into practice 
in the ideal state and Glaucon grants him his request. These examples of hesitation 
and uncertainty as demonstrated by Socrates during the course of the dialectic enquiry 
leave the reader confused as to what Plato's intention was in portraying Socrates in 
this manner. 
Socrates' response to Adeimantus' interruption is also interesting. Socrates does not 
restart the enqUiry into imperfect states and souls until much later in Books VIII and IX 
of the Republic.1S Significantly, at 502d, Book VI, Socrates admits that he did not gain 
anything by trying to put off a detailed consideration of women and the family in the 
guardian and auxiliary classes. In this example, the respondents have required 
48 Frede 1992, p. 219. 
49 Notably, it is Glaucon rather than Socrates who returns to this issue at the beginning of Book VIII, 
543a-544b, where he requests that Socrates provide more detail concerning the deterioration of 
the ideal state and soul, which is then covered in Books VIII and IX of the Republic. 
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Socrates to pause, consider in more depth, and to reflect upon the philosophical 
theories that he is putting forward and also the dialectic method of enquiry that he is 
adopting. As noted above, when this interruption occurs Socrates had just been 
congratulating himself that he had finished the enquiry into the ideal state and individual 
and that no questions had been raised by the respondents (450a-b). 
As Socrates and the respondents attempt to put the theories outlined in Book IV into 
practice, it becomes apparent that they may work better in theory than in reality.s;) In 
Book V, Socrates alerts the reader and audience to the fact that the theory of justice in 
the state and soul as outlined in Book IV I would require substantial changes within the 
community and in particular the guardian and auxiliary classes. Rather than looking into 
the current needs of the community and finding a theory of justice that fits in with these, 
Socrates formulates the theory of justice in the state and the soul and then considers 
the changes that would be required within society as a whole to implement the theory. 
It would appear that the theory advanced by Socrates concerning women and the 
family in the guardian and auxiliary classes is simply too far removed from the natural 
arrangements for the family. 51 The interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of 
Book V was important in bringing this problem to light. Indeed, it is beginning to 
become clear that the strength of the arguments put forward by Thrasymachus in 
Book I and Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, part 1, concerning justice and injustice 
is that the reader can recognise the practicable nature of these theories as opposed to 
the theories outlined by Socrates in the Republic Books IV and V.f:2 
Socrates and the respondents have covered a wide range of issues during the course 
of the enquiry so far in the Republic. The reader can begin to appreciate the 
connections that are emerging between the radical theories advanced in Book V and 
the theories outlined in the other Books of the Republic. Connections are also coming 
to light between the characters of Socrates and the respondents and the method of 
enquiry being adopted. Perhaps, Plato's intention in putting forward such radical 
proposals for women and the family in Book V was to demonstrate that drastic 
50 Importantly, this outcome is noted by Socrates and Glaucon at the end of Book IX, 592a-b. 
51 Saxonhouse (1997, pp. 95-113) doubts whether the proposals for the male and female 
guardians in Republic Book V could be put in place as she claims that they are too unnatural. 
52 Emlyn-Jones (2007, pp. 10-12) provides a useful account of the cultural background which would 
have influenced the theories advanced by the characters Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
in the Republic. The theories provided by Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus are considered 
in detail in chapters 1 and 2 of this study. 
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changes would be required in order to establish a just society. Another message that 
Plato appears to be giving is that there is a high price to the achievement of justice in 
the state and the individual but that it would be worthwhile. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter consideration has been given to the dramatic and philosophical 
significance of the interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of Book V and 
Socrates' reaction to this interruption. Consideration has also been given to the 
theories put forward by Socrates in Book V concerning the introduction of the female 
guardian and the arrangements for women and the family in the ideal state. This 
chapter also looked at some wider issues relating to the interruption from Adeimantus 
and the Republicoverall. In the dialectic enquiry in Book V, Socrates continues to 
display uncertainty. This leaves the reader confused as to whether he or she should 
take the theories that are outlined by Socrates seriously or not. The reader can 
appreciate that during the course of the dialectic enquiry in Book V the respondents 
continue to playa dramatic role. Nevertheless, this is more subtle than the role 
played by Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in the elenchus enquiry in Book I and 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in the display oration method in Book II, part 1. 
The interruption from Adeimantus at the beginning of Book V is positive as it enables 
Socrates and the respondents to progress with the enquiry. Although it changes the 
direction of the enquiry, it does not prevent Socrates and the respondents from 
proceeding with the overall enquiry into justice. The interruption occurs at a time when 
the phi\osophica\ enquiry has iust been completed into justice in the city and with 
respect to the individual. This has resulted in a controversial theory of justice being 
outlined by Socrates and the respondents. The interruption may give a warning to 
the reader of the radical nature of the theories that will be included in the later Books of 
the Republic and in particular the theory of knowledge as outlined by Socrates in 
Books VI and vn. 
In this example, philosophical elements of the dialogue have interacted with the 
dramatic elements. The increased dramatic tension at the beginning of Book V 
coincides with an increase in the intensity and unorthodoxy of the philosophical enquiry 
and the theories that are resulting from it. The proposals that Socrates advanced prior 
141 
to this interruption concerning the just state and just individual did not provide sufficient 
detail concerning the practical arrangements for implementing the ideal state. The 
detailed enquiry into women and the family in Book V forces Socrates and the 
respondents to think through the implications of the theories that they have put forward 
in the dialectic enquiry, which started at 368a, Book II, part 2. Indeed, Book V and the 
later Books of the Republic alert the reader to the practical implications of the ideal 
state and soul. In the next chapter, consideration is given to the role of the 
philosopher in society. 
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Chapter 5 
Adeimantus: The role of the philosopher In society 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Book VI and early Book VII of the Republic where Socrates 
and the respondents consider the role of the philosopher in society. There are 
several highly dramatic interruptions and illustrations in this part of the Republic, 
including the interruption from Adeimantus at 487b and the allegory of the cave in 
early Book VII. In section 1 of this chapter, consideration is given to the interruption 
from Adeimantus at 487b and on the initial response to this from Socrates. Section 2 
looks at the defence of the philosopher as outlined by Socrates. Section 3 considers 
the simile of the sun, the image of the line and the allegory of the cave. Section 4 
focuses on some wider issues concerning the interruption from Adeimantus in early 
Book VI and how this relates to the Republic overall. The interruptions from 
Adeimantus and Glaucon, as discussed in this chapter, bring to light some significant 
weaknesses with the theories advanced by Socrates in Books VI and VII of the 
Republic. 
(Section 1) 
The Interruption from Adelmantus In early Book VI and the Initial response 
from Socrates 
In early Book VI there is a dramatic interruption from Adeimantus in which he appears 
to criticise the method of enquiry adopted by Socrates in the Republic. He also 
criticises the philosophers in contemporary society. Adeimantus observes that when 
people hear Socrates speak 'they have an uneasy feeling that, because they're not 
very experienced in this procedure of question and answer, each question in the 
argument leads them a little further astray, until at the end of it all their small admissions 
are added up and they come a cropper and are shown to have contradicted 
themselves' (487b). Adeimantus proceeds to observe that the majority of 
philosophers are useless members of society. With regard to philosophers, 
Adeimantus claims that 'in practice people who study philosophy too long, and don't 
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treat it simply as part of their early education and then drop it, become, most of them, 
very odd birds, not to say thoroughly vicious' (487c-d}.1 This is an interesting parallel 
to Callicles in the Gorgias, 485c-d, where Callicles argues that philosophy is not 
something for serious adults. 
This is in response to Socrates' assertion at 473d, which is referred to as "wave 
three", and which contends that philosophers are the only people who should rule the 
state.2 Adeimantus' interruption continues to 487e, where he asks Socrates 'Then 
how, can you possibly say that society's troubles will never cease until it is ruled by 
philosophers, if you agree that they're useless members of society?' Following this 
interruption, Adeimantus takes over as the main respondent in this part of the 
Republic. 
This is a strong and critical interruption from Adeimantus.3 It appears to be a criticism of 
the elenchus method of enquiry as featured in Republic Book I and a number of the 
other dialogues of Plato. This is because it is a characteristic of the elenchus method 
that, through Socrates' questioning, the respondent ends up contradicting himself." 
But, it is unclear to the reader why Adeimantus chooses to raise an objection to the 
elenchus at this point in the Republic. Importantly, from Book II, 368a onwards 
Socrates and the respondents have adopted the dialectic method of enquiry.5 In this 
interruption, Adeimantus could be suggesting that if the respondents had more 
practice in the elenchus method they might be able to avoid contradicting themselves. 
In this criticism, Socrates is being portrayed as seeking to defeat the respondent in the 
elenchus rather than establishing the truth. Perhaps Plato is portraying Adeimantus at 
this point as misunderstanding what Socrates is attempting to do, in the way that 
contemporary society is said to misunderstand the philosopher in Republic Book VI. 
This could help to explain why this criticism is featured in Book VI of the dialogue 
where the role of the philosopher is being considered, rather than in Book I where the 
1 For a useful discussion concerning the significance of this interruption from Adeimantus, see 
Reeve (2006, pp. 193-195). 
2 Consideration is given to the introduction of wave three in the next section of this chapter. 
3 In this interruption in early Book VI, Adeimantus is acting as a capable, sympathetic and 
challenging respondent, as discussed in the typology of key respondents in the introductory 
chapter of this study. This interruption from Adeimantus reinforces the entry from Thrasymachus at 
337c, Book I, where he is critical of the elenchus method. 
4 The elenchus method of enquiry is discussed in chapter 1 of this study. 
5 The dialectic method of enquiry is considered in chapter 3 of this enquiry. 
144 
elenchus method of enquiry was adopted. 
The interruption from Adeimantus may also be designed to alert the reader to the 
implications of what they have agreed so far during the course of the dialectic enquiry. 
Perhaps, in his interruption at 487b-d, Adeimantus is also pointing to some 
weaknesses in the dialectic method. Some have argued that the interruptions from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Books II, V and VI are there to 
demonstrate that they are participating in the enquiry, rather than simply listening to 
Socrates.6 However, in this interruption, Adeimantus appears to be gOing much 
further than that and pointing out some genuine difficulties concerning the theories 
being advanced, the form of enquiry being adopted and the capability of the 
philosopher. With regard to the dialectic method in Book IV, Socrates and the 
respondents agreed to the establishment of the tripartite city. However, this laid the 
foundations for what Glaucon and Adeimantus are now questioning, that is, the 
establishment of the guardian class, which would be comprised of philosophers. 
Indeed, Socrates and the respondents do appear to be advancing contradictory 
arguments.7 They agree that philosophers should rule the ideal state, for the good of 
the state overall. However, they also agree that most philosophers are considered to 
be useless members of contemporary society. Significantly, Socrates admits that 'In 
our attempt to find the cause of this reproach we are now faced with the question, why 
are most philosophers rogues? And this is why we have been compelled to bring 
our definition of the nature of the true philosopher in again' (49Od). Surprisingly, 
Adeimantus appears to be adopting the elenchus method of enqUiry to question 
Socrates in his interruption at (487b-d).8 It would be rather ironic if Adeimantus was 
also criticising the dialectic method, as Socrates then uses this method to answer 
Adeimantus' objection concerning the philosopher. Socrates and the respondents 
continue to adopt the dialectic method of enquiry up to Book X, 614b, where 
Socrates narrates the Myth of Er. What is the reader supposed to make of this 
approach? Plato, through the character Socrates and the respondents, appears to be 
alerting the reader and audience to some concerns with regard to both the elenchus 
6 Rutherford 1995, p. 210. 
7 There are other examples in the dialectic method in the Republic where Socrates and the 
respondents appear to be contradicting themselves. These are discussed in section 4 of this 
chapter. 
8 Maynard 2000, p. 1. 
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and dialectic methods of enquiry at this stage. 
Socrates' reaction to Adeimantus' interruption is surprising. Firstly, he does not 
provide a defence of the elenchus or the dialectic methods of enquiry. Secondly, he 
agrees with Adeimantus that philosophers are useless members of society. This 
leaves the reader somewhat confused. Indeed, it suggests that Plato, through the 
characters of Adeimantus and Socrates, seems to be rejecting the elenchus method 
of enquiry for the time being.9 As observed above, he may also be expressing 
some doubt about the dialectic method. Just before this interruption from 
Adeimantus, Socrates is portrayed in a confident manner having concluded the 
discussion of the qualities of character required in the guardians. Up to that point in the 
discussion in Book VI, Glaucon and Adeimantus appeared to be in agreement with 
Socrates (487a). Indeed, the response from Glaucon at this stage is 'Momus himself 
could find no fault there' (487a). However, as happened earlier in the dialectic enquiry, 
Socrates' confidence does not last long. 
In order to defend what he refers to as 'the better type of philosopher in 
contemporary society' (488a), Socrates proceeds to give an illustration of the state of 
affairs on board a ship (488a-489a).'0 In this illustration, the captain of the ship is 
described as 'larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-
sighted, and similarly limited in seamanship' (488b). The crew are described as 
quarrelsome and ignorant. They lack any knowledge of navigation and are competing 
with each other to take control of the ship from the steersman. They do not appreciate 
the level of knowledge and skill that is required of the steersman to navigate a Ship. 
Importantly, they have more admiration for the sailor who 'knows how to lend a hand in 
controlling the captain by force or fraud' than they do for the captain and steersman 
(488d). This is because they believe that the sailor who is prepared to take over the 
job of steersman can do a better job. Through their ignorance, the sailors admire the 
sailor who professes to have the skills required to navigate the ship, rather than the 
true steersman. Indeed, Socrates argues that the sailors would regard the true 
steersman as 'a word-spinner and a star-gazer, of no use to them at all' (488e-489a). 
Surprisingly, Adeimantus agrees with this assertion by Socrates without any 
9 The elenchus method of enquiry does not disappear forever at this stage from the dialogues of 
Plato. It features in the Theaetetus, which is considered to have been written later than the 
Republic. 
10 For a useful discussion of the ship illustration see Keyt (2006, pp. 189-213). His comparison of 
the unruly ship with the normal ship is of particular interest. 
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questioning. He could have sought clarification from Socrates on how this illustration 
answers the concerns that he raised regarding the philosophers in contemporary 
society. 
Once he has given the ship illustration, Socrates observes that 'my illustration is 
intended to show the present attitude of society towards the true philosopher' (489a). 
He suggests that the present day politicians can be compared with the sailors on 
board the ship (489c).11 Adeimantus gives his agreement to this without any 
argument. Also, surprisingly, Adeimantus does not raise any further concern at this 
stage about the method of enqUiry being adopted, despite his serious concern 
expressed at 487b-c. The interruption from Adeimantus, together with the ship 
illustration, highlights the unfortunate plight of the philosopher in Plato's contemporary 
society. This reminds the reader of the plight of the just man as outlined by Glaucon in 
Book II, 361 b-362a, where he compares the lives of the just and unjust man. 
Glaucon asserts that the just man would suffer torture, imprisonment and crucifixion.12 
This is because both the just man and the philosopher are misunderstood and treated 
badly by society. 
In the ship illustration, Socrates demonstrates a very low opinion of the ordinary 
person in society, that is, the equivalent of the worker in the ideal state, who in my 
view the sailors appear to represent. This is due to their lack of knowledge of the 
Forms. It is interesting that the ship's captain is portrayed as being 'limited in 
seamanship' (488b). He is unable to defend the steersman against the sailors. 
Some have argued that the captain represents the Athenian assembly.13 Others 
have alerted the reader to connections between the ship illustration and the simile of 
the cave. In particular, some have argued that the prisoners in the cave, like the sailors 
on the ship, represent the politically ambitious citizens of the contemporary city.14 
I would suggest that the captain, who should have been able to maintain overall 
control of the ship, appears to represent the auxiliaries in the ideal state, but not 
functioning properly. He could be representative of the auxiliaries in the unjust states 
11 Cross and Woozley (1964, p. 197) assert that the sailors in the ship illustration represent 
'demagogues' . 
12 The arguments from Glaucon concerning the lives of the just and unjust man are considered in 
detail in chapter 2 of this study. 
13 Keyt 2006, pp. 193-194. 
14 Wilberding 2004, p. 126. 
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and souls as outlined by Socrates in Books VIII and IX, where the tripartite state no 
longer functions according to plan. If the steersman, who under the management of 
the captain was responsible for navigating the ship, was being compared with the true 
philosopher, the reader would expect him, together with the captain, to have had 
arrangements in place to defend the ship, against the sailors. What are we to make of 
this point? 
Importantly, the guardian rulers in the ideal state would need to have strong leadership 
skills, in order to ensure that the people were kept within their designated classes. 
Unlike the steersman in the ship illustration, the guardians in the ideal state would have 
the support of the auxiliaries to defend their position. Will the guardians, together with 
the auxiliaries in the ideal state, be able to maintain control of the workers in the long-
term? The ship illustration suggests that this may not be possible. Perhaps Plato, 
through the ship illustration, is expressing doubt here about the long-term viability of 
the ideal state or at least raising the issue of sustainability. This prefigures the 
discussion of unjust states and souls in Books VIII and IX of the Republic, which ends 
with the ideal state deteriorating into a tyranny. 
The overall argument that Socrates is advancing concerning the philosopher ruler 
becomes clearer to the reader and audience in the background when Socrates and the 
respondents proceed to enquire into the question of why philosophers have become 
corrupt and useless members of contemporary society and what might be done to 
change this state of affairs. These issues are considered in the next section of this 
chapter. 
(Section 2) 
The defence of the philosopher from Socrates 
- The Introduction of wave three 
The interruption from Adeimantus at 487b-d was prompted by an earlier argument 
from Socrates where he advanced what is referred to as the third and 'biggest wave' 
(473c).1S In the third wave, Socrates asserts that 'The society we have described can 
15 Kahn (1993, pp. 140-142) notes the cumulative nature of the image of the three waves as 
presented by Socrates in the Republic Book V. He alerts the reader to some other examples of this 
technique of presentation in Books II and III of the Republic. 
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never grow into a reality or see the light of day, and there will be no end to the 
troubles of states, or indeed, my dear Glaucon, of humanity itself, till philosophers 
become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly 
become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come into the same 
hands, while the many natures now content to follow either to the exclusion of the 
other are forcibly debarred from doing so' (473c-e). Some have noted the 
importance of Republic,473c, Book V to 540d, Book VII and have argued that this 
section of the Republic should be read as a reply to wave three.16 It also raises a 
challenge to the theory of the just state as put forward by Socrates in Book IV in that it 
relies on the plan to put philosophers in charge of the state being introduced 
successfully. 
Glaucon makes a strong response to this argument from Socrates. He states 'My 
dear Socrates, if you make pronouncements of that sort, you can't be surprised if a 
large number of decent people take their coats off, pick up the nearest weapon, and 
come after you in their shirt sleeves to do something terrible to you. If you can't find 
an argument to hold them off and escape, you'll learn to your cost what it is to be 
laughed at' (473e-474a). This is a particularly strong response from Glaucon. It 
highlights the controversial nature of the third wave that Socrates has advanced. The 
reader is left confused as to why Plato has chosen to draw the reader's attention to the 
controversial aspects of the theories being advanced in the Republic, rather than the 
more acceptable elements of the theories. 
This is becoming a regular feature of the Republic, with Socrates advancing 
controversial theories with each wave and then having to defend these theories. In 
wave one, Socrates argued that some women would have the capacity to become 
guardians (456a). In wave two, Socrates put forward the theory that guardians should 
live in common, rather than in traditional marriage unions. Also, that the children of 
guardians should be brought up in state nurseries, rather than by their own parents 
(457c-d).17 In these examples Plato appears to be alerting the reader to problems 
associated with the theories being advanced. This places doubt on whether Plato 
expected the reader to be fully convinced of the theories outlined in Books V, VI and 
VII of the Republic. 
16 Maynard 2000, pp. 2-4. 
17 Waves one and two are considered in chapter 4 of this enquiry. 
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Socrates' response to Glaucon at this point is interesting. He blames Glaucon for 
pulling him up in the argument and Glaucon agrees with him. Socrates observes 'But 
it's all your doing' and in response to this Glaucon says 'And I've done very well too' 
(474a). Socrates had argued that philosophers should be put in charge of the ideal 
city and Glaucon had pointed out that this would not have the backing of the majority 
of people. This prefigures the attack by Adeimantus on the method of enquiry being 
adopted by Socrates and the respondents, as discussed in section 1 above. 
However, Glaucon agrees to help Socrates proceed with the enquiry into how to 
convince the sceptics that philosophers should be in charge in the ideal state (474b-
c). They set out to defend their argument by 'showing that there are some who are 
naturally fitted for philosophy and political leadership, while the rest should follow their 
lead but let philosophy alone' (474b-c). They proceed by considering how the 
philosopher should be defined. 
The discussion of the definition of the philosopher runs from 474b, Book V to 487a, 
Book VI. In this discussion, Socrates takes the lead with Glaucon responding on 
behalf of himself and Adeimantus. Socrates asserts that the philosopher has a 
passion for wisdom (475b) and a strong desire to learn (475c). In addition to this, 
Socrates argues that the philosopher looks to the Form of Beauty rather than the 
many beautiful things (476b).18 The philosopher is awake and possesses 
knowledge, as opposed to the non-philosopher who is described as dreaming and 
possessing only opinion (476d). Socrates and the respondents enquire further into 
the difference between knowledge and opinion and they agree that opinion is 
intermediate between knowledge and ignorance (478c-d). During the course of this 
discussion, Glaucon is in agreement with Socrates and he makes positive responses 
at regular intervals. Examples of these include: 'And we shall be quite right' (475c), 
'That is certainly so' (476b), 'Yes, I understand' (477c), 'That follows' (478a), 'Very 
much so' (478c), and 'Precisely' (479d). 
Socrates and the respondents agree that 'the many conventional views held by most 
people about beauty and the rest hover somewhere between what is not and what 
18 Cooper (1999, p. 142) notes that the guardians would spend fifteen years working in the ideal city 
before they would be ready to study and gain knowledge of the ultimate Form, that is, the Form of 
the Good. Once they gained knowledge of the Form of the Good, the guardians would take turns 
to rule the city (RepubliC, S40a-b). The Form of the Good is considered in section 3 of this chapter. 
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fully is' (479d). In response to this, Glaucon raises the question as to whether the 
ordinary person would be annoyed with Socrates and the respondents for accusing 
them of holding opinions rather than knowledge. Socrates argues that they would 
have no right to be annoyed 'at the truth' (480a). Surprisingly, Glaucon does not 
pursue this point any further with Socrates. Indeed, given the strength of the reaction 
from Glaucon at (473e-474a) to Socrates' assertion that philosophers should be put 
in charge of the ideal state (473c-e), the reader is left puzzled as to why the character 
Glaucon is portrayed as being so willing to agree with the points advanced by 
Socrates concerning the philosopher. One theory may be that this encourages the 
reader to take on the role of the respondent at these points in the dialogue and to 
reflect upon the theories being advanced by Socrates. 
It is worth noting that in the arguments that Socrates is outlining in this part of the 
Republic, he appears to be referring to the guardians in the ideal state, rather than the 
philosophers in their contemporary society. Through their education, the guardians 
would be given the opportunity to seek to gain knowledge of the Forms.19 Although 
the philosophers in contemporary society would aspire to gain knowledge, they 
would not have reached the level of knowledge and understanding of the guardians. 
Therefore, like the ordinary members of society, they would possess opinion rather 
than knowledge. However, it was the philosophers in contemporary society to whom 
Glaucon referred in his reaction to Socrates' assertion that philosophers should be in 
charge of the ideal city. So, although Glaucon pulled up Socrates concerning this 
point, Socrates now appears to be changing the focus of the discussion. It is 
important to note that Socrates and the respondents have not yet considered the 
second stage of the education of the guardians, as outlined in Book VII, 521c-541a, 
which includes dialectic. This would enable the guardians to study the Forms and 
ultimately the Form of the Good.l:ll 
This discussion continues with an enquiry into the character of the philosopher which 
runs from 484a-487a, Book VI. Despite the earlier protests from Glaucon and 
19 Weiss (2001, pp. 203-209) compares the different approaches taken to opinion in the Meno and 
the Republic. She observes that with the introduction of the Forms in the Republic, opinion no 
longer carries the weight that it held in the Meno. Notably, in the ideal city, the guardians would take 
on responsibility for aU moral enquiry and moral decisions on behalf of the city as a whole, due to 
their knowledge of the Forms (Weiss 2001, p. 15). 
20 With regard to the education of the guardians, Gill (2004, p. 3) points out that, in order to 
understand the Form of the Good, the guardians would need to gain an appreciation of the 
connections between the different branches of knowledge. 
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Adeimantus, this ends with Socrates and the respondents agreeing, for now, that 
subject to them being given the right education and reaching an appropriate level of 
maturity, the philosophers are the only members of society who could be trusted to 
rule the state (487a). 
There seems to be some significance in Glaucon's assertion at 473e-474a that 
hordes of people would pick up the nearest weapon and rush naked at you, in 
reaction to ''wave three" as advanced by Socrates. In this example from Book V, 
one of the messages being put forward seems to be that the lack of understanding of 
ordinary people could lead them into a situation where they would use a weapon 
against an innocent person. Some have argued that this passage brings out the 
difference between the philosopher who possesses knowledge and the lover of 
sights who does not.21 I would suggest that it is included by Plato to justify the level of 
control that the guardians would need to maintain in the ideal state, for the good of the 
state overall. It also raises the question in the reader's mind as to how the guardians 
would enforce the ideal state, that is, whether they would be able to assert that level 
of control. 
• The corruption of philosophers In contemporary society 
After he has given the ship analogy in Book VI, Socrates claims that, 'the most 
damaging reproach to philosophy is brought on it by those who pretend to practice it' 
(489d). Socrates asserts that through the ship analogy they have explained why the 
majority of philosophers are useless members of society. He proposes that they 
should proceed to consider why the majority of philosophers are corrupt and he 
asserts that philosophy should not be blamed for this state of affairs (489d-e). 
Adeimantus, who is acting as respondent at this point, agrees to proceed in this way. 
They start by looking back at the characteristics that the philosopher would need to 
possess, which they had agreed earlier in the discussion.Z! They then note that the 
philosopher seeks the truth (490a-b), and seeks to gain knowledge of the Forms (or 
ideals) rather than focusing on the particular objects that surround him or her (490b). In 
21 Roochnik 2003, pp. 62·65. 
22 Here Socrates and the respondents are referring back to 484b·487a, Book VI, where they 
considered the qualities of character that the philosopher would need to possess and how these 
would make them suitable to rule in the ideal state. 
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addition to this, the philosopher would need to have a just and self-disciplined 
character (490c). Socrates suggests that they do not need to review all the qualities 
of the philosopher that they had agreed earlier. He then observes 'You will 
remember we found that they also included courage, greatness of mind, quickness to 
learn and a good memory' (490c). He recalls that it was at that point that Adeimantus 
interrupted and that 'In our attempt to find the cause of this reproach we are now faced 
with the question, why are most philosophers rogues? And that is why we have 
been compelled to bring our definition of the nature of the true philosopher in again' 
(490d). 
It is interesting to consider how Socrates would have proceeded with the enquiry if 
Adeimantus had not interrupted at 487b-d. The interruption from Adeimantus brought 
out the difference between the philosophers in contemporary SOCiety and the 
guardians that Socrates was describing, who would rule in the ideal state. If 
Adeimantus had not interrupted, Socrates would not have had to provide a detailed 
defence of the philosopher. Also, it might have been unnecessary for Socrates to 
give the simile of the sun, image of the line and allegory of the cave, which are 
designed to illustrate the level of knowledge that the guardians would possess. The 
interruption from Adeimantus and the subsequent discussion between Socrates and 
the respondents alert the reader to the controversial aspects of the theories being 
advanced in the enquiry in the Republic. It also raises a question as to whether Plato 
expected the reader to accept these theories. Importantly, it also highlights the 
strength of the role of Adeimantus and Glaucon in the dialectic enquiry. 
The character Socrates did not make it clear enough to the respondents and the reader 
in the enquiry in Book IV that he envisaged that philosophers would take on the role 
of guardian in the ideal state. Indeed, he admits this at 497c-d. Notably, in the course 
of the discussion concerning the role of the philosopher in contemporary SOCiety, 
Adeimantus seeks clarification when he observes that 'I was going to ask whether it 
was the state whose foundation we have been describing' (497c). The reader is left 
with the impression that the character Socrates may have been trying to avoid this 
controversial issue, in the same way that he tried to avoid discussion of women and 
the family in Book IV, 423e-424a. The reader is left confused as to how the ideal 
state could ever get off the ground with such a gap between the philosophers in 
contemporary SOCiety and the guardians as envisaged by Socrates. The interruption 
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from Adeimantus has raised serious concern about the theories that have been 
advanced in the dialectic enquiry in the Republic. It leaves the reader uncertain as to 
whether the better type of philosophers in contemporary society could ever aspire to 
become guardians. It also raises a doubt as to whether the ideal state could ever 
become a reality. 2l 
Socrates and the respondents continue the enquiry by considering why the 
philosophic nature is vulnerable and has become corrupt. Furthermore, they consider 
why some members of society, who do not posses the characteristics required of the 
philosopher, choose to take on the role of philosopher. It has been observed by 
some that, at this pOint in the Republic, Plato is being very perceptive in bringing out 
his awareness of the fact that the most intelligent members of society are in danger of 
being corrupted.24 Socrates asserts that the good qualities that the philosopher 
possesses, for example, courage and self-discipline, make the philosopher 
vulnerable to becoming corrupt within the wrong environment (491 b-e). Interestingly, 
Socrates does not blame the individual sophists for this as he claims that they do not 
have a sufficient level of influence.25 Instead, Socrates blames society as a whole for 
the corruption of the philosopher. Indeed he accuses society of being 'sophists on a 
grand scale' (492a-b). Notably, Socrates claims that the philosophers would be 
punished by society, and even put to death, if they did not obey (492d). This 
appears to be a reference to the real Socrates being put to death and to how he 
claimed he was misunderstood by society. 
Socrates observes that members of society would use the talents of the 
philosophers for their own good, rather than the good of the philosopher or the state 
overall. With regard to the philosopher, Socrates notes that 'his friends and fellow-
citizens will want to use him for their own purposes when he grows up' (494b). This 
pressure would result in the majority of philosophers becoming corrupt and taking on 
the corrupt values of society as a whole. It would also lead to the philosopher 
becoming ambitious and seeking a powerful position within the state (494c-d). It is 
23 Importantly, later in the dialectic enquiry in book IX, Glaucon and Socrates express doubt as to 
whether the ideal state could ever become a reality on earth (592a-b). 
24 Mitchell and Lucas 2003, p. 53. However, against Plato, they suggest that the young intellectuals 
would be more vulnerable to being influenced by the intelligentsia rather than society as a whole. 
To back this up, they give the example of Marxism. 
25 Here the character Socrates may be playing down the level of influence that the sophists had 
within society. Lawson-Tancred (1998, pp. 6-18) suggests that the sophists had a high level of 
influence in Athens during Plato's time. 
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notable that, through the character Socrates, Plato is being highly critical of society at 
this point in the enquiry. 
During the course of this discussion, Adeimantus responds on behalf of Glaucon and 
himself. Despite the strong condemnation of philosophers in contemporary society 
by Adeimantus in his interruption at 487b-d, he is very much in agreement with 
Socrates in the enquiry into why philosophers have become corrupt members of 
society. Apart from the occasional request for further clarification, the responses from 
Adeimantus are positive and they include: 'That is as fair a reply as we can make' 
(490b), 'Yes, reasonable enough' (491d), 'Yes, punish they certainly do' (492d), and 
'Yes, that's bound to happen' (494b). 
It is interesting that Glaucon or Adeimantus do not interrupt the discussion at this stage 
in order to defend society against the accusations made by Socrates. This 
encourages the reader to take on the role of the respondent and to question the 
theories being outlined by Socrates. For example, Glaucon and Adeimantus could 
have argued that philosophers should take some of the blame themselves for 
becoming corrupt. They could have objected that Socrates is portraying SOCiety too 
negatively in the way it treats philosophers. Indeed, in Books VIII and IX of the 
Republic, Socrates acknowledges that the guardian class would be subject to decline 
when he considers the deterioration of the ideal state and soul. Importantly, in the 
discussion concerning imperfect states and souls, Socrates does attach some blame 
to the guardians for the deterioration of the ideal state. He observes that despite their 
training, the guardian rulers would make an error in their calculation for the breeding 
cycle of guardians which would lead to the decline and eventual downfall of the 
guardian class and the ideal state (546b-d). This alerts the reader to some possible 
flaws with the ideal society that Socrates is advancing in the Republic, which would 
threaten its sustainability in the long-term. 
Now that they have identified why the majority of philosophers become corrupt, 
Socrates and the respondents proceed to consider why non-philosophers take on 
the role of philosopher. Socrates asserts that 'a whole crowd of squatters gladly sally 
out from the meaner trades, at which they have acquired a considerable degree of 
skill, and rush into philosophy.' 'For philosophy, abused as it is, still retains a far higher 
reputation than other occupations' (495d). Notably, Socrates accuses these non-
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philosophers of lacking wisdom and practising sophistry (496a). Adeimantus 
expresses agreement with Socrates concerning this point, on behalf of Glaucon and 
himself. At this stage in the enquiry, the reader can begin to appreciate why 
Adeimantus raised his concerns about philosophers in contemporary society in his 
interruption and why Socrates agreed with him that philosophers are useless and 
corrupt. 
Significantly, Socrates claims that some genuine philosophers have managed to 
escape becoming corrupt. However, they have opted to live quietly and not enter 
into political life. It is worth observing that Plato chose not to enter into politics. It is 
also worth noting that the few genuine philosophers left in contemporary SOCiety 
would have their work cut out to form the ideal state. Indeed, this would appear to be 
an important obstacle to the establishment of the ideal state. 
- The possibility of the philosopher ruler 
At 497b-c, Socrates makes an interesting comment. He has just asserted that there is 
no form of society currently in existence that is capable of making the best use of the 
philosophic nature. With regard to the philosophic nature, Socrates observes 'If only 
it could find a social structure whose excellence matched its own, then its truly divine 
quality would appear clearly, and all other characters and ways of life stand revealed 
as merely human' (497b-c). The reader can appreCiate that in this passage Socrates 
is referring to the ideal state, as outlined in Republic Book IV, where the philosophers 
would be in charge. Indeed, this is noted by Adeimantus. However, this passage 
leaves the reader with the concern that Socrates' primary objective in the introduction 
of the ideal state is to provide the philosophers with a form of state in which they 
would have the opportunity to develop fully.a> The fact that it would also be for the 
good of the other classes within the ideal state appears to be of secondary concern to 
Socrates at this point in the enquiry. It is surprising that the respondents do not raise 
any objections to Socrates at this stage.27 
Rather than proceeding confidently with the theories that he is outlining, Socrates 
shows signs of uncertainty and hesitation at this point. He admits 'I was afraid of what 
26 This is despite the fact that in Republic Book IV it has been argued by Socrates and the 
respondents that the ideal state for the philosophers is the ideal state for all three classes. 
27 The ideal state and soul is considered in detail in chapter 4 of this study. 
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your criticisms had already shown to be a long and difficult demonstration; and the 
hardest part of it is still to come' (497d). When Adeimantus asks what Socrates is 
referring to here, Socrates explains that they have yet to consider 'How a state can 
handle philosophy without destroying itself' (497d). Socrates shows further signs of 
uncertainty when he admits that he does not lack the will but may lack the ability to 
demonstrate this point (497e). However, Socrates quickly recovers his confidence 
and he argues that in contemporary society people take up philosophy at too young 
an age (497e-498a). He asserts that children should only be exposed to a limited 
amount of philosophical training. Instead, philosophical training should take place 
when they are adults and they have the mental capacity to handle philosophy (498b-
c).2B 
At this stage in the discussion, there is an unexpected reference to Thrasymachus. 
Adeimantus argues that the majority of the people, including Thrasymachus, would not 
be convinced by the arguments being advanced by Socrates concerning the 
introduction of the philosopher ruler. In response to this, Socrates says 'Now don't 
start a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, when we've just become friends - not 
that we were ever really enemies' (498c-d). Socrates asserts that he will not give up 
until he has managed to convince Thrasymachus and the rest of the audience or at 
least prepared them for 'a future incarnation when they will meet these arguments 
again' (498d).29 
The reader is left confused as to why Plato refers to the character Thrasymachus at this 
point. This is the second last reference to Thrasymachus in the Republic. Therefore, it 
would appear to be of some significance. It is also a reference to the wider audience 
present at the discussion. Socrates demonstrates signs of hesitancy here in that he is 
not sure if he will be able to convince Thrasymachus and the wider audience of the 
theories that he is advancing. It might only prepare them for further discussion of the 
theories being outlined. Another point worth noting is that in the ideal state it is only 
necessary for the guardians and auxiliaries to be convinced that the ideal state is the 
28 See also, Republic, 535a-540e, where the philosophical development of the philosopher is 
discussed in more detail. 
29 The reader is not convinced of Socrates' sincerity in his desire to convince Thrasymachus of the 
arguments that he is putting forward in the dialectic enquiry. In chapter 1, section 3, of this study, I 
argue that Thrasymachus is not fully defeated by Socrates in the Republic overall. In chapter 4, 
section 2, I argue that characters such as Thrasymachus would have to be controlled by the 
guardians by force in the ideal state. 
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best form of state. The other classes would be required to play their designated role 
within the state, by force if necessary. This would be regardless of whether they 
considered the state to be ideal or not. Indeed, due to their lack of knowledge of the 
Forms, the majority of the people would not be in a position to make an informed 
judgement concerning the benefits of the ideal state overall. 
Socrates provides an explanation as to why the majority of people would not be 
convinced by the arguments that he is giving concerning the philosopher ruler. He 
notes that they have never seen the ideal state in action. Significantly, they have 
never been ruled by a ruler who ruled for the good of the state rather than himself 
(498e-499a). Socrates then argues that it would be possible to persuade the 
majority of people of the benefits of introducing the philosopher ruler. According to 
Socrates, the people would be less angry with the proposal to put philosophers in 
charge of the state if they realised that the philosopher would by guided by 
knowledge of the Forms, rather than opinion (501 b). Also, the character, which the 
philosopher rulers possessed would make them suitable to rule (501 d). Socrates 
then argues 'Will they still be angry when we say that until society is controlled by 
philosophers there will be no end to the troubles of states or their citizens, and no 
realization in practice of the institutions we have described in theory' (501 e)? 
In response to Socrates, Adeimantus makes an interesting comment. He suggests 
that the majority of the people would be less angry, but still not convinced by 
Socrates (501e). However, at 501e-502a, Socrates then seeks approval from 
Adeimantus for them to go further and assume that they have convinced the people 
that philosophers should be put in charge of the state. Surprisingly, Adeimantus lets 
Socrates get away with this point. This seems uncharacteristic of Socrates and the 
respondents who have been prepared to enter into more detailed argument at other 
points in the enquiry in the Republic. Examples of these include the discussion of the 
ideal state and soul in Book IV as well as the enquiry into imperfect states and souls in 
Books VIII and IX. Socrates concludes that 'our proposed legislation, if put into effect, 
would be the ideal, and that to put it into effect, though difficult, would not be 
impossible' (502c), and the respondents appear to agree. 
The concern expressed by Adeimantus in Republic Book VI would appear to be an 
accurate reflection of how the majority of the people would have reacted to the 
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proposal by Socrates to put philosophers in charge of the state. This is exemplified 
by the representation of the philosophers in The Clouds by Aristophanes as being 
out of touch and of no practical use to society. Also, of not recognising the official 
Gods.31 This gives the reader an appreciation of the level of mistrust in society 
towards philosophers and philosophy in Plato's time, at least the kind of philosopher 
that Plato depicts, and of the difficulties that philosophers faced in putting forward their 
theories and having a voice in society. 
The reader is left in doubt at this stage as to whether Socrates and the respondents 
really thought that they could convince the majority of the people of the benefits of 
introducing the philosopher ruler. Indeed, as observed above, it is unclear why they 
felt that the people would need to be convinced. Later, in Republic Book VII, 
Socrates and the respondents consider how the ideal state could be established. 
They agree that the best way for this to be achieved would be to remove al\ the 
citizens over the age of ten from the state and to bring up the remaining children 
according to the methods and rules of the ideal state that they had described (540e-
541 a). Importantly, this would not involve seeking the consent of the people. This 
reminds the reader of the level of control that the guardian rulers would have in the 
ideal state, which would even include the arrangements for the procreation of the 
guardian class. 31 
(Section 3) 
The Simile of the Sun, Image of the Line and Allegory of the Cave 
Once Socrates and the respondents have given provisional agreement that it would 
be possible to put into effect the ideal state, with philosophers in charge, they 
proceed to consider further the qualities and knowledge of the guardians within the 
ideal state.32 In this part of the Republic, 502c-521 b, Socrates gives the simile of the 
sun, the image of the line and the allegory of the cave. These provide the reader and 
audience with a graphic illustration of the level of knowledge, which the guardians 
30 For a useful discussion on how the philosophers were perceived by society at the time of Plato, 
see (Natali 1987, pp. 232-241). 
31 This is considered in chapter 4 of this enquiry. 
32 As observed in section 2 above, Socrates and the respondents express doubt later about the 
possibility of the ideal state actually existing (Book IX, 592a-b). 
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would aspire to possess as opposed to the workers and auxiliaries in the ideal state.33 
This forms the basis for the discussion of the second stage of the education of the 
guardians in Book VII, 521 c-541 a, and especially dialectic as outlined from 531d-
534e. Together, these attempt to give further backing to the theory that philosophers 
should be put in charge of the ideal state. In this section, consideration is given in 
particular to the simile of the sun and the allegory of the cave . 
• Simile of the Sun and Image of the Line 
During the course of the enquiry, Socrates and Adeimantus, who is acting as 
respondent at this stage, agree that in their enquiry into the qualities and knowledge of 
the guardians they must 'demand the highest precision' (504e). Adeimantus then 
points out that Socrates could not have expected to escape questioning concerning 
the 'highest form of knowledge and its object' and Socrates agrees with him (504e). 
At this point, it is suggested that Socrates and the respondents have covered this 
area in previous discussions. Socrates observes that 'you have certainly often been 
told that the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of the Form of the Good' 
(505a).34 However, Socrates then expresses hesitation and doubt when he states 
that they do not have sufficient knowledge of the Form of the Good, which provides 
the foundation for all the knowledge that they possess (505a-b). 
Importantly, Socrates observes that the guardians in the ideal state would need to 
possess knowledge of the Form of the Good (506a-b). Interestingly, during the 
course of their enquiry into the Form of the Good, Socrates and the respondents do 
not give any consideration to how the guardians would apply their knowledge of the 
Good to ruling the city. It is surprising that Glaucon and Adeimantus do not raise this 
issue. Some have argued that one reason for this is the respondents' lack of interest 
in how the bodies that would administer the ideal city would be organised.:!) I would 
suggest that Plato may have avoided addressing this issue in the Republic because, 
without knowledge of the Form of the Good, Socrates and the respondents could 
33 Mitchell and Lucas (2003, pp. 88-108) provide a useful account of the sun, line and cave and 
especially with regard to the difficulties in interpreting these illustrations. See also (Irwin 1995, pp. 
271-280) and (Cross and Woozley 1964, pp. 196-228) for helpful accounts of the sun,line and 
cave. 
34 It is unclear here whether Plato is referring to previous discussions concerning the Form of the 
Good in the Republic or outside the enquiry in the Republic. 
35 Pradeau 2002, pp. 67-69. 
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only speculate about how the guardians could apply this knowledge to ruling the city. 
Adeimantus urges Socrates to give his own opinion concerning the Form of the Good 
(S06b-c). In response to this request, Socrates demonstrates uncertainty by claiming 
again to lack knowledge concerning the Form of the Good (S06c). Socrates states 
'Then do you want a poor, blind, halting display from me, when you can get 
splendidly clear accounts from other people' (S06c-d)? The reader can appreciate 
Socrates' irony at this point in the enquiry. However, this is a very negative response 
from Socrates considering the detailed account of the child of the Good that he 
proceeds to give. We are not told who the other people that Socrates refers to are, 
who could give a clearer account of the Form of the Good. They do not appear to be 
present at the discussion in the Republic. Perhaps Socrates is referring to the 
sophists or the contemporary politicians who might be less hesitant than him in putting 
forward a view concerning the Good, regardless of whether it was true or false. 
We are then told that Glaucon begged Socrates to continue with the enquiry and to 
provide the best account that he could of the Form of the Good. In response to this, 
Socrates offers to give an account of the child of the Good, that is, the simile of the 
sun, rather than the Good itself (S06d-e).$ The support that Socrates receives from 
the respondents at this stage of the enquiry enables him to advance the theory 
concerning the child of the Good. Nevertheless, it also leaves the reader somewhat 
suspicious of the approach taken by Socrates in assuming the existence of the Form 
of the Good without being able to provide a full account of this Form. 
When Glaucon grants Socrates his request to describe the child of the Good (S06e), 
rather than the Form of the Good itself, he makes an interesting comment. Glaucon 
observes that Socrates will still owe them an account of the parent, or the Form of the 
Good itself (506e). In response, Socrates says 'It's a debt I wish I could pay back to 
you in full, instead of only paying interest on the loan' (507a). It is worth noting that in 
the Republic, Socrates and the respondents do not return to the issue of the Form of 
the Good itself. This would appear to be beyond the reach of Socrates and the 
respondents in the Republic. It would also appear to be beyond the reach of Plato. 
36 Cooper (1999, p. 143) alerts the reader to Socrates' refusal to give an account of the Form of the 
Good itself and his need to bring in the simile of the sun, image of the line and allegory of the cave 
instead. Cooper (1999, pp. 143-144) provides a useful summary of the concept of the Form of the 
Good that is advanced by Socrates in the Republic. 
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This leaves the reader with the impression that the enquiry into the Form of the Good 
has not been completed in the Republic and that Socrates and the respondents will 
need to enquire further into this matter in the future. As knowledge of the Form of the 
Good is central to the role of the philosophers in the ideal state, the reader is left in 
doubt as to the possibility of the establishment of the tripartite state as outlined by 
Socrates and the respondents in Book IV. In another example, after Socrates and 
the respondents have considered the role of women and the family in Book V, they 
do not return to this issue in the Republic. 
Interestingly, despite the lack of knowledge that the character Socrates claims to have 
concerning the Form of the Good, he advances the simile of the sun with confidence. 
In this simile, Socrates compares the sun with the Form of the Good.37 Socrates 
observes that the sun enables the individual to see, but that it is not sight (SOab). 
Also, the sun 'causes the process of generation, growth and nourishment, without itself 
being such a process' (50gb). We are told that the Form of the Good enables the 
mind to seek truth and reality and gain knowledge (SOad). Socrates asserts that 'The 
good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the 
objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality' (S09b). 
Socrates, with the support of the respondents, proceeds to give the image of the 
line,509d-S11e. In this image, Socrates highlights the level of knowledge that the 
guardians would possess in the ideal state, due to their knowledge of the Forms, 
which they would gain through dialectic enquiry.38 Socrates concludes that four states 
of mind: intelligence, reason, belief and illusion, correspond with the four sections of 
the line (511d-e).~ While Socrates gives the simile of the sun and the image of the 
line, the respondents make the occasional response in agreement with him. Indeed, 
when Socrates has finished the image of the line, Glaucon states that he understands 
and agrees with the image advanced by Socrates (S11e). It is worth observing that 
as these illustrations are presented by Socrates, the reader and audience are in 
danger of forgetting that Socrates has not yet established the existence of the Form 
of the Good itself. 
37 Murdoch (1997, pp. 169-179) provides an interesting exploration of the concept of the good, 
which includes the concept of it put forward by Socrates in the Republic. 
38 Socrates gives an account of dialectic enqUiry in Republic Book VII, 531d-534e. 
39 Annas (1997, pp. 148-151) considers the image of the line as outlined by Socrates and she 
asserts that Plato's use of imagery to illustrate a point may be resulting in a lack of intellectual clarity 
(p. 149). This is because Socrates has yet to prove the existence of the Form of the Good. 
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- Allegory of the Cave 
Having given the simile of the sun and the image of the line, Socrates proceeds to put 
forward a third illustration, that is, the allegory of the cave. This allegory is designed to 
illustrate to the reader and audience in the background the level of knowledge that the 
guardians would have in the ideal state, due to their knowledge of the Form of the 
Good and the other Forms. It also brings to light the ignorance of members of 
contemporary society. Socrates introduces this allegory by saying 'I want you to go 
on to picture the enlightenment or ignorance of our human condition somewhat as 
follows. Imagine an underground chamber like a cave, with a long entrance open to 
the daylight and as wide as the cave' (514a). We are told that in the cave there are 
prisoners who are fastened in such a way that they are unable to move and can only 
look straight ahead. Socrates continues 'Some way off, behind and higher up, a fire is 
burning, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them runs a road, in front 
of which a curtain-wall has been built' (514b). It transpires that, due to the physical 
make-up of their surrounds, the prisoners are only in a position to see shadows of 
goods being carried by men outside the cave. Due to their lack of knowledge of what 
is going on behind them or outside the cave, the prisoners take these shadows to be 
real objects. As a result of this, any communication between the prisoners concerning 
the objects that they see would be based on the false premise that these objects are 
real,.:Kl 
Socrates describes what would happen if one of the prisoners escaped out of the 
cave and into the daylight. At first, he would have difficulty adjusting to the light. 
However, once he got used to being out in the daylight, he would be able to see the 
objects around him and eventually look up at the sun. Through this experience, he 
would come to realise that the objects that he used to see in the cave were only 
shadows of objects being carried by people outside the cave. The escaped 
prisoner would have reached a higher level of understanding than the prisoners back 
40 Wheaten Bestor (1996, pp. 33-82) alerts the reader to the constraint that their surrounds would 
put on the prisoners' ability to communicate effectively with one another in the cave. He asserts 
that, in the allegory of the cave, Plato assumes that the prisoners could communicate effectively 
with one another, despite this constraint. 
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in the cave (515c-516c}.41 
In this allegory, the prisoners in the cave appear to represent the workers in the ideal 
state, due to their lack of knowledge of the Forms. Like the sailors in the ship 
illustration, they also appear to represent the contemporary politicians, due to their 
ignorance and competitiveness for power.42 Notably, Socrates observed earlier that 
the sailors in the ship illustration represented the politicians in contemporary society 
(489c). This leaves the reader confused as to what Socrates means when he refers 
to the prisoners in the cave as being 'drawn from life' (515a). Perhaps he is 
suggesting that the prisoners in the cave, like the politicians in contemporary society, 
are the worst examples of human beings. In contrast with this, the prisoner who 
escapes and gains a view of the sun, appears to represent the guardian rulers in the 
ideal state, who would have the opportunity to gain knowledge of the Form of the 
Good and the other Forms. <13 
Socrates observes that 'you won't go wrong if you connect the ascent into the upper 
world and the sight of the objects there with the upward progress of the mind into the 
intelligible region' (517b). Glaucon makes an interesting response at this stage. He 
agrees with Socrates as far as he is able to understand him (517c). This suggests that 
Socrates has moved somewhat ahead of the respondents at this point in the 
discussion. The prisoner returning to the cave appears to represent the guardian 
taking his or her turn to rule within the ideal state. The description given by Socrates of 
the reaction of the prisoners in the cave to the escaped prisoner who returns to the 
cave is worrying. Socrates argues that lif anyone tried to release them and lead them 
up, they would kill him if they could lay hands on him' (517a). This reminds the reader 
., Malcolm (1962, pp. 38-45) considers the connections between the image of the line and the 
allegory of the cave. He offers a slight modification to what he considers to be the traditional view 
that the four levels of enlightenment in the cave correspond with the four parts of the line. Morrison 
(1977, pp. 212-231) considers two unresolved difficulties in the current interpretation of the line 
and the cave. This leads him to conclude that the line and cave illustrate the place of the sciences 
in the philosophical education of the guardians. 
42 Wilberding (2004, pp. 120-121) observes that this breaks with what he considers to be the 
orthodox view which is that the puppeteers and not the prisoners in the cave represent the 
politicians in contemporary society. Strang (1986, p. 29) also notes some connections between 
the prisoners in the cave and the contemporary politicians. He argues that the competition for 
honours among the prisoners in the cave represents the politicians competing for power in 
contemporary society. Both these examples alert the reader to the lack of understanding that the 
prisoners in the cave would have about what is really good. 
43 Cooke (1999, p. 43) asserts that the allegory of the cave provides a description of the moral and 
intellectual development of the guardian which results in the guardian being transformed into a 
higher moral state. 
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of the death of the real Socrates and also the treatment of the philosopher by 
contemporary society as considered in section 2 of this chapter. 
Socrates alerts the reader and audience to the fact that the guardians in the ideal state 
would be compelled to take their turn in ruling, for the good of the state overall. He 
reminds us that the ideal state would be set up for the good of all three classes rather 
than the good of any particular class (519d-e). Socrates notes that the state would 
benefit from the fact that, unlike the contemporary politicians, the guardians would be 
reluctant to rule. He observes that 'the state whose prospective rulers come to their 
duties with least enthusiasm is bound to have the best and most tranquil government, 
and the state whose rulers are eager to rule the worst' (520d).o14 
There is an important difference between the returned prisoner to the cave and the 
guardian taking his or her turn to rule which Socrates does not consider and the 
respondents do not raise. In my view, it is likely that the returned prisoner would want 
to persuade the prisoners that they are seeing shadows rather than the objects 
themselves. Also, if he could, he would want to help them to escape from the cave, 
in due course. He would have nothing to gain from leaving them in their ignorance. 
Indeed, Socrates states that the escaped prisoner would feel sorry for the prisoners 
back in the cave (516c). However, the guardians in the ideal state would not seek to 
enable the workers and auxiliaries to escape from their classes through education or 
any other means.45 The guardian rulers would seek to maintain the tripartite state. 
They would live separate lives in separate quarters to the workers in the ideal state. 
This is unlike the returned prisoner who would live in the cave with the prisoners. 
Another interesting difference is that the prisoner that escaped had to be 'forcibly 
dragged up the steep and rugged ascent and not let go till he had been dragged out 
into the sunlight, the process would be a painful one' (515e-516a). In comparison 
with this, the guardians would not need any encouragement to engage in the 
contemplation of the Forms. Indeed, the guardian would have to be forced to take his 
or her turn in ruling the state. 
44 Kraut (1999, p. 248) observes that, in taking their turn in ruling the state, the guardian rulers 
would be given the opportunity to imitate the Forms. It is worth noting that Socrates first raises the 
issue of the guardians being compelled to rule for the good of the state in the elenchus exchange 
in Book I, 347b. 
45 Socrates' response to this comment would be that in the ideal state people would be placed 
naturally where they fitted and that education would not help the workers. 
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This can be compared with a passage in The Clouds by Aristophanes where one of 
Socrates' students comes out as Strepsiades is burning down the philosophers' 
house. At this point we are told that the student 'is white as a sheet, with enormous 
eyes', as if he had never seen the daylight (The Clouds, 1485-1505).«> This is the 
opposite to what happens in Plato's cave allegory. In The Clouds, the philosopher 
comes out of the house and into the daylight. Whilst, in Plato's cave allegory, the 
ignorant prisoner escapes into the daylight and the guardian rulers who possess 
knowledge of the Form of the Good and the other Forms are required to go into the 
cave and out of the daylight.41 
In the illustrations of the Sun, Line and Cave, Socrates is again showing signs of 
hesitation and uncertainty. This is because, understandably, he is only able to 
provide simile, image and allegory rather than a description of the Form of the Good 
itself. As a result of this, the core metaphysics of the Republic is backed up by simile, 
image and allegory rather than fact. Socrates and the respondents do not have the 
knowledge that the philosophers in the ideal state would need to possess. The 
message emerging here seems to pOint to our limited ability to gain knowledge of the 
Form of the Good and the other Forms, without the education and experience of the 
guardians. 
(Section 4) 
Wider Issues concerning the Interruption from Adelmantus In early Book VI 
and In particular how this relates to the Republic overall 
In section 1 of this chapter, it was noted that Socrates and the respondents advance 
theories in some parts of the Republic which they reject or revise later in the dialogue. 
A number of examples of this can be found in the dialectic enquiry, from Republic, 
368a onwards. In Book IV, they argue for the establishment of the tripartite city, which 
is justified on the basis of the tripartite soul. However, in Books VIII and IX they 
consider the gradual decline of the ideal state into a tyranny.48 Then, at the end of 
Book IX, Socrates and the respondents express doubt as to whether the ideal state 
48 Sommerstein 1973, p. 173. 
47 At 518a, Republic Book VII, Socrates observes that 'eyes may be unsighted in two ways, by a 
transition either from light to darkness or from darkness to light' and that the same thing applies to 
the mind. 
48 Consideration is given to the tripartite state and soul and also to imperfect states and souls in 
chapter 3 of this study. 
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could ever exist on earth (592a-b). 
Significantly, in Book I, Thrasymachus argued in support of the tyrant and tyranny, 
which it subsequently appears that the ideal state would inevitably decline into. How 
is the reader and audience supposed to interpret this development in the Republic? 
Importantly, this contradicts what Socrates and the respondents agreed in Book VI 
where Socrates asserted that 'The conclusion seems to be that our proposed 
legislation, if put into effect, would be the ideal, and that to put it into effect, though 
difficult, would not be impossible' (502c). In response to this, Adeimantus said 'That 
is our conclusion' (502c). 
The reader is left confused as to why Socrates and the respondents have been 
satisfied to put forward an ideal state that would only be sustainable in the short-term. 
Perhaps this was the best that they could achieve in the present enquiry and they 
would need to revisit this issue at a later discussion. Another possibility is that, once 
the ideal state was implemented, the guardians might be able to find a way of dealing 
with the sustainability issues that Socrates raised in Republic Books VIII and IX. But. 
unfortunately, this would be some time in the future. This leaves the reader uncertain 
about whether the ideal state, as outlined in Book IV, could ever become a reality. It 
also alerts the reader to the enduring strength of the arguments advanced by 
Thrasymachus in Republic Book 1.49 
Another example where Socrates and the respondents seem to be advancing 
contradictory theories can be found in Republic Book V where Socrates and the 
respondents agree that there would be male and female guardians in the ideal state. 
However, during the course of the enquiry in Book V, it becomes apparent to the 
reader that very few women would become guardians.&> This leaves the reader in 
doubt as to why Plato, through the character Socrates, made the point that women 
could aspire to become guardians in the first place. Another example can be found in 
Republic Book II, 369a-372e, where Socrates puts forward the case for a basic form 
of society which he claims to be the 'true one' (372e). Nevertheless, Socrates and 
the respondents reject this later in favour of the ideal state as considered in Book IV. 
49 The theories advanced by Thrasymachus in Republic Book I are considered in chapter 1 of this 
enquiry where it is argued that Thrasymachus has not been fully defeated by Socrates in the 
Republic as a whole. 
50 This issue is discussed in chapter 4 of this study. 
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Notably, this change in direction is prompted by an interruption from Glaucon where 
he complains about the basic form of society that Socrates is advancing. Glaucon 
argues 'that's just the fodder you would provide if you were founding a community of 
pigs' (372d). 
Socrates' use of illustration in Books VI and VII, as discussed in the earlier sections of 
this chapter, builds upon the use of illustration since the enquiry began. Examples of 
this include the passage in Book I where Socrates describes Thrasymachus as being 
like a 'wild beast' (336b), the story of Gyges' ring as outlined by Glaucon in Book II 
(359c-360d), and the illustration of Leontius looking at dead bodies in Book IV (43ge-
440a). The illustrations in Republic Books VI and VII also prepare the reader and 
audience for the images found later in the dialogue. Examples of these include the 
image of the many headed beast in Book IX (588c·e), and, importantly, the myth of 
Er as advanced by Socrates in Book X (613e-616a). The use of illustration in the 
Republic helps to give the wide·ranging work a sense of coherence.51 
Nevertheless, the use of illustration in the Republic can also make it difficult for the 
reader and audience to distinguish between fact and fiction with regard to the theories 
being outlined by Socrates and the respondents. Socrates uses this to his 
advantage at some pOints in the dialogue. An example of this is the simile of the sun. 
It is important to note that although this is introduced as a simile and Socrates admits 
that he cannot provide a description of the Form of the Good itself, he assumes the 
existence of the Form of the Good in the remainder of the dialogue and the 
respondents do not object to this assumption.52 
By Book VII of the Republic, the reader is left confused as to which method of 
enquiry Plato is promoting. During the course of the discussion so far, Socrates and 
the respondents have adopted three methods of enquiry, elenchus, display oration 
and dialectic. However, all three methods have proved to be problematic and they 
have not succeeded in providing a definitive answer to the challenge posed by 
Adeimantus in Book II, part 1. Adeimantus had challenged Socrates to 'Prove to us 
therefore, not only that justice is superior to injustice, but that, irrespective of whether 
51 Rutherford 1995, p. 216. 
52 Annas (1997, p. 145) observes that Socrates and the respondents do not provide suffiCient 
detail concerning the Forms before the Form of the Good is introduced in Republic Book VI. This 
leads her to accuse Plato, through the character Socrates, of assuming that the good is the Form of 
the Good. 
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gods or men know it or not, one is good and the other evil because of its inherent 
effects on its possessor' (367e). The elenchus exchanges in Book I ended with no 
firm conclusions being reached concerning the nature of justice. In Book II, Glaucon 
and Adeimantus adopted the display oration method to put forward convincing 
arguments in favour of the unjust life. However, it becomes apparent to the reader 
that Glaucon and Adeimantus do not agree with these theories. 
The change to the dialectic method of enquiry at 368a, Book II, enabled Socrates and 
the respondents to advance positive theories concerning the just state and soul. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, there are some problems associated with the 
dialectic method of enquiry which put doubt on the theories being advanced. Another 
ongoing concern with regard to the dialectic method of enquiry is the long periods 
when Glaucon and Adeimantus remain fairly silent.S3 Importantly, there appears to be 
a limit to what Socrates and the respondents can achieve in the dialectic exchange in 
the Republic, due to the abstract nature of the subjects that they are enquiring into. 
Socrates acknowledges this when they are discussing the dialectic method in Book 
VII. Socrates says to Glaucon 'you won't be able to follow me further, not because of 
any unwillingness on my part, but because what you'd see would no longer be an 
image of what we are talking about but the truth itself, that is, as I see it; one ought not 
at this point to claim certainty, though one can claim that there is something of the kind 
to see, don't you think' (533a). 
Conclusion 
In section 1 of this chapter, consideration was given to the interruption from 
Adeimantus at 487b and on the initial response to this from Socrates. In particular, the 
reader was surprised with the reaction from Socrates to this interruption, where he 
agreed with Adeimantus that philosophers are useless members of society. Section 
2 looked at the defence of the philosopher as outlined by Socrates. This gave 
Socrates an opportunity to discuss the level of knowledge that the philosopher would 
possess, as opposed to the contemporary political leaders. He also provided an 
explanation as to why the philosophers in contemporary society should not be 
a3 As discussed in the typology of key respondents in the introductory chapter of this study, at 
some of the pOints in the dialogue when the respondents remain silent for extended periods of 
time, the reader feels the need to take on the role of the respondent and to question the theories 
being outlined and what message Plato is trying to convey. 
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blamed for their current predicament. Section 3 considered the simile of the sun, the 
image of the line and the allegory of the cave. This brought to light Socrates' reliance 
on the use of illustration to provide an account of the Form of the Good. Section 4 
focused on some wider issues concerning the interruption from Adeimantus in early 
Book VI and how this related to the Republic overall. This alerted the reader to a 
number of problems associated with the dialectic method of enquiry. 
The interruption from Adeimantus at 487b, together with Glaucon's reaction to 'wave 
three' at 473e-474a, had a strong impact on the enquiry. This forced Socrates to 
provide further justification for the thesis that philosophers should be put in charge in 
the ideal state. The three waves in Book V give the impression of Socrates and the 
respondents swimming together to survive each wave. Indeed, this appears to be a 
metaphor for the dialectic method of enquiry in the Republic. It would seem that each 
time Socrates and the respondents advance positive theories in the enquiry, they are 
put in a situation where it becomes necessary for them to give further consideration to 
these theories. This is usually prompted by an interruption from Glaucon or 
Adeimantus. Here, unlike the elenchus and display oration methods, the dialectic 
method of enquiry is being portrayed as a co-operative method. However, the 
dialectic method of enquiry in Books VI and VII is resulting in a number of 
unsubstantiated theories being advanced by Socrates, for example, the existence of 
the Form of the Good. The reader is left unconvinced that Glaucon and Adeimantus 
are in full agreement with Socrates concerning these theories. 
At the end of the section of the Republic discussed in this chapter, the reader is left 
with the impression that Plato did not expect the reader to be fully convinced of the 
theories outlined by Socrates and the respondents. Nevertheless, Plato has given 
an impressive defence of the philosopher and of philosophy. 
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Conclusion 
One could spend a lifetime studying the Republic and the other works of Plato and still 
only gain a tiny grasp of what Plato was attempting to achieve in writing these works. 
I have chosen the title of this study deliberately to highlight the fact that, although the 
reader feels that he or she is engaging directly with the respondents in the Republic, 
one is really engaging with the author Plato who has created these lifelike characters. 
This study has attempted to gain an insight into what message or messages Plato 
may have wished to convey in the discussions between Socrates and the 
respondents in the Republic and Socrates' response to the interruptions from the 
respondents. That is, if assuming a 'message' is the correct way to approach the 
Republic. I acknowledge that it is not possible to determine with certainty what Plato 
wished to communicate, due to the complex nature of his style of presentation and 
the fact that he does not feature in the dialogues. However, through a detailed study 
of the Republic, I have attempted to gain a deeper understanding of this work and 
have put forward some observations concerning what Plato may have wished to 
convey to the reader. I have also attempted to question in detail the widely held view 
that the major significance of Socrates' respondents ends with Book I. 
While it would have been interesting to carry out a detailed commentary on each of 
the Books of the Republic, this was not the purpose of this enquiry. It would also 
have been beyond the scope of this study. In this enquiry, I have focused on Book I, 
early Book II, and Books IV, V, VI and VII of the Republic. This is because these 
Books contain the most significant input from the respondents and the respondents 
playa more dramatic role in these Books. However, this is not to suggest that the 
issues discussed by Socrates and the respondents in the other Books of the 
Republic and in particular Book II, 368a onwards, Books Ill, VIII and IX are of less 
importance. In Books II and III Socrates advances cOntroversial theories concerning 
the censorship of poetry in the ideal state. In Books VIII and IX Socrates describes 
the deterioration of the ideal state and soul. 
The Republic is a complex work to study. Plato adopts three methods of enqUiry: 
elenchus, display oration and dialectic. The work is presented in dialogue form. Plato 
also makes use of story, image and myth in the course of the Republic. The dialogue 
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covers a wide range of topics including: morality, social structure, education, the nature 
of reality and politics in the overall enquiry into a just state and just soul. Book I ends in 
aporia or deadlock, following a heated elenchus exchange between Thrasymachus 
and Socrates with Thrasymachus speaking out in favour of injustice and Socrates 
defending justice. In early Book II, Glaucon and Adeimantus are depicted as devil's 
advocates providing speeches which favour injustice and they challenge Socrates to 
advance a positive theory of justice. 
In the dialectic method of enquiry from Book II, 368a onwards, the respondents 
Glaucon and Adeimantus continue to play an important role. In this part of the 
Republic, Socrates provides positive theories, with the support of the respondents, 
only for some of these theories to be undermined later in the dialogue. The 
respondents playa key role in raising problems concerning these theories and in 
forcing Socrates to provide further detail concerning some of these issues. 
For example, in Book IV, Socrates puts forward the tripartite state and soul. 
However, in Books VIII and IX Socrates gives a detailed account of the deterioration 
of the ideal state Into a tyranny. The discussion of the deterioration of the ideal state is 
prompted by Glaucon at the beginning of Book VIII, 543c-544b, where he notes that 
Socrates had raised this issue at the end of Book IV but then moved on to discuss 
the Issue of women and the family in the ideal state. At the end of Book IX, 592a-b, 
Socrates and Glaucon speculate on whether the ideal state would be possible and 
whether its deterioration would be inevitable. 
At the beginning of Book V, 449b-450a, Adeimantus interrupts and insists that 
Socrates provide more detail concerning women and the family in the ideal state. This 
is an Issue that Socrates had tried to avoid. This results in Socrates changing the 
direction of the enquiry and giving a detailed account of women and the family in the 
guardian and auxiliary classes, which takes up most of Book V. 
In early Book VI, 487b-d, there is a dramatic interruption from Adeimantus in which he 
appears to critiCise the method of enquiry adopted by Socrates in the Republic. He 
also criticises the philosophers in contemporary society. Adeimantus proceeds to 
observe that the majority of philosophers are useless members of society. This is in 
response to Socrates' assertion at 473d that philosophers should rule in the ideal 
172 
state. This interruption from Adeimantus results in Socrates providing a detailed 
defence of the philosopher and the knowledge that the philosopher ruler would 
aspire to gain in the ideal state, which continues to the end of Book VII. 
These interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus alert the reader to considerable 
practical problems associated with the theories advanced by Socrates in the dialectic 
enquiry in the Republic. The reader's concern is increased by the doubt in his ability 
that Socrates expresses at regular intervals, sometimes ironically, in the dialogue. It is 
not always easy to interpret whether Plato intends Socrates to be ironic or not. This is 
a complicated way for Plato to present theories to the reader. It can leave readers 
confused as to whether Plato expected them to be convinced of the theories 
provided by Socrates in the dialectic enquiry and also whether Plato fully supported 
these theories. 
Another complication is that in the dialectic method of enquiry the input from the 
respondents is not distributed evenly. In some Books of the Republic they make 
dramatic entries whilst in other Books they remain fairly silent as 'yes men' for 
extended periods of time and in particular Books II, III, VIII and IX. It is difficult for the 
modern reader to understand why the respondents are depicted as being more 
upset about the issue of women and the family, as raised in Book V, and the other 
issues raised by the respondents, than the censorship of poetry in the ideal state, as 
discussed by Socrates In Books II, III and X. All these issues seem controversial to 
the contemporary reader, although it may have been different for readers in Plato's 
time. For example, ancient perceptions of the meaning and significance of poetry and 
art may have been very different from our modern ideas. 
One theory may be that the enquiry is designed in this way to encourage the reader 
to take on the role of the respondent at the points in the dialogue when the 
respondents remain fairly silent and to reflect upon the theories being advanced by 
Socrates. Another possible explanation is that the issues raised by the respondents 
as noted above are more fundamental to the establishment of the ideal state than the 
censorship of poetry and that this is why the respondents pick up Socrates on these 
matters. Also, there may be a cumulative effect being dramatised up to the 
beginning of Book VIII of the Republic with the respondents' concern about what is 
being put forward by Socrates overall building up in the course of the dialectic 
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enquiry. 
Significantly, if the respondents were to interrupt constantly in the enquiry, it would not 
be possible for Socrates to advance any substantial theories. A weakness of the 
elenchus exchanges in Book I was that they did not enable Socrates to advance any 
positive theories concerning justice. However, an opposite weakness of the dialectic 
method of enquiry from Book II, 368a onwards, is that it does not allow for continual 
opposition from the respondents. 
A further confusion with the dialectic enquiry is that despite the lengthy discussion of 
the deterioration of the ideal state and soul in Books VIII and IX, which ends with 
Socrates and Glaucon admitting that the ideal state would not become a reality on 
earth (592a-b), Socrates proceeds to enquire into the theory of Art in Book X and he 
appears to assume the existence of the ideal state. He also assumes the existence 
of the theory of the Forms, which had not been fully established in the dialectic enquiry 
as, understandably, Socrates was only able to provide a description of the Child of 
the Good rather than the Form of the Good itself (507a-509c). So, in the end, the 
Republic raises as many questions as it answers for the reader. 
A. What I claim to have shown in my study 
1. That the view held by many commentators, as stated in the introductory chapter, 
that after Book I of the Republic the respondents cease to be active and become 
simply 'yes men' does not present a complete picture of what is happening in the 
dialogue. While there are clear distinctions between Book I and early Book II and the 
rest of the Republic in terms of dramatic structure and behaviour of the respondents, it 
is demonstrable that the respondents remain important both philosophically and 
dramatically. 
2. That the philosophical and dramatic role of the respondents cannot really be 
separated. Examples of this include: 
i. Plato staging a dramatic link between breakdown in Book I, assertive respondents 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, early Book II, speeches by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus and Book II, 368a onwards, Socrates' attempt to answer. Arguably this 
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represents Plato exploring the issues. 
ii. Decisive interventions from Adeimantus and Glaucon in Books V, VI and VIII, as 
outlined above. These occur at crucial points in the philosophical argument and 
underline particular philosophical difficulties. 
iii. Major images and Myth of Er; Socrates anticipating problems in reception of ideas 
by the respondents, by using images and in the case of the Sun/Form of the Good 
and Myth of Er, unable to express these theories in any other way. 
So this much is clear - that the thread of argument in the Republic is far from 
straightforward and linear, and the respondents are to a major extent responsible for 
or a reflection of this. 
B. So what might be the overall significance of the role given to the respondents by 
Plato in the context of his own composition? This section is by its nature more 
speculative than section A above. 
1. Simple ornamentation. Self-evidently not the case as discussed in A above. 
2. Gaining and maintaining the attention of the reader and listener. Perhaps the 
audience is to be encouraged to identify with the respondents, that is, the dramatic 
structure is essentially a teaching device, encouraging the audience to identify their 
problems with those stated by the respondents. There does appear to be 
something in this but the interruptions from the respondents are not evenly spread 
throughout the dialectic enquiry. 
3. Plato working things out in his own mind; so the problems are not just those of his 
less expert audience in understanding but also perhaps his own problems as well. 
The interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus as noted above are important for this 
as they raise problems concerning the theories being advanced and at points change 
the direction of the enqUiry. 
4. The dramatic structure and the role of the respondents suggest that Plato is 
consciously expressing his own doubt about the ideas expressed, that is, 
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problematising. We are not necessarily to assume that he has finally worked things 
out and for him the problems remain ongoing. Notably, at the end of Book IX, 592a-
b, Socrates admits that the ideal state is unlikely ever to exist on earth. 
5. Whilst, 4 above is a possibility, in my view the answer lies somewhere between 3 
and 4, rather than 2. While the interruptions from Glaucon and Adeimantus in the 
dialectic enquiry and the expressions of hesitation and doubt by Socrates might 
reflect Plato himself, we cannot be sure that this is always the case. I do see the 
respondents and Socrates' reaction to them as reflecting something in Plato's actual 
thought-process, rather than Plato simply using Glaucon and Adeimantus as a 
'teaching device'. 
Plato's unique style of presentation has made it difficult for scholars in the past and 
present to gain a clear understanding of Plato and his dialogues. Indeed, Aristotle, in 
his Poetics (2, 1447b11), notes the difficulty of categorising the style of presentation 
adopted by the writers of Socratic dialogues, induding Plato. In particular, it is hard to 
determine what message Plato seeks to convey in his works, or according to some, 
whether he intended to put forward a message at all. Importantly, despite the unique 
challenges of interpretation associated with the works of Plato, the Republic and 
Plato's other works remain relevant to and capture the interest of the modern day 
reader in the same way that they have engaged numerous scholars in the past. 
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